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ABSTRACT 
  Two decades ago, Professor Richard Epstein fired a shot at the 
administrative state that has gone largely unanswered in legal 
scholarship. His target was the “permit power,” under which 
legislatures prohibit a specified activity by statute and delegate to 
administrative agencies the discretionary power to authorize the 
activity under terms the agency mandates in a regulatory permit. 
Accurately describing the permit power as an “enormous power in the 
state,” Epstein bemoaned that it had “received scant attention in the 
academic literature.” He sought to fill that gap. Centered on the 
premise that the permit power represents “a complete inversion of the 
proper distribution of power within a legal system,” Epstein launched 
a scathing critique of regulatory permitting in operation, condemning 
it as a “racket” for administrative abuses and excesses. 
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  Epstein’s assessment of the permit power was and remains 
accurate in three respects: it is vast in scope, it is ripe for 
administrative abuse, and it has been largely ignored in legal 
scholarship. The problem is that, beyond what he got right about the 
permit power, most of Epstein’s critique was based on an incomplete 
caricature of permitting in theory and practice. 
  This Article is the first to return comprehensively to the permit 
power since Epstein’s critique, offering a deep account of the theory 
and practice of regulatory permits in the administrative state. This 
Article opens by defining the various types of regulatory permits and 
describing the scope of permitting in the regulatory state. From there it 
compares different permit design approaches and explores the 
advantages of general permits, including their ability to mitigate many 
of the concerns Epstein advanced. This Article then applies a 
theoretical model to environmental degradation problems and 
concludes that if certain conditions are met, general permits can 
effectively respond to many of the complex policy problems of the 
future. Finally, this Article adds to the scholarship initiated by Epstein 
by proposing a set of default rules and exceptions for permit design 
and suggesting how they apply to complex policy problems. 
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  This is a racket (no lesser word will do) . . . .1 
  – Richard A. Epstein, The Permit Power Meets the Constitution 
INTRODUCTION 
Every law student eventually encounters the classic statutory 
interpretation puzzle: “No vehicles allowed in the park.”2 The 
exercise is designed to lead to questions such as whether the 
legislature really meant no vehicles, of any kind, ever. If so, could the 
legislature have been more emphatic and said something like 
“absolutely no vehicles of any kind ever allowed in the park under 
any circumstances”? Recognizing that it would be nonsensical not to 
allow, say, a fire truck into the park to stop the merry-go-round from 
burning down, would it help for the legislature to add something like 
“except fire trucks, ambulances, and law enforcement vehicles”?3 
Although statutory language making a prohibition unequivocal or 
listing exemptions might clarify legislative intent, the puzzle reveals 
that administration of the statute must of necessity rely on iterations 
 
 1. Richard A. Epstein, The Permit Power Meets the Constitution, 81 IOWA L. REV. 407, 
416 (1995). 
 2. The American Bar Association describes the “no vehicles in the park” hypothetical as 
“a classic of law-related education” and suggests judges use it to educate people about what is 
involved in judicial interpretation of statutes. Am. Bar Ass’n, No Vehicles in the Park, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/initiatives_awards/constitution_day/
lessons/lessons_1/no_vehicles.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2014). 
 3. For discussion of the inevitability of exemptions to rules that prohibit or regulate 
activity, see generally Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Equity: An Analysis of Exceptions to 
Administrative Rules, 1982 DUKE L.J. 277 (1982); Peter H. Schuck, When the Exception 
Becomes the Rule: Regulatory Equity and the Formulation of Energy Policy Through an 
Exceptions Process, 1984 DUKE L.J. 163 (1984).  
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of judicial interpretation and legislative revision. A court might hold, 
for example, that a child’s electric tricycle is not a vehicle, and if the 
legislature disagrees it must amend the statute. 
An alternative approach, common in the modern administrative 
state,4 is for the legislature to enlist an administrative agency and 
specify something like “no vehicles in the park, except as allowed in a 
permit issued by the park agency pursuant to park agency rules.” 
Although such legislation does not avoid questions of statutory 
interpretation—we still need to know whether a child’s electric 
tricycle is a vehicle—the provision for a park agency permit opens the 
door to the innumerable theoretical and practical dimensions of 
administrative law. 
For example, administrative law scholars would eagerly engage 
theoretical questions about the power of the agency to define the 
term “vehicle” in rules, the agency’s policy for how to define them, 
whether courts should defer to the agency’s definition, how judicial 
review ossifies the park agency, and whether certain vehicle industry 
or park advocacy interests have captured the agency.5 Furthermore, 
practitioners representing various interest groups would likely engage 
in drafting comments on park agency rules regarding vehicle permits, 
challenge park agency permit rules and other actions in court, and 
represent parties in park agency enforcement proceedings. 
Ironically, however, one of the most under-theorized questions 
in administrative law is the lynchpin of these theoretical problems and 
of utmost practical importance to administrative law practitioners: 
 
 4. The term “administrative state” is traced to political scientist Dwight Waldo’s epic 
book published in 1948. See DWIGHT WALDO, THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: A STUDY OF THE 
POLITICAL THEORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (1948). Although there is no 
universally recognized definition, for our purposes the administrative state’s most important 
attribute is reliance on administrative agencies for law making and decisionmaking—that is, a 
system of governance relying on legislative delegation of discretionary authority to 
administrative agencies led by unelected officials appointed by the elected executive and 
exercising that authority through rules, adjudications, permits, and other mechanisms. Agencies 
fitting this description have existed in our federal system since it was founded. See generally 
JERRY MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE 
HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012). We refer to the modern 
administrative state to reflect the proliferation of this model of governance throughout federal, 
state, and local governments in the twentieth century with increasing involvement by the courts 
in policing agency action through judicial review. See id. at 1–27.  
 5. See JACK M. BEERMAN, INSIDE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: WHAT MATTERS AND WHY 
1–2 (2011) (describing what administrative law encompasses and its focus on “sources of agency 
power, the constitutional limits on that power, the procedural requirements for the exercise of 
agency power, and the availability and scope of judicial review of agency action”). 
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continuing with the park scenario, how should the legislature and the 
park agency design the agency’s permits? Administrative permits are 
ubiquitous in modern society. Thousands of local, state, and federal 
agencies have a hand in administering a vast system of permits 
ranging from mundane building permits to permits covering the 
operation of sprawling industrial facilities.6 Plans for everything from 
a backyard deck to an interstate highway are swept up in this 
permitting system, and there is no hope of moving forward on them 
without having the necessary agency permits in hand. The vast 
breadth and depth of permitting in modern American society has 
even captured the Supreme Court’s attention on several occasions.7 
Yet, as Professor Richard Epstein pointed out in the mid-1990s, 
despite being the “focal point of enormous public discontent,” the 
permitting system “has received scant attention in the academic 
literature.”8 His observation is no less true today.9 
Epstein expressed deep concerns with what he called the “permit 
power,” the root attribute of which is its reversal of “the classical 
American view . . . that all that is not prohibited is permitted, which 
sets the initial presumption in favor of liberty—not in favor of 
government action.”10 Although he did not advocate a “permit-free 
society,”11 Epstein dwelled at length on the sharp contrast between 
the tort system and its injunction remedy, which requires the party 
claiming injury to prove its case before a court will prohibit continued 
harm,12 and the permit system, under which “the individual citizen 
becomes a supplicant before the government in all cases, whether or 
not any real threat of harm exists.”13 When legislatures  
change the default rule from “permitted-until-judicially-prohibited”  
to “legislatively-prohibited-until-administratively-permitted,” they 
create an “enormous power in the state”14 that in Epstein’s view, 
 
 6. For some dazzling statistics on the variety and number of regulatory permits by which 
America is inundated, see infra Part I.B. 
 7. See, e.g., Util. Air Reg. Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2439–49 (2014) (discussing the 
attributes of air pollution permitting); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 721 (2007) 
(discussing the attributes of water pollution permitting). 
 8. Epstein, supra note 1, at 407. 
 9. For a survey of the minimal coverage the permit power has received in legal 
scholarship, see infra Part I.B. 
 10. Epstein, supra note 1, at 407. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 409–12. 
 13. Id. at 412. 
 14. Id. at 413. 
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“results in a complete inversion of the proper distribution of power 
within a legal system.”15 The shift in the locus of power from courts to 
agencies, Epstein warned, turns the fate of much of the public and 
private affairs of the nation over to “specialized bodies which often 
have a strong ideological position on the issues that come before 
them time after time.”16 
Epstein described the potential for agency abuse of the permit 
power in ominous terms. Given what he claimed to be the “utter lack 
of substantive standards by which permits can be denied,” he 
portrayed the permit power as “a stranglehold on individual 
behavior” repugnant to basic principles of due process of law.17 He 
warned that agencies, whose “ostensible expertise . . . is little more 
than a pretext for a strong one-sided commitment,”18 would inevitably 
entrench and abuse the permit power by promulgating elaborate sets 
of administrative procedures, imposing onerous conditions for the 
granting of a permit, manufacturing excuses for delay, retaining the 
power to revise or terminate permits virtually at will, adopting 
amorphous substantive standards that justify any outcome the agency 
prefers, and piling up the need to obtain multiple permits for the most 
mundane of activities.19 His bottom line: “[t]his is a racket (no lesser 
word will do).”20 
Really? Is the permit power that bad? To be sure, the permit 
power is at its core about legislatures demanding that public and 
private actors seek permission from administrative agencies before 
they engage in proscribed activities. If that is enough for one to 
condemn the permit power, there is nothing more to say—Epstein 
wins the day. But Epstein based the weight of his critique on how 
agencies will actually exercise the permit power, not merely its 
existence, and thus must ground his argument in the reality of permit 
power practice. For this purpose, however, he employed a caricature 
of permitting that bears little resemblance to permitting in action 
today. This is not to say that the parade of horrors Epstein postulated 
cannot happen—like any government power, the permit power must 
be closely monitored—but the reality is that the permitting system 
 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 416–17. 
 18. Id. at 413. 
 19. See id. at 415–17. 
 20. Id. at 416. 
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has evolved into a far more flexible, nuanced, and innovative 
institution in the modern administrative state than Epstein’s dismal 
vision would suggest is possible.21 
No doubt agencies abuse the permit power in specific cases and 
there is room for improvement in the permitting system as a whole, 
but the actual experience of permitting as practiced by agencies is rich 
with evidence that the problems motivating Epstein’s pessimistic 
assessment are neither inevitable nor insurmountable. The question 
Epstein’s critique raises, therefore, is not as much whether to employ 
the permit power as an instrument of public policy, but how to design 
permits so as to avoid falling into the traps he identified as reason to 
pull back from the permit power in general. As Epstein articulated: 
“we cannot (and should not) strive for a permit-free society.”22 But his 
concession inevitably leads one to ponder what the numerical limit of 
permits should be and what form these permits should take. 
On this query, Epstein offered few clues, and administrative law 
scholars in general have failed to engage these questions. Epstein 
proposed a “modest reformation of the law of permits”23 that would 
limit the universe of government permits to those contexts in which 
“some permissible justification exists that would allow the 
government entity to obtain injunctive relief, subject to the same 
limitations that are routinely applied to private plaintiffs.”24 Under his 
scheme, in other words, the scope of the permit power would be 
defined by the scope of private injunction law. This seems a modest 
proposal only in that it takes few words to describe the simple rule for 
a complex world.25 Epstein predicted this approach would “isolate 
thousands of . . . instances of the permit power that should be 
consigned to relative oblivion.”26 Still, there would be some permits. 
And more realistically, it is probably safe to assume that Epstein’s 
proposal, which has gained no traction since he launched it, likely 
 
 21. For this account, see infra Part I. 
 22. Epstein, supra note 1, at 407. 
 23. Id. at 422. 
 24. Id. at 421–22. 
 25. Our language is a reference to Richard Epstein’s book. See RICHARD EPSTEIN, SIMPLE 
RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1997). 
 26. Epstein, supra note 1, at 422. It is beyond the scope of this Article to evaluate Epstein’s 
prediction that his harm-based rule would largely eviscerate the scope of permitting in modern 
society. We point out, however, that many permitting regimes, such as those authorizing water 
and air pollution and waste disposal, regulate types of harms that could fall well within judicial 
injunction powers, and these permitting regimes thus would remain on the books under 
Epstein’s rule.  
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never will come to be. So there will continue to be lots of permits. 
What should they look like? 
This Article is the first to develop a comprehensive theory of 
regulatory permit design. Some permitting programs are designed 
around the agency engaging in extensive fact gathering and 
deliberation particular to the individual circumstances of an 
applicant’s proposed action, after which the agency issues a detailed 
permit tailored just to that applicant’s situation. These are referred to 
herein as “specific permits.”27 Other programs have the agency issue a 
permit on its own initiative, with no particular applicant before it, that 
defines a broad category of activity and allows the entities engaging in 
that activity to take advantage of the permit with little or no effort on 
their part, and limited agency review of specific facts in any particular 
case unless the agency finds good cause to condition or withdraw the 
general approval. These are referred to herein as “general permits.”28 
Across the hundreds of permitting programs in federal, state, and 
local regulatory authorities, we would expect to find a spectrum of 
approaches from extreme specific permit design to extreme general 
permit design. Our question of interest is where on this spectrum a 
particular permitting program should fall given its policy goals, 
practical implementation context, and background concerns with the 
permit power. 
Indeed, a gaping omission from Professor Epstein’s critique of 
the permit power is the idea that there is a spectrum across which 
permits can be so flexibly designed. In particular, general permits 
have become the dominant permit model in many fields of 
regulation.29 Their core feature—the agency’s issuance of a permit in 
advance to authorize an activity generally, while retaining the power 
to withdraw the general approval in specific cases—responds to 
Epstein’s central complaint that the permit power flips the proper 
order of governance on its head. True enough, specific permits follow 
the “legislatively-prohibited-until-administratively-permitted” model 
Epstein finds so unappealing. But general permits follow a model 
Epstein did not include in his critique—the “administratively-
approved-unless-administratively-prohibited” model. Although not 
 
 27. For the details of specific permitting, see infra Part I.C. This kind of permit is also 
referred to as an “individual permit.” Id. 
 28. For the details of general permitting, see infra Part I.C. The term “general permit” is 
widely used to describe this kind of permit. Id. 
 29. See infra Part II.C–D. 
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fully restoring matters to his ideal model of “permitted-until-
judicially-prohibited,” general permits offer the permitting power an 
option Epstein did not consider and that we believe can respond to 
many of his concerns. 
By no means, however, are we suggesting that concerns about 
the permit power are trivial or that general permits obviate them 
entirely. Permitting unquestionably is an enormous enterprise of the 
administrative state. Hundreds of statutes spanning a wide range of 
different regulatory fields authorize federal, state, and local 
administrative agencies to establish and operate permitting programs 
taking up vast time and financial resources of agencies, regulated 
entities, and other interests.30 Permit design choices thus are vitally 
important to effective, efficient, and equitable administration of 
agency authorities.31 No doubt the permit power can be arbitrarily 
administered and abused, but even a responsibly administered permit 
program can impose substantial costs on public and private actors.32 
And even if a permit program can be delivered with low costs, a 
poorly designed program, regardless of whether it employs specific or 
general permits, can thwart public policy goals and unnecessarily 
impede private enterprise.33 
There are also good reasons to believe permit design will be of 
increasing importance as new kinds of regulatory programs are 
quickly emerging around looming problems such as climate change, 
biodiversity loss, and globalized trade, and these problems’ broad and 
diverse sets of environmental, economic, and social harms.34 A 
coherent theory of regulatory permit design thus is not only long 
overdue, but urgently needed. 
To build such a theoretical foundation for regulatory permit 
design, we start in Part I by positioning regulatory permits within the 
 
 30. For examples, see infra Part I.B. 
 31. For an examination of permit design options and their consequences, see infra Part II.  
 32. For example, the costs of obtaining and complying with the federal Clean Water Act’s 
permitting program, which regulates placement of fill material in navigable waters and wetlands, 
have been estimated to exceed $1 billion annually. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 
721 (2007) (discussing attributes of the permitting program). 
 33. Residential-solar-power-panel installers, for example, point to complex state and local 
permitting requirements as adding unnecessary expense and posing significant obstacles to 
widespread adoption of residential solar power. See More Than a Third of U.S. Solar Installers 
Say Permit Requirements Limit Growth, CLEAN POWER FINANCE, 
http://www.cleanpowerfinance.com/about-us/media-center/press-release/more-than-a-third-of-
u-s-solar-installers-say-permitting-requirements-limit-growth (last visited Sept. 23, 2014). 
 34. See infra Part III. 
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administrative state. We define what a regulatory permit is, outline 
the scope and scale of permitting in the regulatory state, and explain 
the different types and characteristics of permits. Part II compares the 
pros and cons of the specific permit and general permit approaches, 
and models the conditions under which general permitting is most 
likely to offer significant advantages over specific permitting, 
including mitigating many of Epstein’s concerns. Using examples 
from a variety of contexts, Part III applies the theoretical model built 
in Parts I and II in concrete policy settings, concluding that general 
permits, if carefully designed and administered, could be deployed 
and used to effectively respond to many of the complex policy 
problems looming in the future. We close by proposing a set of 
default rules and exceptions for permit design and suggesting how 
they apply to such problems. 
Before we move on, however, it is important for us to emphasize 
the scope and limitations of this Article’s project. First, it is not our 
goal to respond point-by-point to Professor Epstein’s critique of the 
permit power. Rather, our premise is that a reasoned debate about 
the permit power requires a robust account of its central medium for 
exercising the power—permits. Our primary objective, therefore, is to 
provide that account. Second, we acknowledge that the permit power 
is but one of many powers available to the administrative state, 
including taxes, penalties, regulatory standards, exemptions, 
incentives, and monitoring. A comprehensive assessment of how the 
permit power compares to these other powers and how the 
mechanisms behind issuing permits compare to those of other powers 
is beyond the scope of this work. Rather, given how little attention 
legal scholars have paid to the permit power, our main objective is to 
articulate the theory and practice of permitting so that such 
comparisons can begin to be made on deeper levels than they have 
been. Finally, given how expansive the permit power has become, and 
how much variety there is in permitting designs, we cannot cover the 
entire landscape of permitting. Topics such as enforcement, public 
participation, permit terms, amendment and revocation procedures, 
inspections and monitoring, and judicial review deserve more 
attention than we can give here. Hence, we focus on what we believe 
is the most important feature of permitting design—choosing where 
to land on the spectrum between general and specific permits. This 
choice drives most of the remaining decisions that matter in 
permitting. 
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I.  THE PRACTICAL DIMENSIONS OF REGULATORY PERMITS 
To reach an informed assessment of the nature, scope, and 
impact of the permit power, one should have a robust account of what 
distinguishes it from other government regulatory instruments, such 
as fines, inspections, and taxes. It thus strikes us as useful to start by 
unpacking the features of the permit power’s distinct delivery mode—
permits. It is, after all, the permit power. 
Yet for all his worrying about the permit power, Epstein had 
little to say about permits. His postulated world of permit power 
abuses included only fleeting references to the permits involved. His 
permit examples—drawn mostly from zoning, building codes, and 
environmental regulations35—served merely as the medium for his 
critique of the permit power. We learn almost nothing about the 
permits themselves, except that they were the channels for abuse of 
power. What forms did they take? What were their terms? What were 
their procedures and conditions? From Epstein’s examples, we get 
very few of these details; instead, we get horror stories, such as a fire 
department’s conditions for school doors leading to disrupted 
classrooms,36 and tales of a local planning commission’s excessive land 
use exactions.37 To be sure, the permit power can be carried too far in 
some cases, leading to abusive agency practices, but by cherry-picking 
from the annals of permitting-gone-bad, Epstein set up a straw man, a 
caricature designed to make the permit power look more ominous in 
theory than it must necessarily be and more abused in practice than it 
is in fact. Hence, in revisiting the permit power, we start at the 
beginning. 
A. What Are Permits? 
Exactly what constitutes a regulatory permit in the 
administrative state is not self-evident. For example, the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)38 refers to permits only once—
including the term “permit” in the definition of a “license.”39 A 
license is one form of “agency action,” which includes “the whole or a 
part of any agency rule, order, license, sanction, [or] relief.”40 One 
 
 35. See generally Epstein, supra note 1. 
 36. See id. at 416. 
 37. See id. at 419–21. 
 38. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2012).  
 39. 5 U.S.C. § 551(8). 
 40. Id. § 551(13). 
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might reasonably conclude that because permits are included only 
under the definition of licenses, they are thus neither a part of nor the 
result of a rule, order, sanction, or relief. But this conclusion turns out 
not to be accurate, as the term “order” is defined in the APA to 
include the act of licensing;41 the term “sanction” includes the 
“requirement, revocation, or suspension of a license;”42 the term 
“relief” includes the “grant of . . . [a] license[;]”43 and the term “rule” 
includes certain kinds of “approval.”44 Agencies issue orders through 
“adjudication”45 and issue rules through “rule making.”46 Hence, given 
that permits are one form of licenses, in theory an agency could 
engage in adjudication to issue an order to grant a permit, issue a 
sanction to revoke or suspend a permit, or grant relief to issue a 
permit; or an agency could engage in a rule making to issue a rule 
establishing an approval of a permit. All of these actions could be 
described as acts of permitting. But what is a permit? All that can be 
extracted from the APA on that score is from the definition of 
license, which, in addition to agency permits, includes “the whole or 
part of an agency . . . certificate, approval, registration, charter, 
membership, statutory exemption or other form of permission.”47 
The APA’s structure of agency actions, although convoluted, 
thus provides several core concepts for further articulation of 
regulatory permits consistent with this catch-all “form-of-permission” 
concept. First, permits are a type of statutorily authorized 
discretionary agency action. Which type of agency action they are is 
not entirely clear from the APA—it seems that permits can take 
several forms.48 But there is no room for doubt that, however issued, 
permits are administrative actions rather than actions of legislatures 
or courts, and that there is some degree of discretion involved in how 
the agency acts. Second, permits are a “form of permission.”49 The 
APA does not specify how permits differ from the other forms of 
permission included in the definition of license. It is clear, however, 
that a permit must involve some process and standards for an agency 
 
 41. Id. § 551(6). 
 42. Id. § 551(10)(F). 
 43. Id. § 551(11)(A). 
 44. Id. § 551(4). 
 45. Id. § 551(7). 
 46. Id. § 551(5). 
 47. Id. § 551(8) (emphasis added). 
 48. See infra Part I.C. 
 49. 5 U.S.C. § 551(8). 
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to grant (or deny) permission to a regulated entity to engage in what 
would otherwise be a statutorily restricted activity. Third, permits 
must fit into a broader range of agency and legislative regulatory 
measures spanning from unconditional exemption from regulation, in 
which case no permission is needed, to unconditional prohibition of 
approval, in which case no permission can be obtained. Finally, 
permits, as a form of administrative rulemaking or adjudication under 
the APA, are subject to the APA’s rules of judicial review.50 
These four features allow us to situate permits in a broader 
spectrum of forms-of-permission models represented in the following 
table comparing five combinations of the baseline rules regarding 
whether permission is needed and available, the institutional modes 
for implementing the baseline rules, the forms the permission (or 
nonpermission) can take, and the availability of APA judicial review 
(or a state equivalent). 
Table 1. Permits as a Form of Permission 
Rule 
 
No Permission Needed 
Permission 
Required 
No Permission Allowed 
Mode 
 
Legislative Administrative Legislative 
Form Statutory 
Exemption 
Regulatory 
Exemption 
PERMITS 
Regulatory 
Prohibition 
Statutory 
Prohibition 
Review 
 
Non-APA APA APA APA Non-APA 
 
We defer for later the question of why a legislature or agency 
would opt for one or another of these permission models. For now we 
are only sorting out their differences for a better understanding of 
what lies within the “permits box.” We also recognize that the entire 
category of forms-of-permission regulatory instruments fits within a 
larger universe of regulatory delivery options including fines, taxes, 
standards, subsidies, inspections, monitoring, reporting, and a host of 
others. Many times a combination of instruments, including or not 
including one of the forms of permission, is deployed. Hence there is 
something to be learned about permits by comparing them to, say, 
taxes. But we believe the appropriate starting point for learning about 
permits comes from first comparing them to their closest cousins, 
 
 50. Id. §§ 701–706. 
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exemptions and prohibitions, and then comparing the variations that 
fit within the permit box itself. 
Taking the forms-of-permissions comparison first, at one end of 
the forms-of-permission spectrum shown in Table 1 is the statutory 
exemption: a legislatively specified activity that is excluded from the 
need to obtain permission from the agency under the statutory 
regime. A statutory exemption could be explicit or implied, and its 
scope could be subject to agency and judicial interpretation. Once 
defined, a statutory exemption serves as the form of permission and 
thus removes the specified activity from the need to take any 
additional steps to establish compliance with the law. A regulatory 
exemption accomplishes the same outcome, but it is specified by the 
agency pursuant to a legislative delegation of authority. At the other 
end of the spectrum lie prohibitions: the statutory prohibition is a 
legislatively specified activity not eligible for permission, and a 
regulatory prohibition is an activity the agency has, pursuant to 
legislatively delegated authority, excluded from eligibility for 
permission. This leaves permits occupying the middle ground, where 
a statute authorizes an agency to grant permission to a proposed 
activity—an activity that would otherwise be prohibited—and some 
degree of discretion over the process and standards used to grant that 
form of permission. 
Distilled to its essence, therefore, a permit can be defined as: an 
administrative agency’s statutorily authorized, discretionary, 
judicially reviewable granting of permission to do that which would 
otherwise be statutorily prohibited. We intend this definition to be 
both formal and functional. The definition demands that the act of 
permitting (1) be explicitly delegated or implied by statute, (2) 
administrative, (3) discretionary, and (4) judicially reviewable, and 
that (5) it provide an affirmative grant of permission (6) allowing an 
act that would be otherwise statutorily prohibited. Regardless of what 
a form of permission is called—permit, license, certificate, exemption, 
or something similar—all six elements must be satisfied for it to be a 
permit, and if all six elements are satisfied, it is a permit. 
Consider the role of discretion. If a statute specifies all the 
qualifications (such as age or residency) that are needed for 
permission to perform an act (such as hunting or driving), leaving it 
solely to the agency to “check off the boxes” for an applicant to 
receive permission to perform the act, there is no permit because the 
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agency has no discretion to exercise regarding its issuance.51 If, 
however, the statute leaves some judgment to the agency as to 
whether a qualification is met (for example, whether the applicant is 
of good character), the element of discretion is satisfied and the form 
of permission is a permit. 
Similarly, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion not to enforce a 
statutory prohibition against an actor is administrative and 
discretionary, and functionally allows what is otherwise prohibited by 
statute. Nevertheless, prosecutorial discretion does not usually take 
the form of an affirmatively issued grant of permission—it is an 
internal agency decision not to act—and it is not usually subject to 
judicial review,52 so it is not a permit.53 If, however, the agency 
promulgates a formal policy announcing the general conditions under 
which it will not enforce a statutory prohibition, and if doing so 
subjects the agency to judicial review,54 under our definition, that 
would be a permit. 
 
 51. Forms of permission of this variety are vast in number. For example, Michigan and 
Texas each individually issued over one million hunting permits in 1994 alone; the 1994 total 
across all states was over fifteen million. See AM. FIREARMS, Hunting License Holders, Sales, 
Revenues, http://www.amfire.com/statistic.asp (last visited Oct. 6, 2014) (listing firearm statistics 
in all fifty states for 1994, the last year for which comprehensive statistics are available). Of 
course this aggregate number only captures a small number of state firearm-related permits, 
given that it only tallies hunting licenses and does not account for gun licenses, background 
checks, and conceal-carry permits, some of which may involve exercise of discretion. 
  It is possible that even for generally ministerial licensing decisions like driver’s and 
hunting licenses, there can be discretion on the margins. For instance, the DMV employee who 
determines whether a teenager has passed the driving test has to make some judgment about 
whether the relevant standards have been met. Generally, however, the ministerial nature of 
licensing decisionmaking will dominate—undermining the possible identification of the 
resulting decisions as permits. 
 52. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (“This Court has recognized on several 
occasions over many years that an agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether 
through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute 
discretion.”). 
 53. For discussions of nonenforcement as an important agency policymaking instrument, 
see Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative Law, 60 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 1, 16–19 (2008); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An 
Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1644–65 (2004). See also David M. Uhlmann, 
Prosecutorial Discretion and Environmental Crime, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 159, 168 (2014) 
(discussing the prosecution of permit violations).  
 54. See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 833 n.4 (reserving the question whether express 
nonenforcement policies are reviewable); Crowley Caribbean Transp., Inc. v. Peña, 37 F.3d 671, 
676 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (general nonenforcement policy expressed through a full rulemaking or 
universal policy statement may be reviewable). 
RUHL IN PRINTER FINAL - FOR KRISTI (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2014  5:18 PM 
148 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:133 
As with prosecutorial discretion, rising attention has been given 
to the proliferation of waiver provisions in regulatory statutes.55 
Broadly speaking, waivers are “statutory grants of the power to waive 
statutory requirements.”56 Although this definition appears to have 
some overlap with the definition of permits, not all waivers will also 
be permits. For example, if the waived statutory requirement is an 
affirmative duty to act (for example, to pay a tax), the waiver is not of 
an act otherwise prohibited by statute and thus is not a permit. By 
contrast, waivers from zoning and building code restrictions—known 
as special exceptions and variances—relieve the applicant of having 
to follow prohibitions, and thus are permits.57 
One final example drives the point home: patents. A patent gives 
the inventor a form of permission not previously enjoyed—the right 
to enforce the patent—and thus the patent process looks something 
like the permit process. In addition, a patent fits most of the elements 
of a permit as a statutorily authorized, administrative, discretionary, 
and affirmative grant of permission (to enforce the patent) that is 
subject to judicial review. A patent does not, however, allow an act 
that is otherwise prohibited by statute—an inventor is free to market 
the invention without having patented it. A patent, therefore, is not a 
permit. 
These are not merely nice distinctions. Legislatures, courts, 
agencies, and interest groups pay close attention to the language and 
structure of statutes to discern precisely what forms of permission or 
other regulatory instruments an agency may use. For example, the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has, on several 
occasions, gotten into hot water with courts for exempting specified 
activities from Clean Water Act (CWA) statutory prohibitions when 
the courts have found that the statute authorizes only permits as the 
form of permission, even when the difference between the permits 
and statutory exemptions seems nuanced.58 Most recently, for 
example, a court rejected the EPA’s administrative exemption of 
“discharges of a water transfer” from CWA pollution discharge 
 
 55. See generally David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 265 (2013) (discussing the proliferation of “big waiver” theory).  
 56. Id. at 276. 
 57. See JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE 
PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW 157–75 (2d. ed. 2007). 
 58. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1377–80 (D.C. Cir. 
1977) (rejecting the EPA’s exemption of agricultural discharges but suggesting the statute 
authorizes general permits). 
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prohibitions, which would have relieved those discharges of the need 
to obtain National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) 
permits—and thus exempted millions of water transfers from 
regulation—on the ground that “courts have consistently held that 
the EPA does not have statutory authority to create NPDES [permit] 
exclusions.”59 Hence, both form and function matter when it comes to 
defining when an administrative act is or is not permitting, and to 
evaluating the consequences thereof.60 
Although his description of what constitutes a permit was not as 
developed as ours, we suspect Epstein would agree with what we have 
outlined above as the definition of a regulatory permit. As the next 
Section shows, we also agree with him that permits are ubiquitous in 
American society, touching everything “from a dog house in the back 
yard to a nuclear power plant,”61 and yet, permits are largely absent 
from academic teaching and scholarship. 
B. The Ubiquity of Permits in Modern Society (and Their Absence in 
Legal Scholarship) 
Permitting is one of the workhorses of the administrative state 
from top to bottom, and for centuries it has reached into every corner 
of life in America.62 For example, since its enactment the CWA has 
 
 59. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. EPA, Nos. 08-cv-5606, 08-cv-
8430, 2014 WL 1284544, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2014).  
 60. As decisions like these reveal, the form of permission an agency may use and how it 
designs that form of permission—whether as a general permit or as a specific permit—
implicates doctrines of judicial review of agency statutory and regulatory interpretation that lie 
outside the scope of this Article. See generally Kevin Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. 
L. REV. 355 (2012) (discussing regulatory interpretation and judicial review). 
 61. See Epstein, supra note 1, at 407. 
 62. For example, § 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, also known as the Refuse 
Act, has since 1899 outlawed the discharge of “any refuse matter of any kind or description 
whatever other than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state, 
into any navigable water of the United States, or into any tributary of any navigable water.” 33 
U.S.C. § 407 (2012). Having thus provided a broad general prohibition, the statute authorizes 
the Army Corp of Engineers to issue permits for such discharges. The specific language reads:  
[T]he Secretary of the Army, whenever in the judgment of the Chief of Engineers 
anchorage and navigation will not be injured thereby, may permit the deposit of any 
material above mentioned in navigable waters, within limits to be defined and under 
conditions to be prescribed by him, provided application is made to him prior to 
depositing such material; and whenever any permit is so granted the conditions thereof 
shall be strictly complied with, and any violation thereof shall be unlawful. 
Id. (emphasis added). For a thorough history of this and other water pollution regulations, 
including accounts of state permit programs dating back to the early 1900s, see generally 
William L. Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution Control in the United States—State, 
Local, and Federal Efforts, 1789-1972: Part I, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 145 (2003); William L. 
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been a veritable engine of permitting across the nation.63 The CWA’s 
NPDES permit program,64 under which the EPA and delegated states 
regulate discrete sources of water pollution, is an illustrative example 
of the vast scope of the modern administrative permitting scheme. As 
of October 2013, the EPA’s online database listed over 750 active 
general NPDES permits covering both huge classes of industries 
(mining facilities, concentrated animal feeding operations, and 
seafood processors just to name a few) and huge numbers of facilities 
(each individual general permit can itself cover over 30,000 discrete 
facilities).65 Nationally, roughly 6800 major pollution sources and 
44,000 nonmajor sources are required to hold a specific NPDES 
permit, and over 133,000 nonmajor sources are authorized by a 
general NPDES permit.66 In addition, the EPA estimates that there 
are over half a million sources of stormwater discharge pollution 
authorized under CWA general permits at any given time.67 The U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps), discussed in detail below, also 
has a hand in CWA permitting, with approximately 74,000 discrete 
activities per year receiving authorization through general permits the 
Corps administers under section 404 of the CWA for placing fill in 
navigable waters and wetlands, plus thousands of specific permits for 
more significant fill activities.68 All told, in any given year roughly 
750,000 sources of water pollution in the United States are required 
to obtain or maintain permit authorization under these various CWA 
regulatory programs. And that is just from one federal statute. 
State permitting schemes can be just as, if not more, robust and 
wide-reaching as their federal counterparts. For example, states 
exercise vast permitting powers through occupational licensing 
 
Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution Control in the United States—State, Local, and 
Federal Efforts, 1789-1972: Part II, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 215 (2003). 
 63. We do not in this Section explain the details of the regulatory programs mentioned. For 
an overview of the CWA, see THE CLEAN WATER ACT HANDBOOK (Mark A. Ryan ed., 3d ed. 
2011).  
 64. See NPDES Home, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/npdes (last 
visited Oct. 6, 2014). 
 65. NPDES General Permit Inventory, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://cfpub.epa.gov/
npdes/permitissuance/genpermits.cfm (last visited Oct. 6, 2014). 
 66. Analyze Trends: State Water Dashboard, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://echo.epa
.gov/node/19 (last visited Oct. 6, 2014). 
 67. See CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL97290, STORMWATER 
PERMITS: STATUS OF EPA’S REGULATORY PROGRAM 1–3 (2012).  
 68. See CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL97223, THE ARMY CORPS OF 
ENGINEERS’ NATIONWIDE PERMITS PROGRAM: ISSUES AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS 2 
(2012). 
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programs. Today, nearly a third of American workers must obtain a 
state occupational license to perform their jobs legally.69 States, large 
and small, have occupational licensing requirements for dozens of 
professions including locksmiths, beekeepers, auctioneers, interior 
designers, fortune tellers, tour guides, and shampooers.70 
Permitting schemes permeate local governmental regulatory 
programs as well. For example, food trucks operating in Washington, 
D.C., are subject to the permitting authority of three discrete D.C. 
governmental agencies. The result is that a single truck can be 
required to maintain as many as seven permits.71 Sometimes local 
permitting schemes can even outstrip the scope of their state or 
federal counterparts. For example, the New York City Department of 
Health and Mental Hygiene’s (DOH’s) permitting scheme covers a 
vast swath of activities. Although the agency is just one of dozens in 
New York City with permitting authority, the DOH’s scheme 
requires permits for, among other things, manufacturing frozen 
desserts (different permits are required for wholesale and retail 
frozen-dessert manufacturing), operating bathing establishments 
(different permits are required for those with and without pools) and 
petting zoos, and exhibiting exotic animals.72 
The variety of activities for which the DOH requires a permit is 
staggering, but its scope is dwarfed by that of the building permits 
issued by local governments. Before the recession of 2008, local 
governments nationwide regularly issued a total of over one million 
building permits per year, and even in the years following the 2008 
recession, they issued well over five hundred thousand per year.73 
We could continue to dazzle with statistics like these for pages. 
To drive the point home, consider that the EPA estimated that, were 
it immediately to apply the strict letter of the Clean Air Act to the 
regulation of carbon dioxide emissions, over six million discrete 
 
 69. See Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels By Another Name: Should Occupations Face 
Antitrust Scrutiny?, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1096 (2014).  
 70. See id. at 1104–10 (detailing the professions subject to licensing in Florida and 
Tennessee). 
 71. See D.C. FOOD TRUCK ASS’N, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, http://dcfoodtrucks
.org/myths.html (last visited July 13, 2013) (discussing common myths associated with food 
trucks). 
 72. See License, Permit, and Course Information, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL 
HYGIENE, http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/licenses/permit.shtml (last visited Oct. 6, 2014) 
(listing the types of licenses and permits under the New York Health Code). 
 73. New Privately Owned Housing Units Authorized, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (June 2014), 
http://www.census.gov/construction/bps/pdf/table1a.pdf. 
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emission sources spread throughout the nation would need to obtain 
air pollution permits.74 The EPA attempted to avoid the strict 
interpretation of the statute, which the agency argued would lead to 
absurd results, by regulating only the very large sources first and 
postponing action on smaller sources while it devised a regulatory 
strategy for them.75 In effect, this so-called “tailoring rule” approach 
gave small emission sources a temporary regulatory exemption. The 
Supreme Court, however, found the very possibility that six million 
carbon dioxide sources might eventually require Clean Air Act 
permits a “patently unreasonable” interpretation of the statute, and 
thus found that the EPA could not regulate them at all unless a 
source were subject to permitting requirements for other pollutants.76 
The EPA’s failed attempt to ease its way into a massive permitting 
program thus illustrates the potential scope of the permit power. 
Suffice it to say that permits seem firmly entrenched as a central 
way the administrative state does business and there is little prospect 
of them going away any time soon. Hence it is a bit of a puzzle—at 
least it is to us (and Professor Epstein)—that permitting is scarcely 
mentioned in administrative law teaching and scholarship materials. 
Although it is true that a law student might read cases that involve a 
permit, the law school curriculum is virtually devoid of permitting as a 
topic of study. Amid dozens of courses on litigation and transactions 
in virtually every law school’s offerings, one would strain to find 
courses approaching anything like “Permitting in the Administrative 
State” or “Securing and Challenging Permits.”77 Even courses that are 
about the administrative state leave permitting as a focused topic of 
study out in the cold.78 In short, even a law student who focuses his or 
 
 74. Operating Permits Burden Reductions, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa
.gov/nsr/documents/20100413piecharts.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2014). For the EPA’s explanation 
of why it chose not to immediately regulate these sources, see Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,516–18 
(June 3, 2010). Consistent with the theme of this Article, the EPA examined how to use “permit 
streamlining” tools such as general permits to ease the regulatory impact of subjecting these 
sources to Clean Air Act permitting. See CLEAN AIR ACT ADVISORY COMM., REPORT TO EPA 
ON AIR PERMITTING STREAMLINING TECHNIQUES AND APPROACHES FOR GREENHOUSE 
GASES (Sept. 14, 2012), available at http://www.epa.gov/air/caaac/pdfs/ghg-permit-streamlining-
final-report.pdf. 
 75. See 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,516–18. 
 76. Util. Air Reg. Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014). 
 77. We reviewed the course offerings of ours and several dozen other law schools and 
could find no such course.  
 78. For example, although one leading administrative law textbook includes a chapter on 
agency licensing cast broadly, such as federal broadcast station licensing and state occupational 
RUHL IN PRINTER FINAL - FOR KRISTI (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2014  5:18 PM 
2014] THE PERMIT POWER REVISITED 153 
her curriculum choices on administrative law and a regulated field 
such as environmental law could easily graduate with very little 
exposure to regulatory permitting systems and the design of permits. 
Although permits receive more attention in legal scholarship, the 
focus of most work is on particular permitting programs, most 
prominently environmental regulatory program permitting,79 but also 
 
licensing, the main thrust of the chapter is to cover formal adjudication, which represents a 
small portion of the world of permits. RONALD A. CASS, COLIN S. DIVER, JACK M. BEERMANN 
& JODY FREEMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ch. VII (6th ed. 2011). There is no attention given 
even in that text to the design of permits. Other administrative law texts have no coherent unit 
on licensing at all, much less on permit design. See, e.g., PETER L. STRAUSS, TODD RAKOFF, 
CYNTHIA FARINA & GILLIAN METZGER, GELLHORN AND BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 
CASES AND COMMENTS (11th ed. 2011). Similarly, neither of the two leading texts used in first-
year “regulatory state” classes now popular in law schools devotes any attention to agency 
permitting. See LISA SCHULTZ BRESSMAN & EDWARD L. RUBIN, THE REGULATORY STATE 
(2010); JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 
(2010). The same story is largely true outside of administrative law course materials. For 
example, of the dozen or so textbooks on environmental law and natural resources law—two 
fields knee-deep in permitting regimes—a few texts devote some pages to particular permitting 
programs. See, e.g., ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN CONTEXT 806–909 (3d 
ed. 2012) (CWA permits); ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: 
NATURE, LAW, & SOCIETY 539–68 (4th ed. 2010) (CWA permits). Only one such text includes 
any substantial discussion of permitting in general as its own theme. See J.B. RUHL, JOHN 
NAGLE, JAMES SALZMAN & ALEXANDRA KLASS, THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 710–39 (3d ed. 2014) (discussing coverage of permitting proceedings, 
specific permits, and general permits). 
 79. Permitting under the CWA receives considerable coverage in legal scholarship. See, 
e.g., Thomas Addison & Timothy Burns, The Army Corps of Engineers and Nationwide Permit 
26: Wetlands Protection or Swamp Reclamation?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619 (1991); Terence J. 
Centner, Challenging NPDES Permits Granted Without Public Participation, 38 B.C. ENVTL. 
AFF. L. REV. 1, 1 (2011); Steven G. Davison, General Permits Under Section 404 of The Clean 
Water Act, 26 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 35, 35 (2009); Jeffrey M. Gaba, Generally Illegal: NPDES 
General Permits Under the Clean Water Act, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 409, 410 (2007); Andrew 
King, Leading the EPA to Stormwater: The Long Road to Construction Stormwater Regulation 
and the Role of Numeric Effluent Limitations, 24 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 335, 335 (2011); Chris 
Reagen, The Water Transfers Rule: How an EPA Rule Threatens to Undermine The Clean Water 
Act, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 307, 307 (2011). The Endangered Species Act’s permitting program is 
also a focal point. See, e.g., Alejandro E. Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a 
Study in Maladaptive Management, 55 UCLA L. REV. 293, 293 (2007); Patrick Duggan, 
Incidental Extinction: How the Endangered Species Act’s Incidental Take Permits Fail to Account 
for Population Loss, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,628, 10,628 (2011); J.B. Ruhl, How to Kill 
Endangered Species, Legally: The Nuts and Bolts of Endangered Species Act “HCP” Permits for 
Real Estate Development, 5 ENVTL. LAW. 345, 345 (1999); Karin P. Sheldon, Habitat 
Conservation Planning: Addressing the Achilles Heel of the Endangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 279, 279 (1998). One insightful article that digs into the anatomy of permitting in 
general more than most involved a comparative study of the environmental permitting of two 
similar BMW production plants, one in Germany and the other in the United States. See Molly 
Elizabeth Hall, Pollution Havens? A Look at Environmental Permitting in the United States and 
Germany, 7 WIS. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 2 (2000).  
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covering a broad diversity of fields including land use permitting,80 
speech permitting,81 and cancer drug production permitting.82 
Although this kind of work surely contributes to better 
understandings of how different permitting programs operate and 
perform in different contexts, it is not directed at developing a theory 
of permitting and permit design. 
A broader take on permitting is found in the emerging body of 
scholarship focused on how permits fit into the increasing 
“privatization” of the administrative state through the introduction of 
market-based instruments, private organization standard setting, and 
similar mechanisms.83 Permitting design could both affect and be 
affected by this privatization trend, but the scholarship on the topic 
does not examine permitting design in any broader sense and is more 
concerned with theories of privatization than with theories of 
permitting systems.  
There is also a body of scholarship examining the prevalence of 
statutory and regulatory exemptions and waivers in some regulatory 
fields.84 As close cousins to permits, knowing more about the design 
and impact of exemptions and waivers can help inform the theory and 
 
 80. See generally, e.g., Peter A. Buchsbaum, Federal Regulation of Land Use: Uncle Sam the 
Permit Man, 25 URB. LAW. 589 (1993). 
 81. See generally, e.g., Nathan W. Kellum, Permit Schemes: Under Current Jurisprudence, 
What Permits are Permitted?, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 381 (2008). 
 82. See generally, e.g., Richard Epstein, Against Permititis: Why Voluntary Organizations 
Should Regulate the Use of Cancer Drugs, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2009). 
 83. See generally Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions and the New 
Administrative State, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 813 (2000) (examining programs under which public 
functions, such as standard setting, are delegated to private organizations); Jessica Owley, The 
Increasing Privatization of Environmental Permitting, 46 AKRON L. REV. 1091 (2013) 
(examining environmental-permitting programs that rely on private markets to manage 
environmental harm mitigation). 
 84. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 55 (examining the widespread use of waivers); Kara 
Cook, The Middle Ground of Pesticide Regulation: Why EPA Should Use a Watershed-Based 
Permitting Scheme in Its New Aquatic Pesticides Rule, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 451, 451 (2010) 
(examining the EPA’s failed attempt to exempt pesticide applications from CWA permitting); 
Paul Kampmeier, Enough is Enough! Stormwater Discharged from Man-Made Pipes, Ditches, 
and Channels Along Logging Roads Is Not Nonpoint Source “Natural Runoff”, 43 ENVTL. L. 
757, 757–61 (2013) (examining an EPA exemption from CWA permitting for runoff from 
logging operations); J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 264, 331–33 (2000) (examining a variety of exemptions enjoyed by the 
agricultural production industry); Michael Vandenbergh & Kevin Stack, The One Percent 
Problem, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1385, 1387, 1394–96 (2011) (examining a variety of exemptions 
premised on the lack of significant harm). Some of that discussion has been general, but it has 
also focused on why we would have exemptions and on the distinctions between adjudication 
versus rulemaking. See generally, e.g., Aman, supra note 3; Schuck, supra note 3.  
RUHL IN PRINTER FINAL - FOR KRISTI (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2014  5:18 PM 
2014] THE PERMIT POWER REVISITED 155 
design of permits. Nevertheless, exemptions and waivers are not 
permits, so there is a limit to how much assistance this type of 
scholarship can offer. Overall, therefore, it is no exaggeration to say 
that Professor Epstein’s observation two decades ago, that the permit 
power had “received scant attention in the academic literature,”85 
remains true to this day. 
C. Types of Permits—From General to Specific 
Permits are everywhere and seem to take on many sizes and 
shapes. To be sure, all permits have certain characteristics: among 
other things, they apply to specified regulated actions and actors, 
have a specified duration, and impose enforceable conditions on the 
regulated entity. But the range of possible permit designs seems 
boundless, producing permits for everything from backyard decks to 
food trucks to vast industrial complexes. How does one make sense of 
a world in which permits cover so much of American society? Indeed, 
that world turns out to be quite complex. 
In our typology of forms of permission, permits are situated 
between regulatory exemptions and regulatory prohibitions. As such, 
the universe of possible configurations of permits defines a 
continuum that stretches between those two opposing models. At the 
extreme boundaries of permitting, permits do not look much different 
from either exemptions on one end or prohibitions on the other. The 
permit power’s differences from exemptions and prohibitions at its 
edges, however, are significant nonetheless. 
For example, imagine that a statute authorizes an agency to 
implement regulatory exemptions, permits, and regulatory 
prohibitions with respect to a particular category of activities, such as 
water pollution. The statute instructs the agency to decide which 
permission form to use for different types of water pollution sources 
based on the cumulative harm to environmental resources a type of 
source, if not regulated, is expected to produce when all such sources 
are taken into account.86 Based on this standard, the agency could 
 
 85. Epstein, supra note 1, at 407. 
 86. This is one of the standards used in many statutes authorizing general permits. 
Although a harm continuum like the one in our hypothetical statute can provide one rationale 
for moving across the forms-of-permission spectrum from exemptions (targeted at the lowest 
harms) to general permits to specific permits to prohibitions (targeted at the highest harms), it is 
not the only possible policy rationale and is often ignored in practice. For example, agricultural 
pollution is a leading cause of water resources degradation but is exempt in many of its forms, 
largely for political reasons, from permitting under the CWA and other environmental laws. See 
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array its regulatory instrument options based on a harm continuum 
with exemptions at one end for very low harm levels, prohibitions at 
the other end for very high harm levels, and permits for the 
intermediate harm levels. In such a system, permits thus must be able 
to handle everything from low to high levels of harm, suggesting that 
permitting must be a flexible regulatory instrument. 
For example, say the agency expects Type X sources to produce 
extremely low levels of cumulative harm. For that situation the 
agency might simply declare that Type X sources are exempt from the 
need to obtain permission. Type X source harms could be more than 
trivial in some cases, however. In this case, the agency could, by its 
own initiative, issue a permit that any Type X source could take 
advantage of by simply filling out a one-time form with basic 
information such as just the name of the owner and the location of 
the source. Only if the agency determines, perhaps through an 
inspection or citizen complaint program, that a particular Type X 
source poses unusual risks would the agency require that source to 
undergo more extensive assessment. This approach is representative 
of the general permit, the example offered here being an extreme 
version in that all it requires for the action to qualify for the permit is 
a one-time filing of information anyone could easily find in a phone 
book. 
On the face of things, it looks as if the only difference between 
an exemption and a general permit is the filing of the form in the 
latter. But there is more to it than that. Under the exemption 
approach, Type X sources simply do not register in the agency’s 
regulatory program—the agency will not know, for instance, how 
many there are, where they are, or who owns them. Under the permit 
approach, the agency knows all this information and thus can use it 
for its regulatory purposes. The agency could, for example, develop 
and make public maps of Type X source locations or conduct periodic 
visits to Type X sources. Over time, moreover, the agency could add 
requirements to the form, such as reporting annual output, adding an 
annual fee, or requiring more frequent filings. In short, the 
requirement that one meet some condition or take some action, 
although minimally burdensome, could lead to a slippery slope of 
 
Ruhl, supra note 84, at 293–316. For a discussion of the harm continuum and other rationales in 
more detail, see infra Parts II, III.  
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additional requirements ending in Professor Epstein’s vision of 
administrative reigns of terror.87 
At the other end of the permit continuum—where that slippery 
slope leads—is the boundary between permits and prohibitions. Here 
the agency can make a similar choice for Type Y sources, which are 
expected to impose extensive cumulative harm if left unregulated, as 
it can at the other end of the continuum. One way to avoid Type Y 
harm would be to flatly prohibit Type Y sources. Problem solved. But 
if Type Y sources also produce significant economic or other benefits, 
a prohibition might not be the optimal approach when all costs and 
benefits are considered. Alternatively, therefore, the agency could 
provide that all Type Y sources are prohibited unless they obtain a 
permit from the agency. To obtain this kind of permit, however, a 
Type Y source must, among other things, prepare a comprehensive 
cost-benefit analysis weighing all possible environmental, economic, 
and social effects expected from its particular facility, employ 
expensive pollution control technology, mitigate all unavoidable 
harmful effects, submit to inspections, perpetually monitor impacts, 
and file monthly reports. This approach is representative of the 
specific permit, and this example shows how a specific permit imposes 
potentially extensive and expensive requirements. 
As a practical matter, the conditions for obtaining and 
maintaining this kind of permit could become so extensive and 
expensive as to effectively prohibit Type Y sources, making the 
permitting regime look like a prohibition. For example, although it is 
possible in theory to obtain all the permits necessary to construct a 
new major gasoline refinery in the United States, it is a mind-boggling 
undertaking. The EPA once issued a 135 page “guidance” just to 
explain the inner workings of but one requirement for permitting a 
refinery under the Clean Air Act.88 Although permitting complexities 
 
 87. As we discuss later in connection with our case study of permitting under the CWA, 
some general permits do not require even the filing of a simple form, making them look 
indistinguishable from exemptions except in terms of the orientation of the form of 
permission—that is, exempted activities are unregulated whereas activities authorized by 
general permit are regulated. Although the distinction may seem semantic when applied to this 
kind of general permit, we discuss in Parts II and III reasons why it makes a difference to 
agencies and regulated entities whether an activity falls on the exemption side or the permit side 
of the line. See infra Parts II, III. 
 88. See E. RESEARCH GRP., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA/456-B-00-001, Petroleum 
Refinery MACT Standard Guidance (2000), available at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/
petrefine/mactdoc1.pdf (explaining the maximum-achievable-control-technology standards for 
petroleum refineries in the United States).  
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are not the sole factor, it should be no surprise that no major refinery 
has been constructed anywhere in the nation since 1977. This has not 
been because of excess refining capacity—the United States must 
import refined gasoline to meet demand.89 A more current example 
comes from the controversial Keystone XL shale oil pipeline, 
proposed to run from Canada to the Gulf Coast refineries, which the 
U.S. State Department’s analysis concludes will require over ninety 
“major permits, licenses, approvals, authorizations, and 
consultation[s] by federal, state, and local agencies prior to 
implementation of the proposed Project.”90 
For Epstein, a legislative or administrative prohibition may be 
bad enough—it violates the permitted-until-judicially-enjoined 
principle. But the agglomeration of federal, state, and local agencies 
issuing the dozens of burdensome specific permits that would be 
needed for a major refinery or pipeline is Epstein’s nightmare, 
opening the door to all the administrative excesses and abuses he 
predicted. Of course, these are extreme examples. Plenty of work gets 
done in the nation notwithstanding the dark cloud of permitting that 
hangs overhead. Even so, relying on the specific permit model can 
impose nontrivial costs on social and economic actors, and the 
potential for agency abuse of power in the administration of the 
permitting program cannot be ruled out. Although a flat prohibition 
also imposes costs, the prohibition, once in effect, does not rely on 
continuing agency administration and thus the abuse of power 
concern is not present. 
Hence the differences between exemptions and general permits 
at the one end of the permit spectrum, and between prohibitions and 
specific permits at the other end, are by no means inconsequential. 
Ironically, however, they are dwarfed by the differences between 
general permits and specific permits. General permits at the far end 
of the spectrum look like exemptions, and specific permits at the 
other end look like prohibitions. Thus, the distance between general 
permits and specific permits is almost the same as the distance 
 
 89. When Was the Last Refinery Built in the United States?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. 
(June 25, 2014), http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=29&t=6. The United States regularly 
imports anywhere from several hundred thousand to more than a million gallons of gasoline per 
day. Weekly U.S. Imports of Total Gasoline, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Aug. 27, 2014), 
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=WGTIMUS2&f=W. 
 90. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
STATEMENT—KEYSTONE XL PROJECT tbl.1.9-1 (2014), available at http://keystonepipeline-
xl.state.gov/documents/organization/221152.pdf. 
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between exemptions and prohibitions. In other words, just as 
exemptions and prohibitions are diametric opposites, so too are 
general permits and specific permits. Yet both are permits that 
represent agency exercise of the permit power. To be sure, obtaining 
a specific permit, like the kind described above, sounds like an 
enormous and expensive hassle, whereas obtaining a general permit 
that asks for only a name and an address is a piece of cake. Yet even 
the simple general permit fits the criteria that Epstein and we agree 
are the defining traits of permits: discretionary, administrative 
granting of permission to do that which is otherwise prohibited by 
statute. 
Epstein’s critique of the permit power, however, failed to 
account for this broad a range of what fits inside the permits box in 
the forms-of-permission spectrum, and the space it thus allows for 
designing a permit to fit its regulatory context. Again, if one objects in 
principle to any instance in which discretionary administrative 
permission is required to do that which is otherwise prohibited by 
statute, the differences between general and specific permits do not 
matter—they are both part of “the racket.” But if one accepts that a 
permit-free society is impractical and thus is concerned with how the 
permit power is actually implemented, the differences between 
general and specific permits, and how agencies make use of them, 
may matter. 
Indeed, given how close general permitting can come to an 
exemption, Epstein overstated the case by portraying all permitting as 
following the legislatively-prohibited-until-administratively-permitted 
model. He overlooked general permitting, which adds the  
third and potentially important administratively-permitted-until-
administratively-prohibited model.91 Although this leaves the 
permitting and prohibiting functions in the hands of agencies rather 
than courts, general permits restore the default rule to a state of 
permission and require some action by the agency to shift to a 
prohibition in particular cases. As Figure 1 below suggests, this 
approach looks much closer to Epstein’s ideal model of permitted-
until-judicially-prohibited than it does to the legislatively-prohibited 
until-administratively-permitted model he condemned. General 
permits thus call into question how deeply into the permit power 
 
 91. General permitting was well entrenched in various permit systems by the time Epstein 
offered his critique. See, e.g., Addison & Burns, supra note 79 (discussing the CWA section 404 
general-permitting program, which was added as part of the 1977 amendments to the statute).  
RUHL IN PRINTER FINAL - FOR KRISTI (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2014  5:18 PM 
160 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:133 
Epstein’s critique penetrates. A more robust analysis of the breadth 
of permit design possibilities is needed to think more clearly about 
the permit power in application. 
Figure 1. The Spectrum of Permits 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To facilitate that study, we use examples taken from one of the 
more well-known permitting programs in environmental law—section 
404 of the CWA.92 True to the permits model, section 301 of the 
CWA establishes a broad category of prohibited activity, declaring 
the “discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful.”93 
There are decades’ worth of judicial opinions and reams of agency 
rules and guidances expounding on the meaning of those ten words.94 
For purposes of understanding the structure of the section 404 permit 
program, however, it suffices to explain that the CWA defines 
“pollutant” to include a long list of items including everything from 
incinerator residue to sand,95 and defines “discharge of any pollutant” 
to mean “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from a 
point source.”96 Continuing down the definitional trail, the CWA 
defines “navigable waters” to mean “the waters of the United 
States”97 and defines “point source” to mean “any discernible, 
confined and discrete conveyance . . . from which pollutants are or 
may be discharged.”98 In lay terms, you cannot use pipes and ditches 
to dump pollution into lakes and rivers. 
 
 92. It is not necessary for our purposes to plumb the intricate details of the section 404 
program; rather, we use it to flesh out the structural differences between specific and general 
permits. For thorough coverage of the section 404 program, see generally WETLANDS LAW AND 
POLICY: UNDERSTANDING SECTION 404 (Kim Diana Connolly et al. eds., 2005).  
 93. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2012). 
 94. See H. Michael Keller, Regulated Activities, in WETLANDS LAW AND POLICY, supra 
note 92, at 105–11 (discussing section 301 of the CWA). 
 95. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2012). 
 96. Id. § 1362(12). 
 97. Id. § 1362(7). 
 98. Id. § 1362(14). 
PERMITS Exemptions Prohibitions Specific General 
No Permit 
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Prohibited Until 
Permitted 
Permitted Until 
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No Permit 
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Transition 
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But yes you can, if you get a CWA permit. The prohibition 
clause of section 301, recited above, appears after the proviso: 
“Except as in compliance with . . . .”99 One of the several “in 
compliance with” opportunities section 301 specifies is found in 
section 404, which provides that the Secretary of the Army, acting 
through the chief of the Corps,100 “may issue permits, after notice and 
opportunity for public hearings for the discharge of dredged or fill 
material into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites.”101 
Section 404 thus completes the four ingredients necessary for 
exercising the permit power: the Corps, an administrative agency, 
may exercise its discretion under section 404 to grant permission to 
do that which is otherwise prohibited by section 301. 
Section 404 articulates a few more features of this permit regime 
that are important for our purposes. First, another agency has its 
hand in the process. Section 404(b) provides that the Corps’ decisions 
about where to allow disposal sites must follow environmental and 
other guidelines established by the EPA.102 Second, true to the forms-
of-permission spectrum, section 404(f) provides several statutory 
exemptions, called “non-prohibited discharges,” including such 
activities as “normal farming,” dam repairs, and construction of farm 
stock ponds.103 Third, section 404(e) establishes a general permit 
option “for any category of activities involving discharges of dredged 
or fill material if the Secretary determines that the activities in such 
category are similar in nature, will cause only minimal adverse 
environmental effects when performed separately, and will have only 
minimal cumulative adverse effects on the environment.”104 
On its face the section 404 permit program might appear narrow 
and mundane—it seems to be concerned with dumping dredged soil 
and sand into lakes and rivers. But as with many permit programs, 
there is more there than meets the eye. Through a long and often 
 
 99. Id. § 1311(a). 
 100. Id. § 1344(d) (2012). 
 101. Id. § 1344(a). The other major CWA permitting program administered by the EPA is 
known as the NPDES program, covering discharges not covered by section 404. See 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1342 (2012). The Supreme Court has drawn a sharp line between the two programs, such that 
a particular type of discharge falls into one program or the other, but not both. See Coeur 
Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261 (2009). We discuss the NPDES 
program at various points infra. 
 102. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b); see Mark T. Pifher, The Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines and 
Practicable Alternatives Analysis, in WETLANDS LAW AND POLICY, supra note 92, at 221–26. 
 103. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f); see Keller, supra note 94, at 131–38.  
 104. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e)(1)–(2). 
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tortuous history of judicial and administrative interpretations, the 
geographic reach of section 404 includes not just navigable waters, 
but also wetlands having a “significant nexus” to navigable waters.105 
Although it is not necessary for our purposes to plumb the depths of 
what “significant nexus” means in this context, it is important to note 
that the extension of section 404 jurisdiction to wetland areas that 
meet the “significant nexus” test transformed section 404 from a 
dredging and fill regulatory provision to one of the federal 
government’s major land use regulation programs.106 It is not an 
exaggeration to observe that “no landowner or developer can 
proceed without awareness of wetlands protection law.”107 
Indeed, consistent with Epstein’s assessment of the permit 
power, the section 404 program has received scathing criticism for its 
extensive reach and impact on land development. Justice Scalia, for 
example, once claimed that “[t]he burden of federal regulation on 
those who would deposit fill material in locations denominated 
‘waters of the United States’ is not trivial. In deciding whether to 
grant or deny a permit, the [Corps] exercises the discretion of an 
enlightened despot.”108 The focus of most of this criticism, however, 
has been on the Corps’ work involving specific permits—what the 
agency refers to as an “individual permit.”109 The vast majority of 
permitting under section 404, however, takes place through the 
Corps’ numerous general permits, which cover activities such as the 
 
 105. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 741–42 (2007) (establishing the “significant 
nexus” test). The details and implications of Rapanos are far too complex to cover here. For a 
series of articles explaining the significant nexus test and some of the confusion it has caused, 
see generally Symposium, Rapanos v. United States, 22 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T (2007). For 
the pre-Rapanos history of the administrative and judicial interpretations of the geographic 
scope of section 404 jurisdiction, which was itself complex, see Mark A. Chertok & Kate 
Sinding, Federal Jurisdiction Over Wetlands: “Waters of the United States,” in WETLANDS LAW 
AND POLICY, supra note 92, at 59–92.  
 106. Douglas R. Williams & Kim Diana Connolly, Federal Wetlands Regulation: An 
Overview, in WETLANDS LAW AND POLICY, supra note 92, at 1–17.  
 107. Margaret N. Strand & Lowell Rothschild, Wetlands: Taming the Swamp Monster, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS OF REAL ESTATE AND COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: FROM 
BROWNFIELDS TO GREEN BUILDINGS 589 (James B. Witkin ed. 2011).  
 108. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 721. For his bleak assessment of the Corps, Justice Scalia relied 
heavily on David Sunding & David Zilberman, The Economics of Environmental Regulation by 
Licensing: An Assessment of Recent Changes to the Wetland Permitting Process, 42 NAT. RES. J. 
59 (2002). Some of the findings of the Sunding and Zilberman study, however, have been 
contested in other work studying the Corps’ performance. See generally Kim Diana Connolly, 
Survey Says: Army Corps No Scalian Despot, 37 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,317 (2007) (examining the 
Corps’ permitting program performance record).  
 109. See Connolly, supra note 108, at 10,317 n.4. 
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placement of navigation aids and erosion control structures, permits 
the Corps has actively been using since 1977.110 The use of general 
permits by the Corps is by design and meant to avoid the kind of 
problems Epstein associated with permit power abuse.111 As one 
congressional study of section 404 permits concluded, general permits 
“are a key means by which the Corps seeks to minimize the burden 
and delay of its regulatory program: they authorize a landowner or 
developer to proceed with the covered activity without having to 
obtain an individual, site-specific permit in advance.”112 Although 
more than half of its general permits require advance notification to 
the Corps for some or all covered activities, others require only after-
the-fact notification. The result has been that the Corps handles the 
vast majority of its permitting through general permits113 and 
processes them far more efficiently and cost-effectively than is 
possible for specific permits. 
Section 404 thus illustrates the flexibility inherent in the permit 
power once the full breadth of permit design options is taken into 
account. However, with over 90 percent of the demand on the section 
404 permit program handled under general permits requiring a small 
amount of paperwork, or even none, and anywhere from zero to at 
most a few weeks’ time to work through the permitting system, does 
the Corps truly look like an “enlightened despot”?114 Does the section 
404 general permit program smack of a “racket”? Why, if the Corps 
wished to abuse the permit power, would it funnel so much of the 
section 404 permit program through general permits?115 These are 
questions one would not think to ask without a firm grasp of the full 
dimensions and design options available under the permit power. So 
 
 110. The Corps’ general permit program began in 1977 with the agency’s promulgation of 
five general permits covering specified activities such as utility-line crossings and minor road 
crossings. See 42 Fed. Reg. 37,121, 37,146–47 (1977). Congress amended the CWA in 1977 after 
the Corps promulgated its first set of general permits, essentially codifying the approach the 
Corps took. See Palmer Hough & Morgan Robertson, Mitigation Under Section 404 of the Clean 
Water Act: Where It Comes From, What It Means, 17 WETLANDS ECOLOGY & MGMT. 15, 17 
(2009).  
 111. See supra notes 10–20 and accompanying text. 
 112. COPELAND, supra note 68, at 2. 
 113. Id. at 2 (“Approximately 74,000 activities per year (representing 92 percent of the 
Corps’ regulatory workload) were authorized by nationwide and other general permits.”). 
 114. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 721 (2007). 
 115. Indeed, surveys of applicants for the Corps’ section 404 permits generally reveal them 
to be happy customers. See Connolly, supra note 108, at 10,325–61 (compiling and assessing 
survey results).  
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that we may fully address them later, therefore, in the next Section we 
continue with section 404 as the case study for unpacking and 
comparing the characteristics of general and specific permits. 
D. Design Options  
There are three levels of analysis across which to compare 
general and specific permits as alternative design options. The first 
level focuses on the permitting system, which consists of the 
regulatory apparatus and process the agency constructs in order to 
issue the permit. The second level of analysis focuses on permit 
administration, which pertains to how a particular project, subject to 
the regulatory prohibition, avails itself of the permitting system to 
obtain permit approval. At a macro scale, from the agency’s 
perspective the fundamental distinction between general permitting 
and specific permitting is that general permits are issued at the 
permitting-system stage, whereas specific permits are issued at the 
permit administration stage. That is, most of an agency’s work in 
general permitting is in establishing the permitting system, whereas in 
specific permitting, most of the agency’s work is in permit 
administration. 
The third level of analysis concerns how the agency manages the 
transition between general and specific permitting as it searches for 
the appropriate balance among the general and specific permitting 
characteristics. There are two modes of transition—a “continuum 
mode,” in which the agency can more or less move incrementally 
between the two extremes as it chooses, and a “discontinuity mode,” 
in which moving between the extremes at some point triggers sharp 
thresholds regarding the features of one or more of the characteristics 
of the permitting system or permit administration. 
Table 2 shows how these three levels of analysis fit together, 
detailing each of the key features of permitting systems and permit 
administration, describing how they vary between the extremes, and 
showing the transition mode for each. As explained above, at the 
extreme, a general permit is kept distinct from an exemption by its 
regulatory orientation and the discretion an agency retains under the 
terms of the permit to build more into the process for issuing a permit 
on a case-specific basis. For the first distinction, general permits are 
regulatory and exemptions are not. For the second distinction, in the 
case of permits, but not exemptions, the agency might include in the 
permit’s terms demands for information, closer scrutiny of the 
proposed project, and performance conditions, among other things. 
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Exemptions thus are better thought of as safe harbors—the agency 
cannot identify a specific project or action that meets an exemption 
and pull it back into the regulatory program on a case-specific basis—
whereas general permits can expand in regulatory scope. 
Because general permits have the flexibility of being more or less 
general, an agency can adjust many parameters along a continuum to 
move away from the quasi-exemption effect of general permits at the 
extreme. In doing so, however, the agency runs the risk that as more 
parameters move in the direction of specific permitting attributes, at 
some point there will be sufficiently particularized agency action that 
some features of the permitting system and permit administration 
must flip into what are distinctly specific-permitting procedures. 
Questions pertaining to whether this flip is desirable, and the 
circumstances under which one approach is superior to the other, will 
be discussed later in this Article in Parts II and III. First, in the 
remainder of this Section we dig deeper into what Table 2 reveals in 
terms of the system and administration of regulatory permits. 
Table 2. Permitting Systems, Permit Administration, and Transitions 
General Permits Transition Specific Permits 
Permitting System 
Agency issues permit Discontinuities Applicant requests permit 
High agency assessment burden Continuum No agency assessment burden 
Low regulatory infrastructure Continuum High regulatory infrastructure 
High promulgation requirements Discontinuities Low promulgation requirements 
Permit by regulation Discontinuities Permit by order 
Permit Administration 
No factual submission burden Continuum High factual submission burden 
No agency assessment burden Continuum High agency assessment burden 
No negotiation of terms Continuum High negotiation of terms 
Low agency discretion Continuum High agency discretion 
No public participation  Continuum High public participation 
No agency order Discontinuities Requires agency order 
No judicial review Discontinuities Judicial review available 
1. Permitting Systems.  We propose five essential characteristics 
of permitting systems across which general and specific permitting 
differ. The first characteristic is the determination of which party 
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initiates the permitting approval process—agency or applicant. In 
general permitting at its extreme, the agency issues a general permit 
available for all qualifying projects, whereas in specific permitting, 
applicants must approach the agency to request a permit. 
A second factor is the substantive assessment burden the agency 
assumes when establishing the system. In general permitting systems, 
to issue a general permit, the agency usually must make substantive 
findings about the merits of a general permit it intends to issue, such 
as whether the permitted activities are likely to cause significant harm 
to protected interests. Setting up a specific-permitting system, by 
contrast, involves no agency substantive findings at the extreme—
those are all saved for later during permit administration. 
On the other hand, the reverse is true for the third factor—
regulatory infrastructure. Once a general permitting system is 
established, it requires relatively little procedural and substantive 
infrastructure to move to the permit administration phase. Once the 
general permit is issued, minimal additional agency involvement is 
required for permit administration. Again, the opposite is true of 
specific permitting—which backloads the substantive work to the 
permit administration phase, and thus mostly involves erecting an 
extensive regulatory infrastructure to support permit administration. 
The fourth differentiating characteristic involves promulgation 
requirements of the two permit types. Given all that is bundled into a 
general permit, the general-permitting system must incorporate 
extensive promulgation requirements, such as environmental and 
other impact assessment steps, public notice and comment, and 
judicial review. Because specific-permitting systems are principally 
focused on setting up procedures and standards for later permit 
administration, they impose far less of this promulgation burden. 
The fifth characteristic is the administrative action by which the 
permits are issued. Because general permitting packages much of the 
agency’s work at the permitting-system stage, the prototypical 
general-permitting system uses rulemakings as its workhorse. In other 
words, general permitting involves establishing a rulemaking system 
for issuing permits in the form of general promulgations. Specific-
permitting systems, because they defer the heavy lifting of permit 
issuance to the permit administration stage, use particularized agency 
orders as the permit-delivery mechanism. The point of the specific-
permitting system, therefore, is to set up the procedures and 
standards for running permit administration to issue permits. 
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The Corps’ implementation of section 404 permitting aptly 
illustrates these distinctions between general- and specific-permitting 
systems. Although the Corps’ “nationwide permits” system (a 
general-permitting system) produces a simplified and streamlined 
permit administration burden for agencies and applicants alike, 
promulgating the general permits is a significant burden for the 
agency.116 As section 404(e)(1) provides, to issue a general permit, the 
Corps must make specified substantive findings about an identified 
category of activities otherwise prohibited under section 301117—in 
other words, that the activities are similar in nature and will have 
minimal separate and cumulative effects on the environment. Both 
required findings have been points of contention in the Corps’ 
implementation of general permitting.118 Because the point of general 
permitting is to avoid having to make these substantive findings about 
each discrete project within the activity category during permit 
administration,119 the Corps has established a rulemaking process for 
issuing general permits120 and regularly publishes its nationwide 
general permits in the Federal Register.121 The Corps’ promulgation 
 
 116. For a general overview of the nationwide permitting program, see Davison, supra note 
79, passim; William E. Taylor & Kate L. Geoffrey, General and Nationwide Permits, in 
WETLANDS LAW AND POLICY, supra note 92, at 151. 
 117. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e)(1) (2012) (requiring that the Corps must “determine[] that the 
activities . . . are similar in nature, will cause only minimal adverse environmental effects when 
performed separately, and will have only minimal cumulative adverse effect on the 
environment” before issuing permits). 
 118. Taylor & Geoffrey, supra note 116, at 151, 154–57. The regulations governing proposed 
general permits required the Corps to assess “[a]ll factors which may be relevant to the 
proposal” including: 
[C]onservation, economics, aesthetics, general environmental concerns, wetlands, 
historic properties, fish and wildlife values, flood hazards, floodplain values, land use, 
navigation, shore erosion and accretion, recreation, water supply and conservation, 
water quality, energy needs, safety, food and fiber production, mineral needs, 
considerations of property ownership and, in general, the needs and welfare of the 
people. 
33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(1) (2011). 
 119. See Snoqualmie Valley Pres. Alliance v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 683 F.3d 1155, 
1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (“A general nationwide permit . . . must undergo that extensive process at 
the time the permit is promulgated, rather than at the time an applicant seeks to discharge fill 
material under such a permit.”); Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 13-cv-1239, 2013 
WL 6009919, at *15 (D.D.C. Nov. 13, 2013) (“[T]he entire point of the general permitting 
system is to avoid the burden of having to conduct an environmental review under [the National 
Environmental Protection Act] when a verification—as distinguished from an individual 
discharge permit—is sought.”). 
 120. See 33 C.F.R. § 330.1–.6 (explaining the process for distributing general permits).  
 121. See, e.g., 77 Fed. Reg. 10,184 (Feb. 21, 2012) (most recent publication of nationwide 
permits). 
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of each general permit involves compliance with a myriad of impact 
assessment and public process requirements,122 and is subject to 
judicial review regarding whether the permit satisfies the section 
404(e) standards as well as all of the promulgation requirements.123 
Assuming the Corps completes the nationwide permit 
promulgation process and withstands any judicial review, the end 
result of this permitting system in operation is a ready-made form of 
permission—a general permit. It warrants emphasizing, however, that 
one should not mistake “general” as meaning “nonregulatory.” There 
is no reason why a general permit cannot be a robust regulatory 
instrument. The Corps’ suite of nationwide permits, for example, 
covers a broad spectrum of activities from relatively trivial projects, 
such as minor dredging projects, to more extensive projects, such as 
certain kinds of mining operations.124 Each nationwide permit 
incorporates particularized conditions the Corps deems appropriate 
to the intensity of the permitted activity, such as the amount of soil 
dredged or the areas excluded from eligibility, and all nationwide 
permits incorporate a set of general conditions, such as requirements 
to comply with other applicable laws.125 Although the level of intensity 
of these conditions may be a matter of contention between various 
interests,126 our point is that there is plenty of room in general 
permitting for agencies to exercise the permit power. The key design 
feature of general permitting is that most of the permit power is 
exercised by the agency at the permitting-system stage, rather than at 
the permit administration stage. 
By contrast, the Corps’ permitting system for specific permits, 
known as its “individual permits” program, consists entirely of 
 
 122. 33 C.F.R. § 330.1(b); see Sierra Club, 2013 WL 6009919, at *13 (“Under the general 
permitting system, the Corps conducts an extensive environmental review and provides the 
public with notice and an opportunity to comment regarding categories of construction activity 
that the Corps seeks to designate as having minimal impact on waterways within specified 
geographical regions.”). See generally Taylor & Geoffrey, supra note 116, at 157–58 (describing 
compliance with, for example, the Coastal Zone Management Act, the Endangered Species Act, 
the National Historic Preservation Act, and the National Environmental Policy Act). 
 123. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 453 F. Supp. 2d 
116 (D.D.C. 2006) (describing the nationwide permitting system and rejecting a trade 
association’s claims that several nationwide permits had been improperly promulgated). 
 124. Taylor & Geoffrey, supra note 116, at 160–69. 
 125. Id. at 169–80. 
 126. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 131 (addressing trade-
association claims that several nationwide permits had been improperly promulgated because of 
overly restrictive conditions); see generally COPELAND, supra note 68, at 8 (discussing criticisms 
by environmental-protection and industry groups). 
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procedural regulations and permit issuance standards.127 The core of 
the procedural regulations consists of explanations of the Corps’ 
checklist for completeness of a permit application, public notice and 
hearing procedures, and process review of the application.128 The 
regulatory framework also specifies substantive criteria for permit 
issuance under the EPA’s 404(b)(1) guidelines, what the Corps calls 
its “public interest review” criteria, and other applicable statutes 
requiring agencies to conduct impact evaluations when issuing 
permits.129 Although it undoubtedly is helpful to the regulated 
community for the Corps to provide these detailed procedural and 
substantive regulations, the regulations do not independently provide 
any form of permission—permission must await the permit 
administration phase. 
2. Permit Administration.  Once one grasps the differences 
between general- and specific-permitting systems, the manner in 
which general and specific permit administrations differ is fairly 
straightforward. Ideally, administration of a general permit in its 
purest form should (1) not require submissions from the regulated 
entity seeking the permit authorization; (2) not require further 
substantive assessment by the agency; (3) not involve further 
negotiation between a regulated entity and the agency; (4) not 
involve further exercise of discretion by the agency; (5) not involve 
further public participation; (6) not require an agency order; and (7) 
not be subject to further judicial review. In essence, the permit has 
already been issued as part of the permitting system, with assessment, 
negotiation, discretion, public participation, and judicial review 
applied at the macro level, so all that is left is for the regulated entity 
to use the permit at the micro level. Administration of specific 
permits, by contrast, is the opposite: the regulated entity submits a 
voluminous set of application materials, the agency engages in a 
rigorous assessment, the parties negotiate toward mutually acceptable 
terms, the agency makes discretionary decisions about what is 
acceptable under the statutory regime, the agency seeks public input 
at various stages, the agency issues an order setting out its final 
decision, and the order may be the subject of judicial review. In 
 
 127. For a general overview of the individual-permits program, see Stephen M. Johnson, 
Individual Permits, in WETLANDS LAW AND POLICY, supra note 92, at 191.  
 128. Id. at 193–96. 
 129. Id. at 196–201. 
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essence, all that the specific-permitting system accomplishes is setting 
the administration process in motion with governing procedures and 
standards, so that all the work is in the permit administration stage.130 
This is precisely how the Corps has configured its general-
nationwide and specific-individual permitting administrations under 
section 404. As one court recently described the nationwide permit 
program’s administration: 
Many projects undertaken pursuant to a general permit do not even 
need to be brought to the Corps’ attention . . . . Even when a general 
permit requires that the Corps provide pre-construction 
verification, . . . the Corps’ role is limited to determining whether the 
project in question does or does not satisfy the terms of the general 
permit, and if not, what steps the party seeking verification must 
take to bring their project within the ambit of that authorization. 
This type of check-in is far less involved than the probing assessment 
of the particular facts, circumstances, and environmental 
consequences of a specific project proposal that precedes a Corps 
determination of whether or not an individual discharge permit 
should issue. Put another way, under the nationwide permit system, 
the Corps has already done an environmental review on a general 
categorical basis and has already given its imprimatur to discharges 
that result from the type of construction activity at issue under 
specified circumstances. When a prospective permittee files a pre-
clearance notice, the only thing left to be done is for the Corps’ 
district engineers to verify that the planned project does, in fact, fit 
within the category of activities that the Corps has already 
authorized.131 
 
 130. Permit administration might also vary with respect to the need for periodic renewal or 
revision of the permits. Permit issuance might be a one-time decision by the agency, 
permanently authorizing the relevant activity. Alternatively, a permit might only be for a 
limited period of time, requiring renewal by the permit holder and possible revisions by the 
agency. The nature of the regulated activity might also, in practice, determine whether a permit 
is perpetual or temporary. For instance, wetland permits under section 404 authorize the 
disposal of dredge or fill material in wetland areas. Once the disposal has occurred, the area 
may no longer be considered a wetland and no further section 404 regulation applies. The 
permit is therefore only needed once by the regulated party. On the other hand, emissions of 
wastes into waters from a point source are often an ongoing activity. So long as the emitter 
wishes to continue the regulated activity, it needs a permit on an ongoing basis, and renewals or 
revisions may be required. The distinction between one-time and ongoing permits might make a 
difference in whether parties face barriers to enter into a regulated activity and how significant 
those barriers are. See infra Part II.A.  
 131. Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 990 F. Supp. 2d 9, 27 (D.D.C. 2013) 
(citations omitted). Courts have divided over whether an individual actor’s reliance on a general 
permit constitutes federal action triggering statutes such as the National Environmental Policy 
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Processing of individual permits is another story. As the Corps 
has concisely explained: 
Processing such permits involves evaluation of individual, project 
specific applications in what can be considered three steps: pre-
application consultation (for larger projects), formal permit 
application review, and decision-making. Pre-application 
consultation usually involves one or several meetings between an 
applicant, USACE staff, interested resource agencies (federal, state, 
or local), and sometimes the interested public. The basic purpose of 
such meetings is to provide for informal discussions about the pros 
and cons of a proposal relative to its effects on the aquatic 
environment while the applicant is still in the planning process. The 
process allows for a consideration of potentially less 
environmentally damaging alternatives available to accomplish the 
project purpose, to discuss measures for reducing the impacts of the 
project, and to inform the applicant of the factors the USACE must 
consider in its decision-making process. Once a complete application 
is received, the formal review process begins. The project manager 
prepares a public notice (if required), evaluates the impacts of the 
project and considers all comments received, addresses potential 
modifications to the project if appropriate, and drafts or oversees 
drafting of appropriate documentation to support a recommended 
permit decision. The permit decision document includes a discussion 
of the environmental impacts of the project, the findings of the 
public interest review process, and any special evaluation required 
by the type of activity such as determinations of compliance with the 
Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines.132 
Once again, these passages describe the extremes of general and 
specific permitting—some general permits involve absolutely no 
contact with the Corps, and some specific permits potentially involve 
a long engagement.133 But not all of the Corps’ work takes place at 
these extremes. Indeed, what makes the permit box so flexible is the 
 
Act. Compare Spiller v. Walker, No. A 98 CA 255 SS, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18341 (W.D. Tex. 
Aug. 25, 1998) (finding federal action), with Ouachita Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Bostick, 938 F. Supp. 
2d 32, 35–36, 45–46 & 46 n.7 (D.D.C. 2013) (finding no federal action as the project was 
properly authorized under the nationwide permits). 
 132. Individual Permits, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, FORT WORTH DIST. (last visited 
Aug. 20, 2014), http://www.swf.usace.army.mil/Missions/Regulatory/Permitting/Individual
Permits.aspx; see generally Johnson, supra note 127, at 191–202 (describing individual permits’ 
requirements and review procedures under CWA section 404). 
 133. Recall that the average processing time for general permits in one study was reported 
to be 24 days, which includes those general permits with some verification process, whereas for 
individual permits it was 187 days. COPELAND, supra note 68, at 2.  
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range of possibilities between the extremes. The next Section 
describes the mechanisms and consequences of transition from one 
extreme to the other. 
3. Transitions.  A pure general-permitting program frontloads all 
substantive decisions to the permitting-system stage, whereas a pure 
specific-permitting system backloads them to the permit 
administration stage. Illustrating the flexibility that exists for agencies 
to move around within the permits box, however, the Corps has built 
intermediate mechanisms into its permitting program. For example, 
many of its nationwide permits require users to file a preconstruction 
notification (PCN) with the Corps prior to taking advantage of the 
general permit through on-the-ground project development.134 Under 
this check-in process, the Corps then has a certain period of time to 
review the PCN and either provide “verification” that the general 
permit can be used as promulgated or with additional conditions 
tailored to the particular project,135 or decide that the project must 
exit the nationwide permit and obtain an individual permit.136 For 
some nationwide permits, the PCN requires only a “notice of intent” 
to use the general permit, whereas other nationwide permits require 
additional information such as wetland delineation maps and impact 
mitigation plans.137 The practical effect of the latter kind of PCN, of 
course, is to shift more of the general-permitting process from the 
permitting-system phase to the permit administration phase, creating 
something of a hybrid between pure general and pure specific 
permitting. 
This brings us to the question of transition. The PCN process 
illustrates how an agency can adjust some of the features of the 
permitting system and permit administration across a smooth 
continuum. For example, the amount of information required with 
the PCN, the intensity of agency review, and the opportunity for 
negotiation between the parties, can be tweaked incrementally. But 
one can easily see how the PCN mechanism, if pushed too far toward 
 
 134. See 33 C.F.R. § 330.6 (2011) (“Nationwide permitees may, and in some cases must, 
request from a [district engineer] confirmation that an activity complies with the terms and 
conditions of an NWP.”).  
 135. Sierra Club, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 27. 
 136. See Snoqualmie Valley Pres. Alliance v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 683 F.3d 1155, 
1163 (9th Cir. 2012) (describing the PCN verification process); Sierra Club, at *12–13 (same); see 
generally Taylor & Geoffrey, supra note 116, at 181 (same). 
 137. See Taylor & Geoffrey, supra note 116, at 180. 
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requiring applicant submission and agency assessment, could blur into 
a specific-permitting system. To put it another way, a nationwide 
permit relying on extensive and burdensome PCN requirements 
simply would not be a general permit given its onerous case-specific 
requirements. As a practical matter, users of the general permit 
would not know their status until after an extensive submission 
process and intensive Corps review process, possibly with extensive 
negotiation between the parties over conditions. The Corps would 
likely want to establish more extensive procedural and substantive 
regulations for PCN reviews, and require reviewing officers to issue 
decisions with extensive findings and justifications. There are 
tradeoffs, in other words, as the agency moves across the permit 
design spectrum. 
Moreover, as a matter of law, at some points such a process 
might cross a threshold from general to specific permitting for other 
permitting features not amenable to a smooth continuum, such as the 
availability of judicial review and public participation. For example, 
courts might perceive the PCN decision as an agency order under the 
APA, and thus require the process to undergo adjudicatory processes 
not required of rulemakings. Precisely where that discontinuity would 
occur is difficult to say,138 but its possibility does impose some drag on 
the ease with which an agency can craft intermediate solutions 
between pure general-permitting systems and pure specific-permitting 
systems. We address these tradeoffs in more detail in Part III. 
E. Hybrids and Other Variations 
Before leaving our description of the dimensions of permitting in 
the administrative state, we should acknowledge that agencies often 
have experimented with innovative ways of configuring permits that 
do not neatly fit onto the permit spectrum described above. Perhaps 
the best example of how important innovative permitting design can 
be to the success of a regulatory program is the Endangered Species 
 
 138. As noted previously, some courts have held that the act of verifying the applicability of 
a nationwide permit, with no additional conditions added, does not convert the PCN process 
into a specific permit order, but others have concluded that more intensive review of PCNs 
could trigger more demanding processing requirements of the Corps. See supra note 131; see 
also Jennifer Seidenberg, Texas Independent Producers & Royalty Owners Ass’n v. 
Environmental Protection Agency: Redefining the Role of Public Participation in the Clean 
Water Act, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 699, 718 (2006) (discussing a split among the courts as to when 
public notice and comment is required for project-specific use of a CWA pollution general 
permit the EPA issued for certain oil  and gas operation activities).  
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Act (ESA).139 The congressional politics of the mid-1990s put the ESA 
at the top of Congress’s hit list for agency reform. Seeing the writing 
on the wall, Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt set in motion an 
administrative reform agenda that successfully staved off the 
congressional assault, but which would forever transform the ESA.140 
Chief among these reforms was the reinvention of a previously little-
used permitting program found in section 10(a) of the statute, known 
colloquially as the habitat conservation plan (HCP) program.141 An 
HCP permit provides an avenue for development projects to obtain 
authorization to take a member of a protected species, usually 
through habitat modification, in return for mitigation and other 
measures assembled in a conservation plan.142 Although Congress 
added the HCP program in 1982 when it amended the statute,143 the 
HCP program had been essentially dormant through the 1980s.144 
Secretary Babbitt saw the HCP program as a win-win reform 
opportunity, however, as he could offer landowners a palatable and 
secure way out of their ESA problems—by giving the species some 
conserved habitat as mitigation for the modified habitat, the 
 
 139. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012). 
 140. For a detailed contemporaneous review of the reform agenda items and 
implementation, see J.B. Ruhl, Who Needs Congress? An Agenda for Administrative Reform of 
the Endangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 367, 374–87 (1998).  
 141. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B). For policy discussions of the HCP permit program 
written when it was emerging from disuse under Secretary Babbitt’s visionary reform agenda, 
see generally J.B. Ruhl, Regional Habitat Conservation Planning under the Endangered Species 
Act: Pushing the Legal and Practical Limits of Species Protection, 44 SW. L.J. 1393 (1991); 
Robert D. Thornton, Searching for Consensus and Predictability: Habitat Conservation Planning 
Under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 21 ENVTL. L. 605 (1991). For policy discussions 
having the benefit of several years’ experience of program implementation, see generally 
DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, FRAYED SAFETY NETS: CONSERVATION PLANNING UNDER THE 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (1998) (detailing the strengths and weaknesses of HCPs); Eric 
Fisher, Habitat Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species Act: No Surprises & the 
Quest for Certainty, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 371 (1996) (same); Albert C. Lin, Participants’ 
Experiences with Habitat Conservation Plans and Suggestions for Streamlining the Process, 23 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 369 (1996) (same); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Endangered Species Act: A 
Case Study in Takings & Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REV. 305 (1997) (proposing compensation for 
private landowners subject to HCPs). 
 142. For a “nuts and bolts” description of the HCP-permitting process, see Ruhl, supra note 
79, at 376–96. A comprehensive guide is available at Endangered Species Act Document Library, 
U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (May 29, 2014), http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/
index.html#hcp (discussing the HCP-permitting process). 
 143. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.). 
 144. By 1992, for example, the FWS had issued only 12 HCP permits. DEFENDERS OF 
WILDLIFE, supra note 141, at vi–xiii. 
RUHL IN PRINTER FINAL - FOR KRISTI (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2014  5:18 PM 
2014] THE PERMIT POWER REVISITED 175 
landowner could move forward with the intended uses of the 
property.145 
The Fish and Wildlife Services (FWS) quickly began issuing 
permits under the rejuvenated HCP program,146 which it has since 
continued.147 Indeed, through the use of regional HCPs, beginning in 
the 1990s large metropolitan areas and states began to solve their 
ESA compliance problems through large-scale permits, some of 
which covered up to hundreds of thousands of acres.148 The nature of 
these regional permits is often hybrid-like, in that the FWS issues 
what looks like a specific permit to the state or local entity, but the 
terms of the “specific permit” set up a general-permitting regime 
under which the state or local government administers what appears 
to be a general permit for specified public and private land use 
activities.149 Overall, these developments went a long way toward 
allaying the property rights pushback against the ESA150—illustrating 
the importance of giving attention to permitting and permit design. 
The FWS has continued to develop innovative hybrids of general and 
specific permitting, including a permit that would authorize a variety 
of activities along Florida’s beaches,151 a permit to facilitate utility-
 
 145. For comprehensive and thoughtful insider accounts of Secretary Babbitt’s vision and 
implementation of this phase of ESA reform, see generally John D. Leshy, The Babbitt Legacy 
at the Department of Interior: A Preliminary View, 31 ENVTL. L. 199 (2001); Joseph L. Sax, 
Environmental Law at the Turn of the Century: A Reportorial Fragment of Contemporary 
History, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2375 (2000). For a brief history of the ramp-up of the HCP program 
specifically, see Robert D. Thornton, Habitat Conservation Plans: Frayed Safety Nets or Creative 
Partnerships?, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 94, 95 (2001). 
 146. By late 1997, FWS had issued more than 225 HCP permits. See DEFENDERS OF 
WILDLIFE, supra note 141, at vi–xiii.  
 147. For a running tally, see U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., ECOS: Conservation Plans and 
Agreements Database, ENVTL. CONSERVATION ONLINE SYS. (Sept. 24, 2014), http://
ecos.fws.gov/conserv_plans/public.jsp (last visited Sept. 24, 2014). 
 148. See Thornton, supra note 145. 
 149. For a contemporary account of the emergence of regional permitting in the early 1990s, 
see Ruhl, supra note 141, at 1404–06. 
 150. See Thompson, supra note 141, at 322–23 (discussing skepticism regarding the 
government’s ability to protect property rights and the development of HCPs). 
 151. See Florida Beaches Habitat Conservation Plan, FLA. DEP’T ENVTL. PROT., http://
www.flbeacheshcp.com (last visited Oct. 6, 2014). 
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scale wind power generation across large regions of the nation,152 and 
guidance on the design of large-scale hybrid “master permits.”153 
Examples like the FWS’s permit innovations demonstrate that 
there is considerable space within the permits box for moving 
between the extremes of general and specific permits and inventing 
new combinations of permit attributes.154 The question thus becomes 
how to navigate this space in a way that most effectively achieves the 
goals of the relevant statute and avoids the pitfalls of the permit 
power Professor Epstein identified.155 This question leads directly to 
the topic of the next Section—the use of rulemaking versus 
adjudication in agency decisions. 
F. Rulemaking and Adjudication 
The general- and specific-permitting processes, for purposes of 
the APA, fall right on the border between rulemaking and 
adjudication. When a permit becomes specific enough, it has to be 
issued through adjudication to produce an agency “order.”156 The 
distinction between rulemaking and adjudication is an old chestnut in 
the administrative law literature, and historically an important issue 
in agency practice. From the New Deal until the 1960s, agencies 
predominantly used adjudication for decisionmaking; in the 1960s and 
1970s, in response to a series of critiques by academics, practitioners, 
judges, and policymakers of adjudication, they moved more toward 
rulemaking.157 Since the 1970s, scholars and practitioners have 
debated the pros and cons of each tool. 
 
 152. See Draft Environmental Impact Statement and Habitat Conservation Plan for 
Commercial Wind Energy Developments Within Nine States, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,512, 42,512 (July 
14, 2011). 
 153. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., GUIDANCE FOR INCIDENTAL TAKE PERMITS 
COVERING MULTIPLE PROJECTS OR PROJECT OWNERS (Apr. 30, 2013) (on file with the Duke 
Law Journal).  
 154. See also David Markell, States as Innovators: It’s Time for a New Look to Our 
“Laboratories of Democracy” in the Effort to Improve Our Approach to Environmental 
Regulation, 58 ALB. L. REV. 347, 376–80, 393–401 (1994) (discussing efforts by state agencies to 
improve permitting through design innovations). 
 155. See supra notes 10–20 and accompanying text. 
 156. See supra Part I.D.2.  
 157. Merton C. Bernstein, The NLRB’s Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571, 574 (1970); Reuel E. Schiller, Rulemaking’s 
Promise: Administrative Law and Legal Culture in the 1960s and 1970s, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1139, 
1145 (2001); Antonin Scalia, Back to Basics: Making Law Without Making Rules, REG., July–
Aug. 1981, at 25, 25. 
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Permits, as we have described them, fit uneasily in this 
dichotomy. As many have noted, the border between a rulemaking 
and an adjudication is not pellucid,158 and their definitions in the APA 
are far from helpful.159 But permits—particularly general permits—
further emphasize the fact that there is truly a continuum between 
rulemaking and adjudication. Permits are hybrid tools—general 
permits may have more of the characteristics of rulemaking because 
they are framed as a general statement about the performance 
capabilities of a wide class of people, and specific permits may have 
more of the characteristics of adjudications because they focus on the 
rights of an individual actor.160 But given the ways in which different 
permits can be “tweaked” to be more general or more specific in 
character, it may be quite tricky to identify whether any one permit 
program is more like rulemaking or more like adjudication. Although 
scholars have on occasion briefly noted the possibility of hybrid forms 
of rulemaking and adjudication,161 they have not engaged deeply with 
 
 158. See, e.g., NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 770 (1969) (“The line between 
these two functions is not always a clear one and in fact the two functions merge at many 
points.”); William D. Araiza, Limits on Agency Discretion to Choose Between Rulemaking and 
Adjudication: Reconsidering Patel v. INS and Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 899, 
908 (2006) (“Adjudicative and rulemaking procedures often feature similar characteristics, and 
orders and regulations often have similar affects.”); Warren E. Baker, Policy by Rule or Ad Hoc 
Approach – Which Should It Be?, 22 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 658, 658 (1957) (noting that 
“the demarcation between the two has become somewhat blurred”); Bernstein, supra note 157, 
at 610 (“One might say . . . that defining the differences between rule making and adjudication 
defies comprehension and expression.”); David L. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or 
Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921, 924 (1965). 
 159. The APA defines “rule making” as the “agency process for formulating, amending, or 
repealing a rule,” 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (2012), and an “adjudication” as the “agency process for the 
formulation of an order, id. § 551(7). Those two terms, in turn, are not well defined. Compare 5 
U.S.C. § 551(4) (defining “rule” as “the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or 
particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or 
policy” including rate-setting and ratemaking proceedings), with § 551(6) (defining “order” as 
“the whole or a part of a final disposition, whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or 
declaratory in form, of an agency in a matter other than rule making but including licensing”). 
 160. See Bernstein, supra note 157, at 613–15 (agreeing); Shapiro, supra note 158, at 924 
(identifying the distinction that rulemaking “is typically a proceeding that is entirely open ended 
in form, specifying only the class of persons or practices that will come within its scope, while 
‘adjudication’ is a proceeding directed at least in part at determining the legal status of persons 
who are named as parties, or of the acts or practices of those persons”). 
 161. See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1383, 1398–99 (2004) (describing some possible intermediate examples such as negotiated 
rulemaking, waivers of rules, and agency litigation strategies); Shapiro, supra note 158, at 924 
(noting wide range of informal tools available to an agency to make policy that do not easily fit 
into rulemaking-versus-adjudication categories); see also Schuck, supra note 3, at 256–57 
(describing adjudicatory exception process for oil price regulation in the 1970s that created 
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what hybridity is and what it might mean for regulatory practice. 
General permits in particular, allow us to engage deeply with those 
questions. In the next Part we discuss some of the pros and cons of 
general versus specific permits, and in doing so, identify different 
ways in which our analysis of general versus specific permits matches 
up with the historic depictions of the strengths and weaknesses of 
rulemaking versus adjudication. 
II.  PERMIT-DESIGN TRADEOFFS: GENERAL VERSUS SPECIFIC 
Why would a regulatory program use general or specific permits, 
or grant a complete exemption from permit requirements? At heart, 
these questions come down to two factors: the risk of harm the 
permitted activity poses, and the level of burden the transaction costs 
of a general- or specific-permitting program impose on the regulated 
parties and the agency. Higher risk of harm generally justifies more 
specific permit requirements. Conversely, more burdensome 
transaction costs generally support more general permit 
requirements. General permits are perhaps most useful when they 
allow for reduced burdens on regulated parties or for reduced 
political resistance for a regulatory program, without changing the 
underlying substantive regulatory standards, and when the harm 
posed by the actions covered by the general permit is minimal. 
We play out these two factors through the following specific 
permit design policy goals and attributes: permits as barriers to entry 
into economic or other activity, permits as tools to gather information 
for the regulatory agency, permits as tools to tailor regulation to the 
specific circumstances of the permitted activity, permits as 
enforcement tools, and the political constraints on permitting and 
regulatory systems. 
A. Permits as Barriers to Entry 
Permits are generally pre-conditions to undertaking a regulated 
activity.162 As such, they effectively act as barriers to entry for that 
activity. These barriers to entry can be significant. Permitting can 
impose substantial costs in the form of paperwork, information 
 
broad categories of relief, similar to general permits). For a discussion of the difficulties 
presented when multiple agencies take roles in adjudicatory, permitting, or hybrid processes, 
see Bijal Shah, Hidden Administrative Coordination, 128 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015). 
 162. But note the possibility that general permits might allow for activity to occur without 
preclearance by the regulatory agency. 
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gathering, legal fees, and administrative charges. Those costs will not 
be evenly distributed, nor will they have even impacts on various 
economic actors. 
First, permitting costs often provide a substantial advantage to 
incumbents in an economic field. Sometimes this is an artifact of the 
underlying regulatory scheme that imposes stricter standards on new 
entrants to a field than those on existing participants. But even if the 
regulatory standards on their face apply equally to existing and new 
participants in an activity, that does not mean that their burdens are 
in fact equal. There will often be substantial fixed costs and 
investments in a permitting system. For instance, there will be a 
learning curve as an organization determines what aspects of its 
operations require permitting, as it confronts how it needs to adjust 
its existing or planned operations to comply with the relevant 
regulatory standards, and as it collects information to complete the 
permit applications and fills out and submits the permits.163 Once the 
first permit has been obtained, it is likely to be much simpler and 
easier to renew a permit because most of the information has already 
been collected and developed, and the organization has learned how 
to manage the permitting process. At the extreme, if a permit is only 
required to enter into an economic activity, but then has an indefinite 
duration, existing participants will never need to apply for a new 
permit, and the permitting system will operate as a significant barrier 
to entry.164 
Many scholars have noted the important political economy 
surrounding regulatory barriers to entry. Existing regulated parties 
will see barriers to entry as a way to create cartels, exclude new 
entrants to the field, and allow the collection of monopoly rents. 
Existing regulated parties will therefore be willing to pay substantial 
amounts to obtain barriers to entry.165 These costs might take the form 
of lobbying efforts to create or maintain regulatory barriers to entry 
 
 163. See Thomas J. Dean & Robert L. Brown, Environmental Regulation as a Barrier to the 
Formation of Small Manufacturing Establishments: A Longitudinal Examination, 40 J. ENVTL. 
ECON. & MGMT. 56, 71 (2000) (finding that firms in industrial areas with higher regulatory 
burdens on average had larger size, and noting importance of “firm learning, past experience in 
solving environmental problems” in determining costs of regulatory compliance). 
 164. This is largely the story of state occupational licensing boards, which have been likened 
to cartels in all but name given, among other behaviors, the high barrier to entry the licensing 
requirement erects. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 69.  
 165. See, e.g., Jonathan Baert Wiener, On the Political Economy of Global Environmental 
Regulation, 87 GEO. L.J. 749, 754–61 (1999) (describing this dynamic). 
RUHL IN PRINTER FINAL - FOR KRISTI (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2014  5:18 PM 
180 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:133 
(through the legislative or regulatory process); alternatively, 
industries might be willing to pay significant costs in the form of 
strengthened regulatory standards (such as higher pollution control 
requirements) in return for obtaining these barriers to entry.166 
Second, not all regulated parties will be equally able to bear 
permitting costs. The more that permitting costs are fixed (invariant 
on the level of production by the firm), the more they are a burden on 
small actors. This is often the case, for the reasons indicated above: 
the costs of determining what permits are required and how most 
effectively to secure them will often have a high fixed component, and 
the difficulty of filling out forms and compiling the relevant 
information will also often have a high fixed component.167 These 
fixed costs may impose a significant economic burden on small 
firms.168 To the extent that we are concerned about deterring or 
reducing economic activity by small businesses, this is a significant 
concern.169 Small businesses also tend to have substantial rhetorical 
 
 166. For a discussion of this dynamic in the context of environmental law, see, for example, 
Jonathan H. Adler, Rent Seeking Behind the Green Curtain, REG., Fall 1996, at 26, 27; Daniel 
Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59, 62–63 (1992); 
Wiener, supra note 165, at 754–61. 
 167. See Dean & Brown, supra note 163, at 59 (“Research suggests that smaller 
organizations, without the specialized resources to cope with regulatory compliance obligations, 
may be more severely impacted by regulations. The costs of discovering and interpreting 
relevant regulations, dealing with regulatory agencies, and performing necessary paperwork 
appear to have a large fixed-cost component that increases the scale necessary for effective 
compliance. Smaller firms, without the ability to spread these administrative costs over higher 
production volumes, incur a penalty in the form of higher per-unit production costs.”). With 
respect to the costs of determining the nature and scope of regulations, costs can be fixed 
because often “the cost of interpreting a regulation does not depend on who is interpreting it.” 
C. Steven Bradford, Does Size Matter? An Economic Analysis of Small Business Exemptions 
from Regulation, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1, 8 (2004). This is also true for the cost of 
researching which regulations apply. Similarly, permits often impose “reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements” in which a substantial amount of the cost is fixed: “the number of 
reports required and the time necessary to complete the reports” often may not “vary with the 
size of the business.” Id. at 9–10. In filling out permits or reports, the firm must “learn exactly 
what the regulation requires, develop a form to collect the required information, train the firm’s 
employees to collect the data, and develop a monitoring system to ensure that the company 
complies.” Id. at 10. 
 168. See Dean & Brown, supra note 163, at 56 (finding that firms in industrial areas with 
higher regulatory burdens on average had larger size). 
 169. There are many claims that small businesses produce a disproportionate share of the 
innovation and job creation in the American economy, but these claims are hotly disputed. See, 
e.g., Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr., Regulation A: Small Businesses’ Search for “A Moderate 
Capital”, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77, 85–86 (2006) (arguing that small businesses produce innovation 
and jobs); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Small Is Not Beautiful: The Case Against Special Regulatory 
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appeal in politics, and thus imposing burdens on them might be 
politically unappealing.170 Entrants in a new field may well be small 
actors, for example, if they are entrepreneurs, rather than an 
established company entering into a new field of business. Thus, fixed 
permitting costs may both differentially harm small actors and deter 
entry into an industry or other area of economic activity.171 
General permits are a way of reducing the fixed costs of 
permitting by making those costs less significant without necessarily 
relaxing the underlying substantive regulatory standards.172 They can 
do that directly by reducing information requirements (for example, 
by making permit applications simpler and shorter).173 They can also 
do that indirectly by eliminating the need for agency approval before 
the regulated activity commences (for instance, in the context of 
 
Treatment of Small Firms, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 537, 551–57 (1998) (rebutting claims that small 
businesses produce innovation and jobs). 
 170. See, e.g., Tamara Keith, Small Businesses Get Big Political Hype. What’s the Reality?, 
NPR (Apr. 18, 2012), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2012/04/18/150822919/small-
businesses-get-big-political-hype-whats-the-reality. 
 171. See Dean & Brown, supra note 163, at 76 (noting possibility of constrained entry into 
industrial fields with high regulatory burdens because of increased costs on small actors). 
 172. Id. at 72 (“Efforts to streamline environmental requirements at the federal, state and 
local level would . . . reduce unit cost disparities created by administrative economies of scale 
that appear to be inherent in environmental regulation.”). 
  Of course, one can also simply provide exemptions from the underlying regulatory 
framework. This will not only eliminate the fixed costs imposed by a permit requirement, but 
also fixed costs that might result from the substantive regulatory requirements. See Bradford, 
supra note 167 (arguing that in general, exemptions for small businesses from regulatory 
requirements will be cost-benefit justified because of the existence of fixed costs). 
 173. Scholars, judges, and agency heads in general agree that standards that are set through 
rulemaking are more transparent, easier for outsiders to assess and comply with, and therefore 
impose lower information costs on regulated parties and the public than standards that are set 
through adjudication. See, e.g., Araiza, supra note 158, at 911 (noting that rulemaking prevents 
agencies from relitigating issues in every case); Baker, supra note 158, at 662 (noting that rules 
provide “definitive guides to agency action”); Richard K. Berg, Re-examining Policy 
Procedures: The Choice Between Rulemaking and Adjudication, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 149, 163 
(1986) (“The articulation of a generally applicable rule provides greater clarity to those affected 
as well as greater uniformity in enforcement.”); Bernstein, supra note 157, at 584–85 (describing 
difficulty of labor lawyers in keeping up with NLRB decisions and how these decisions change 
policy); Magill, supra note 161, at 1396 (discussing advantages to rulemaking); Scalia, supra note 
157, at 26 (noting that the prospective nature of rulemaking also leads to expansive statutory 
interpretation); Shapiro, supra note 158, at 940–41 (describing difficulty of labor lawyers in 
keeping up with NLRB decisions and how these decisions change policy); Peter L. Strauss, 
Rules, Adjudications, and Other Sources of Law in an Executive Department: Reflections on the 
Interior Department’s Administration of the Mining Law, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1231, 1238–43 
(1974) (discussing the lack of information available to the public from the Bureau of Land 
Management’s adjudicatory system). 
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notices of intent).174 General permits can even eliminate any need for 
a permit application—such as when the regulated party may proceed 
without any application or notice to the regulatory agency so long as 
its activities do not exceed certain thresholds.175 
On the other hand, there may be times when we actually wish to 
impose barriers to entry on certain activities through the use of 
permit requirements. More costly specific permit systems can serve as 
costly screens that deter activities that might have a significant 
likelihood of producing high social costs but have low social or 
private benefits.176 By imposing a fixed cost on those seeking to 
pursue the activity, costly permit requirements ensure that at least 
some minimum level of private benefit is likely to be produced in 
return for the potential harms created by the socially risky activity. 
This would screen out a wide range of potential activities that might 
pose significant harm with minimal private benefits.177 For instance, 
someone who is filling a wetland to construct a structure with minimal 
economic or personal benefit will be encouraged by a costly permit 
system to construct that structure elsewhere, without the harm to the 
wetland area, or at least with reduced harm.178 
 
 174. In a notice-of-intent system, such as the PCN system described for section 404 general 
permits, a general permit applicant need only provide notice to the agency of the proposed 
activity, and can proceed with the activity unless the agency moves to halt it. See supra text 
accompanying notes 135–39. 
 175. As we discussed earlier, this last situation is for practical purposes more or less the 
same as a complete exemption from regulation. See supra note 87. 
 176. For discussions of the concept, see generally, for example, Jonathan S. Masur, Costly 
Screens and Patent Examination, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 687 (2010) (applying the concept to 
patent applications, arguing that the administrative costs of patent review screen out low-value 
patents); Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” Judicial Review, 
58 ADMIN. L. REV. 753 (2006) (applying the concept to judicial review of agency action, and 
arguing that agencies can signal to courts that an agency action that is under judicial review has 
high social value by expending significant resources on preparing administrative records for the 
court to review).  
 177. See Masur, supra note 176, at 722–23 (applying costly screen concept to pollution 
permits). 
 178. For example, the Corps has justified its use of general permits in part on the rationale 
that the lower permit burdens of the general permits create incentives for actors to avoid harm 
to wetlands so that they can qualify for the general permit, and avoid the costly process of 
applying for an individual, specific permit. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, Decision 
Document: Nationwide Permit 39, at 7, 23 (Feb. 13, 2012), available at http://
www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/NWP_39_2012.pdf (describing a 
general permit that allows commercial and industrial development so long as the total wetlands 
impact is less than half an acre); id. at 7 (“Another important benefit of the NWP program . . . is 
the incentive for project proponents to design their projects so that those activities meet the 
terms and conditions of an NWP. The Corps believes the NWPs have significantly reduced 
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Costly screens might be particularly useful in situations in which 
individually small actions that have relatively small private benefits 
produce disproportionate social harm. This might be because small 
actors produce greater social harm per unit of activity than larger 
actors.179 Or it might be because we are concerned about the 
cumulative impacts of many small, individual actions. The cumulative 
impacts might produce feedback or threshold effects such that the 
total social harm from the total of all the small actions is larger than 
the sum of the harm from each individual, small action.180 Cumulative 
impacts are often an important issue in environmental harm, for 
instance, when biological systems may have become stressed by prior 
human impacts and are particularly susceptible to future, additional 
impacts, even if small. An endangered species might be pushed over 
the edge to extinction by a small harm that would be trivial for an 
abundant species. In this situation, we would be interested in 
screening out the relatively small action.181 
Of course there are limits to the utility of specific permit systems 
as costly screens. First, personal benefits may not be well correlated 
with social benefits; in other words, it is possible that some activities 
have low personal benefits but high social benefits (large positive 
externalities). The private regulated party seeking the permit will 
only take into account the lack of personal benefits in making the 
decision not to proceed, or to choose an alternate path; as a result, 
even though the activity should occur from a societal perspective, the 
permit requirement will lead the private actor to forego the activity. 
Reciprocally, there may be high private benefits from the activity, but 
low social benefits—often because of negative externalities from the 
activity. If those negative externalities are not the ones covered by the 
permit requirement, then the costly screen will not prevent the harm. 
For instance, in the wetlands example above, the proposed activity in 
the wetland might be extremely lucrative to the regulated party, and 
therefore might be pursued even though it might produce other social 
 
adverse effects to the aquatic environment because most applicants modify their projects to 
comply with the NWPs and avoid the delays and costs typically associated with the individual 
permit process.”). 
 179. See Pierce, supra note 169, at 557–60 (making this claim). 
 180. See Masur, supra note 176, at 723–24 (noting the utility of costly screens in reducing 
cumulative impacts). 
 181. Thus, the benefits of regulation will not necessarily be proportional to the size of the 
activity regulated; regulating even small activities may produce large benefits in certain 
circumstances. See Vandenbergh & Stack, supra note 84. Contra Bradford, supra note 167, at 16 
(arguing that the total benefit of pollution control depends on the size of the output regulated). 
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harms, such as large amounts of air pollution from the structure. The 
section 404 wetlands permit program regulates the harms caused to 
water resources from the activity, but if other harms from the activity 
are not regulated (for example, if there are no regulatory 
requirements for air pollution), the costly screen of wetlands permit 
requirements might not deter the owner and the activity will proceed, 
making society worse off. 
Second, the analysis above only looks at average levels of 
benefits and costs. Some activities may have a low probability of 
producing high social benefits. The expected value of the activity 
might be less than the fixed costs of the permit requirement, such that 
actors are deterred from engaging in the activity by the costly screen. 
However, if society is willing to take the risk of a low probability of 
high social benefits, we might want to encourage the activity to occur 
despite the negative expected value. 
The concerns about the differential impacts of permitting 
requirements have motivated a wide range of statutory and 
regulatory general permit systems, and even complete regulatory 
exemptions, to reduce the regulatory burdens for small businesses or 
small actors and to reduce barriers to entry.182 The Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) has created streamlined filing and 
disclosure forms for smaller firms that are subject to SEC securities 
regulations.183 These streamlined provisions are intended to respond 
to criticisms that the securities laws’ filing and disclosure 
requirements impose large fixed costs on businesses, making it 
 
 182. See Pierce, supra note 169, at 542–43 (describing widespread special treatment for small 
businesses in federal and state regulatory systems). Throughout this Part, we will at times draw 
on both statutory and administrative exemptions as well as general permit systems as examples 
in our analysis, in part because the same policy goals might be met with both exemptions and 
general permits. Moreover, it can sometimes be difficult to distinguish between the two. For 
instance, in the context of securities regulation, the basic rule is that securities must be 
registered before they can be traded. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.2 (6th ed. 2009). An exemption from the registration requirement 
might be seen as an exemption from the regulatory system overall. On the other hand, in many 
cases the unregistered security must still meet other substantive standards in the securities laws, 
in which case the waiving of the registration requirement is more of a general permit. 
Substantive standards must still be met, but the paperwork faced by the issuer or securities 
holder is reduced by eliminating the registration requirement.  
 183. See HAZEN, supra note 182, § 3.4(4)(D) (describing “streamlined disclosure 
requirements” for smaller public companies). The provisions are generally available to 
companies providing up to $75 million in public equity float. Id. The provisions do not exempt 
the companies from any of the reporting or disclosure requirements of the federal securities 
laws. Id. 
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infeasible for smaller entities to obtain capital funding through public 
offerings.184 These streamlined forms do not change the underlying 
regulatory requirements for the firms under the various securities 
laws. There is also a range of statutory and administrative exemptions 
from some of the filing and disclosure requirements under the federal 
securities laws. Those exemptions allow relatively small issuers of 
securities to provide minimal or no filings to the SEC or disclosures to 
purchasers.185 Again, the rationale has been the need to reduce the 
burden of regulatory compliance on small businesses.186 
Finally, the three-tiered permit system for hard rock mining on 
federal lands that is administered by the Bureau of Land 
Management (BLM), was in part explicitly developed to reduce 
burdens on small mining operators. The BLM explicitly exempted 
miners in the “casual use” category from any notice or permitting 
requirements, and also only required miners who disturbed less than 
five acres of public lands with their mining activities to file a notice 
with the agency about their proposed actions—with the burden then 
falling on the agency to object within a specified time and require a 
 
 184. See id.; Campbell, supra note 169, at 88–92 (2006) (describing how compliance costs for 
registering public securities offerings will disproportionately affect small offerings, and 
therefore make many offerings uneconomical); id. at 91–92 (“Registration has never been a 
viable way for small businesses to raise capital. High transaction costs associated with registered 
offerings inevitably put registration out of the range of small businesses in search of capital.”). 
 185. Regulation A is an exception from the registration requirement for issuance of 
securities that are less than $5 million in any given year; the issuer must still provide some 
disclosure information to the SEC and to the public. See HAZEN, supra note 182, § 4.17; 17 
C.F.R. §§ 230.151–.263 (2014). Regulation D provides for a series of exceptions from the 
registration requirement for small-volume issues of securities, generally with limited filing and 
disclosure requirements to the SEC and to the prospective purchasers. See HAZEN, supra note 
182, § 4.19; 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501–.506. Statutory exceptions are in sections 3 and 4 of the 1933 
Securities Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c-d. The most recent of these is the JOBS Act, in which 
Congress provided relaxed filing and disclosure requirements for “crowdfunding” of small 
businesses via the Internet. See HAZEN, supra note 182, § 4.17B; 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6). 
  For an overview of all of the exceptions, see U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Small 
Business and the SEC, http:///www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/qasbsec.htm. Although these 
exceptions do change many of the underlying substantive regulatory standards of the securities 
laws, they are not full exemptions from those laws. For instance, issuers of these securities can 
still be liable under various antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. See HAZEN, supra 
note 182, § 4.1[2]. 
 186. See HAZEN, supra note 182, § 4.15 (describing the history of these exemptions). For 
instance, the JOBS Act, Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 
306 (2012) (to be codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), was specifically developed by 
Congress to reduce the regulatory burden on small, start-up businesses using crowdfunding to 
raise capital. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Issues Proposal on 
Crowdfunding (Oct. 23, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/
1370540017677#.UwRlYfldWSo. 
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full permit application.187 Only the largest operations would be 
required to file a full plan of operations for the BLM’s approval.188 
The BLM stated that the reason for this tiered system was to 
minimize “the adverse impact of the rulemaking on the small 
operator.”189 Nonetheless, all operators were still required to meet the 
fundamental regulatory standard for mining operations on public 
lands: avoiding unnecessary or undue degradation of the public 
lands.190 
B. Permits as a Tool for Revealing or Developing Information 
Essential to the concept of specific permits is the detailed level of 
applicant-specific information required for the completion of the 
permit application. This allows for the tailoring of the permit to the 
circumstances of the particular applicant—either in determining 
whether the permit should be issued, or in determining the scope and 
parameters of the permit itself. Specific permits allow the agency to 
extract information about the activities being permitted, the parties 
seeking permits, and the harms and benefits that the permitted 
activities might be producing. The regulator might be able to 
cumulate the information collected from the full universe of permit 
applications to get a sense of the overall shape of the regulatory 
program, and of the activities the program regulates. Aggregation of 
data in this way can allow for an understanding of how widespread 
particular impacts from permitted programs are (for example, how 
many wetlands have been developed in a geographic area over the 
past ten years) and where those impacts are located (for example, a 
map of where the development of wetlands has occurred and whether 
certain watersheds are particularly impacted by the development). 
Aggregation can give a sense of the net costs and benefits of an 
 
 187. 43 C.F.R. §§ 3809.10, 3809.21 (2013). 
 188. Id. § 3809.11. 
 189. Surface Management of Public Lands Under U.S. Mining Laws, 45 Fed. Reg. 78,902, 
78,902 (Nov. 26, 1980) (noting that many commentators expressed a concern that more 
burdensome regulation “would limit activities on the Federal lands by the smaller operators and 
would result in their being put out of business”); id. (“For example, at the lowest level of 
activity, prospectors or part-time miners who cause only negligible surface disturbance will not 
need to contact the Bureau of Land Management.”). 
 190. 43 C.F.R. § 3809.415; Surface Management of Public Lands Under U.S. Mining Laws, 
45 Fed. Reg. at 78,908 (stating that in all cases operators “must not cause unnecessary or undue 
degradation”). Other requirements, such as specific performance standards or the requirement 
to post a financial guarantee to ensure that postmining reclamation can be paid for, do vary 
from tier to tier. See 43 C.F.R. §§ 3809.415, 3809.420, 3809.500. 
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overall regulatory program. Data aggregation can also allow 
regulators to get a sense of which parties are seeking permits and 
which parties are being granted or denied permits. This might allow 
for an understanding of the distributional impacts of a regulatory 
program on regulated parties (for example, are small permit 
applicants disproportionately having their permits denied?). As noted 
above, distributional impacts may be a significant issue for a 
regulatory program. 
Of course, there is no guarantee that the information that is 
gathered will be effectively used, or that the agency will even 
cumulate the data across permit applicants. For instance, the 
environmental review process under the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) often requires permit applicants to collect and 
present detailed information about the possible impacts of the activity 
for which they are seeking a permit.191 The environmental review 
process can thus be seen as an expansion of the information 
requirements for the permitting process, and a significant increase in 
the complexity and difficulty of any specific-permitting system. There 
is ample evidence, however, that federal agencies do not do very 
much with the information compiled by the NEPA process after they 
have made the decision to grant or deny the permit.192 Nor do federal 
agencies generally cumulate the information across environmental 
review documents to get a sense of overall status or trends of a range 
of permitted activities.193 As such, many observers have noted that 
federal agencies are losing a tremendous opportunity to use the data 
produced by the NEPA process to improve environmental 
decisionmaking.194 
 
 191. When a federal regulatory agency issues a permit, the granting of the permit becomes a 
federal action that triggers environmental review under NEPA. See NEPA Compliance, U.S. 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Aug. 22, 2014), http://yosemite.epa.gov/R10/WATER.NSF/
34090d07b77d50bd88256b79006529e8/fe7c90b6e62c946c882569530056d925!OpenDocument. 
The scope of the review generally encompasses the full range of impacts caused by the proposed 
permitted activity, even if that activity is being pursued by a nongovernmental actor. See 40 
C.F.R. § 6.605(a)(1) (2002) (“When determining the significance of a proposed new source’s 
impact, the responsible official shall consider both its short term and long term effects as well as 
its direct and indirect effects . . . .”). 
 192. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing 
Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 907 (2002). 
 193. See Daniel Farber, Adaptation Planning and Climate Risk Assessments: Learning from 
NEPA’s flaws, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,605, 10,610–12 (2009) (noting lack of 
central repository or digitization of NEPA documentation). 
 194. See id., at 10,610–12; Karkkainen, supra note 192, at 923; see also Joseph F.C. DiMento 
& Helen Ingram, Science and Environmental Decision Making: The Potential Role of 
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General permits, on the other hand, by definition require less 
information from the applicant than specific permits. On average 
then, general permits will provide less information to the agency than 
a specific permit.195 This has been a significant concern with the 
general permit systems under the CWA. A study of the application of 
one section 404 general permit in northern California that covered 
the filling of “isolated” or “headwaters” wetlands concluded that 
there was a “black hole” of information about the use of the permit, 
including a dearth of information on how many activities that were 
covered by the permit were actually reported to the agency (even 
when reporting was required).196 There was also very little 
information in the permit about the quality and nature of the 
wetlands affected by the wetland fills, which prevented an assessment 
of the cumulative environmental harms caused by the permitted 
activities.197 
 
Environmental Impact Assessment in the Pursuit of Appropriate Information, 45 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 283, 300–03 (2005) (calling for creating central NEPA clearinghouses to allow 
the accumulation of information across multiple review documents). 
 195. This is in contrast with the general conclusions drawn by the literature on rulemaking 
and adjudication, in which rulemaking is generally seen as more effective in gathering and 
assessing information about how a particular regulatory program is operating. See Bernstein, 
supra note 157, at 588, 618 (rulemaking “affords greater opportunity for data collection (and the 
clear enunciation of policy for ready transmittal to the affected public)”); Ralph F. Fuchs, 
Development and Diversification in Administrative Rule Making, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 83, 94 
(1977) (“The advantages of rule making include . . . the possibility of assembling all relevant 
information from a variety of sources at that time.”); Glen O. Robinson, The Making of 
Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative 
Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 503–04 (1970) (noting that scholars have stated that 
rulemaking is based on “legislative facts” about general conditions in society and adjudication 
on “adjudicative facts” particular to the individual parties); see also Schuck, supra note 3, at 295 
(describing problems with information collection and analysis for the adjudicatory exceptions 
process for oil price regulation in the 1970s). 
 196. See Addison & Burns, supra note 79, at 637–40 (quoting a Corps official as conceding 
that the agency has little information about the scope or impact of the program, and noting that 
the estimates of usage under the program that do exist “appear[] to rest heavily on 
speculation”). 
 197. See id. at 637–40 (noting that as of the early 1990s there was “little information 
available on the magnitude of wetland alterations permitted” under Nationwide Permit 26). For 
other examples of the lack of information about the scope or impacts of the section 404 general 
permit system, see Wyo. Outdoor Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 
1257–59 (D. Wyo. 2005) (noting lack of cumulative impacts analysis for section 404 general 
permit because of agency’s inability to do analysis until it has specific proposed activities under 
that permit), and U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, Decision Document: Nationwide Permit 39, at 
22 (Feb. 13, 2012), available at http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/
NWP_39_2012.pdf (stating that, for cumulative effects based on one particular section 404 
general permit, “it is not possible to quantify the relative contributions of the various activities 
that affect the quantity of wetlands, streams, and other aquatic resources and the functions they 
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Nevertheless, general permits may still be a good regulatory 
choice to increase the provision of information. First, if the legal or 
political realities are such that the only realistic alternative to a 
general permit is a full-blown exemption for the relevant activity, the 
general permit can provide more information than an exemption. For 
instance, even requiring that minimal information be provided (such 
as a notice of intent by a private actor that it is proceeding with an 
activity covered by a general permit)198 gives more information to a 
regulatory agency than an exemption for which there is no such 
requirement. A notice of intent can at least give the agency a sense of 
how many actors are taking advantage of a general permit provision, 
and a rough idea of the relative impacts of those actions.199 
 
provide, because such data are not available at the national scale,” and providing a very general 
overview of potential impacts from the proposed general permit). 
 198. Both the section 404 general permit program and the NPDES general permit program 
require many (but not all) applicants for general permits to file notices of intent. See, e.g., 
Reissuance of Nationwide Permits, 77 Fed. Reg. 10,184 (Feb. 21, 2012) (reissuing of section 404 
nationwide permits, including requirements for many permits for preconstruction notices to be 
filed with the Corps before work is initiated); General Permit Requirements and Reporting 
Requirements for Storm Water Discharges Associated with Industrial Activity, 57 Fed. Reg. 
11,394, 11,397–98, 11,406 (Apr. 2, 1992) (requiring notices of intent for many sources, but not 
for small discharges with minimal impacts, as the EPA explicitly relies on information gathering 
as the justification for the notice-of-intent requirement); EPA Construction General Permit, 
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Feb. 5, 2014), http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/stormwater/cgp.cfm 
(regulating stormwater discharges from construction activities, such as clearing, grading, and 
excavating, that disturb one or more acres, or smaller sites that are part of a larger 
development). The EPA’s framework regulations for NPDES general permits require a notice 
of intent to be filed for all general permits unless exempted by the agency. See 40 C.F.R. 
§ 122.28(b)(2) (2002). Exemptions can occur only for certain kinds of sources, and only if the 
agency makes specific findings. Id. 
 199. For instance, an upper-bound estimate of the impacts of actions can be made by 
multiplying the total number of notices of intent by the maximum amount of impacts that are 
permitted under the general permit provision. See, e.g., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, Decision 
Document: Nationwide Permit 39, 33 (Feb. 13, 2012), available at 
http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/NWP_39_2012.pdf (using historic 
data of total number of activities reported under a section 404 general permit, and average to 
maximum amount of impacts from each of those activities, to estimate total impacts and 
required mitigation from that permit). The EPA, which sets guidelines that the Corps is 
required to follow in developing its section 404 general permit program, mandates these kinds 
of estimates when the Corps develops a general permit. See 40 C.F.R. § 230.7(b)(3). The BLM 
also has argued that its requirements that many small mining operators provide the agency prior 
notice of their activities would provide useful information about mining activities and impacts 
on public lands, information that would not be available from a complete exemption from 
regulation. Surface Management of Public Lands Under U.S. Mining Laws, 45 Fed. Reg. 78,902, 
78,902, 78,904 (Nov. 26, 1980); see also Andrew P. Morriss, Roger E. Meiners & Andrew 
Dorchak, Between a Hard Rock and a Hard Place: Politics, Midnight Regulations and Mining, 55 
ADMIN. L. REV. 551, 568 (2003). 
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Second, general permits can allow agencies to focus their 
energies, and the energies of permit applicants, on the information 
that is most useful to the regulatory program, rather than waste 
energy on collecting information that is unnecessary or redundant. 
For instance, generic drugs have a streamlined permitting process; 
unlike new drugs, which must provide clinical data on the drug’s 
safety and efficacy, generic drug applications must only demonstrate 
that the generic is “bioequivalent (i.e., performs in the same manner 
as the innovator drug).”200 Because the original name-brand drug has 
already shown its safety and efficacy, requiring that information 
would be redundant and would impose needless obstacles on the 
provision of cheaper generic drugs. Alternatively, information may 
already have been collected and assessed under a different regulatory 
permit program, on which a general permit program could 
piggyback.201 
C. Permits as Tools to Tailor Regulation to Specific Circumstances 
By definition, more specific permits allow for more tailoring of 
the permit to the specific circumstances of the applicant, the 
 
 200. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(7) (2013) (requiring a showing of bioequivalence in 
abbreviated new drug applications (ANDAs)); 21 C.F.R. § 320 (describing bioavailability and 
bioequivalence requirements).  
 201. Many of the section 404 general permits are justified by the Corps as avoiding 
duplication with other regulatory programs that have already assessed the environmental harms 
of a regulated action. See, e.g., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, Decision Document: Nationwide 
Permit 8, at 2 (2012), available at http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/
nwp/2012/NWP_08_2012.pdf (oil and gas structures on the Outer Continental Shelf, justified on 
the basis that the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management already regulates environmental 
impacts); U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, Decision Document: Nationwide Permit 21, at 2 
(2012), available at http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/
NWP_21_2012.pdf (surface coal mining activities, justified on the basis that environmental 
impacts are already regulated under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act); U.S. 
ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, Decision Document: Nationwide Permit 27, at 2 (2012), available at 
http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/NWP_27_2012.pdf (aquatic 
restoration projects, in which the projects have already been approved by other conservation 
agencies); U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, Decision Document: Nationwide Permit 49, at 2 
(2012), available at http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/
NWP_49_2012.pdf (coal mining activities, justified on the basis that environmental impacts are 
already regulated under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act); U.S. ARMY CORPS 
OF ENG’RS, Decision Document: Nationwide Permit 50, at 2 (2012), available at 
http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/NWP_50_2012.pdf (same); see 
also 33 C.F.R. § 322.2(f)(2) (2011) (defining a general permit as available when it would 
“avoid[] unnecessary duplication of the regulatory control exercised by another Federal, state, 
or local agency provided it has been determined that the environmental consequences of the 
action are individually and cumulatively minimal”). 
RUHL IN PRINTER FINAL - FOR KRISTI (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2014  5:18 PM 
2014] THE PERMIT POWER REVISITED 191 
particular activity being approved, or the particular location of the 
regulated activity.202 Tailoring might involve: specific findings about 
the applicant or the activity before an approval is granted; constraints 
on the activity as conditions of the granted permit; or requirements 
for mitigation of the harms caused by the activity, among others. 
The question thus becomes at what point does the ability to 
tailor a specific permit make a specific permit more useful than a 
general permit. Tailoring through specific permits necessarily imposes 
costs—informational costs, administrative costs, transaction costs, and 
potentially even litigation costs—and therefore, tailoring will only be 
worthwhile if the costs of tailoring are outweighed by the benefits of 
tailoring.203 
The benefits of tailoring stem from being able to reduce harms 
and increase benefits by carefully deciding whether an activity should 
proceed and, if so, under what terms. This means that the risks of 
harms must be high, and can be decreased through tailoring, or that 
the potential of benefits from a proposed activity must be high, and 
those benefits can be increased through tailoring. In those 
circumstances, decreasing risks or increasing benefits through careful 
permit design can be socially worthwhile. On the other hand, if 
activities will individually have relatively small risks of harm or 
potential for benefits, the impacts on those risks or benefits through 
careful tailoring will be relatively small.204 Thus, general permits make 
 
 202. This is one of the more important benefits of adjudication in general. See, e.g., NLRB v. 
Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 774–75 (1969) (Black, J., concurring); SEC v. Chenery Corp. 
(Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 202–03 (1947); Baker, supra note 158, at 661 (“Where the particular 
problem is ‘so specialized’ or so dependent for solution on the various complex factual 
situations presented as to render it ‘impossible of capture within the boundaries of a general 
rule,’ the ad hoc approach is necessary.”); Schuck, supra note 3, at 235 (noting utility of 
adjudication in focusing on the particular characteristics of individual actors). 
 203. See C. Steven Bradford, The Cost of Regulatory Exemptions, 72 U. MO. KANSAS CITY 
L. REV. 857 (2004) (noting that one cost of varying regulatory levels among different parties will 
be creating costs for regulated parties, agencies, and third parties to determine what level of 
regulation properly applies to a particular regulated party). 
 204. In determining whether it is the risks of harm or the potential for benefits that matter 
for assessing whether tailoring is important, we focus on why we have the regulatory program in 
the first place. If the program focuses on preventing harm, then it is whether the risks of harm 
are large and controllable in that matter; if the program focuses on providing benefits, then it is 
the potential for benefits that matter; and of course, for some programs both will be relevant. 
  Another way in which the level of harm or benefit might affect the choice of general 
versus specific permits is if the resource being allocated through a permit is extremely limited, 
and we want to ensure that the resource is equally distributed among a limited number of 
claimants, or the resource is distributed to the most deserving of those claimants. (One classic 
example of this is the distribution of permits to operate taxis in major metropolitan areas.) In 
RUHL IN PRINTER FINAL - FOR KRISTI (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2014  5:18 PM 
192 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:133 
a lot more sense when either the risks of harm or the potential benefit 
from an activity are relatively small; or when the risks of harm or the 
potential benefit are invariant no matter what tailoring is undertaken. 
In both situations, tailoring will generally not be beneficial.205 
We can see this kind of analysis present in various general permit 
programs. As explained in Part I, for example, the provision of the 
CWA that allows for general permits in the section 404 regulatory 
program lays out specific requirements that must be met for a general 
permit to be issued. The agency must “determine[] that the activities 
in [the] category [to be covered by a general permit] are similar in 
nature, will cause only minimal adverse environmental effects when 
performed separately, and will have only minimal cumulative adverse 
effects on the environment.”206 The last two requirements (minimal 
individual and cumulative adverse environmental effects) follow from 
the above analysis—the program is focused on preventing harm to the 
environment, but if there is minimal harm, there is no need for careful 
analysis because harm cannot be reduced very much.207 The first 
 
this case, a “first come, first served” general permit system may not be appropriate, and we 
instead might choose to use a specific permit system that allows us to distribute permits to use 
the limited resource to whichever applicants “best” deserve to use the resource, however 
defined.  
 205. Rulemaking is generally identified as the more efficient relative to adjudication when 
the issues that are in common for most regulatory decisions dominate over the issues that vary 
across decisions. See E. Donald Elliott, Re-inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492 
(1992) (observing that rulemaking is better for addressing issues that will be raised repeatedly 
and are similar); Fuchs, supra note 195, at 94.  
 206. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e)(1) (2012). 
 207. Many of the existing section 404 general permits appear to be examples of activities 
that cause de minimis harm to wetlands. See generally, e.g., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, 
Decision Document: Nationwide Permit 1 (2012), available at http://www.usace.army.mil/
Portals/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/NWP_01_2012.pdf (aids to navigation), U.S. ARMY CORPS 
OF ENG’RS, Decision Document: Nationwide Permit 5 (2012), available at 
http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/NWP_05_2012.pdf 5 (scientific-
measurement devices); U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, Decision Document: Nationwide Permit 
6 (2012), available at http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/
NWP_06_2012.pdf (survey activities); U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, Decision Document: 
Nationwide Permit 9 (2012), available at http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/
civilworks/nwp/2012/NWP_09_2012.pdf (structures in fleeting and anchorage areas); U.S. ARMY 
CORPS OF ENG’RS, Decision Document: Nationwide Permit 10 (2012), available at 
http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/NWP_10_2012.pdf (mooring 
buoys); U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, Decision Document: Nationwide Permit 11 (2012), 
available at http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/NWP_11_2012.pdf 
(temporary recreational structures); U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, Decision Document: 
Nationwide Permit 28 (2012), available at http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/
nwp/2012/NWP_28_2012.pdf (modifications of existing marinas); U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, 
Decision Document: Nationwide Permit 36 (2012), available at http://www.usace.army.mil/
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requirement can also be seen as based on the above analysis. For, if 
activities in the category are similar in nature, then that could mean 
the harms or benefits of those activities will be similar as well—
imposing tailored permit analysis or conditions on individual activities 
will not have a major impact on the harms or benefits that the 
activities create.208 
Several of the general permits issued by the Corps for the section 
404 permitting program appear to be examples of relatively high-risk 
and high-benefit projects that might justify a more tailored permitting 
system, such as the nationwide permits for various coal mining 
activities,209 the permits for transportation projects,210 residential 
 
Portals/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/NWP_36_2012.pdf (boat ramps); see also Reissuance of 
Nationwide Permits, 77 Fed. Reg. 10,184, 10,184 (Feb. 21, 2012). 
 208. Note that if our analysis is correct, in situations in which the harms and benefits are 
relevant to the regulatory program, what matters for this particular factor in the general permit 
test is whether the activities are similar in the harms or benefits they cause, not whether they are 
similar on unrelated factors (for example, the number of applicants seeking the permit). The 
EPA’s guidelines for section 404 general permits, which the Corps must follow, appear to 
recognize this point. See 40 C.F.R. § 230.7(a)(1) (2002) (requiring a finding before a general 
permit is issued that the activities to be regulated will be both “similar in nature and similar in 
their impact upon water quality and the aquatic environment”). At times the Corps has pointed 
to other kinds of similarities as justifying the use of general permits. For example, the Corps 
issued a general permit for certain kinds of oil and gas activities, and stated that the general 
permit could be justified because those activities had similar purposes (obtaining oil and gas). 
See Wyo. Outdoor Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1257–59 (D. 
Wyo. 2005). Nevertheless, the Corps also has usually pointed to the similarity of impacts, either 
explicitly, id., or implicitly, by noting how the conditions on general permits greatly narrow the 
kinds of impacts that can be expected from the activities regulated by the permit, see Alaska 
Ctr. for the Env’t v. West, 157 F.3d 680, 84–85 (9th Cir. 1998) (conditions imposed on general 
permit limit the kinds of impacts that can be expected from permitted activities); Sierra Club v. 
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 464 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1190–96 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (holding that the 
conditions imposed on a general permit limit the kinds of impacts that can be expected from 
permitted activities to “suburban development”). 
  Other kinds of similarity besides similarity of impacts might justify the use of general 
permits based on other factors besides tailoring to reduce risks and increase benefits. For 
instance, combining a range of activities that are usually performed together (perhaps because 
they have the same overall purpose) might reduce the administrative burdens of a general 
permit system, advancing the goal of reducing administrative burdens in general, or for small 
actors. See Wyo. Outdoor Council, 351 F. Supp. at 1257–59 (discussing the agency’s reliance on 
this rationale). 
 209. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, Decision Document: Nationwide Permit 21 (2012), 
available at http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/NWP_21_2012.pdf; 
U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, Decision Document: Nationwide Permit 49 (2012), available at 
http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/NWP_49_2012.pdf; U.S. ARMY 
CORPS OF ENG’RS, Decision Document: Nationwide Permit 50 (2012), available at 
http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/NWP_50_2012.pdf. 
 210. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, Decision Document: Nationwide Permit 14 (2012), 
available at http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/NWP_14_2012.pdf. 
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developments,211 and Commercial and Institutional Developments.212 
All of these involve potentially substantial impacts on wetland 
resources,213 all generally involve activities that should have 
substantial economic value, and therefore might well be worth the 
time and effort to tailor. And in fact the Corps does provide some 
tailoring in many of these nationwide permits: the Corps requires 
preconstruction notice for many projects, allowing the agency either 
to require an individual permit if necessary or to strike a middle 
ground by requiring less comprehensive information and attaching 
case-specific conditions to the use of the general permit.214 
The Corps has another way of providing at least some tailoring 
for general permits: general conditions that limit the applicability of 
general permits and reopener provisions. The conditions prevent the 
use of general permits in certain sensitive locations,215 and also require 
a much more detailed analysis when certain sensitive resources are 
present.216 The reopener provisions generally allow the Corps to 
 
 211. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, Decision Document: Nationwide Permit 29 (2012), 
available at http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/NWP_29_2012.pdf. 
 212. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, Decision Document: Nationwide Permit 39 (2012), 
available at http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/NWP_39_2012.pdf. 
 213. All of these permits cap the total impacts on wetlands for each permitted project at 
one-half acre, though even this amount can be substantial cumulatively across all issued permits. 
See Reissuance of Nationwide Permits, 77 Fed. Reg. 10,184, 10,184 (Feb. 21. 2012). 
 214. See supra text accompanying note 191. For Nationwide Permit 14, preconstruction 
notice is required for projects that disturb between one-tenth and one-half an acre; all of the 
other permits require preconstruction notice for all permitted projects. See Reissuance of 
Nationwide Permits, 77 Fed. Reg. 10,184, 10,184. Preconstruction notice means that the Corps 
has forty-five days after receiving the notice to require the permit applicant to file for an 
individual permit or request more information; in general, failure by the Corps to take any 
action allows the permit applicant to proceed with the permitted activity. See id. (general 
condition 31). Nonetheless, these permits have been controversial, both because of concerns 
about a lack of reporting and enforcement, see supra notes 193–96 and accompanying text, and 
because of concerns that the Corps does not effectively exercise its ability to require an 
individual permit. See COPELAND, supra note 68. Nationwide Permit 21 has been particularly 
controversial and the subject of repeated litigation. See id. at 12 (“Citizen groups have filed 
lawsuits seeking generally to halt the Corps’ use of nationwide permit 21 for mountaintop 
mining operations.”); see also Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Hurst, 604 F. Supp. 2d 860, 868 (S.D. 
W. Va. 2009) (vacating the Corps’ issuance of Nationwide Permit 21 because it did not provide 
evidence that a proposed mitigation process would be successful or adequately enforced). 
 215. For instance, general permits cannot be used in Wild and Scenic River areas, and many 
permits are not applicable in marine sanctuaries, marine monuments, and National Estuarine 
Research Reserves. See Reissuance of Nationwide Permits, 77 Fed. Reg. 10,184, 10,283 (general 
conditions 16 and 22). 
 216. If endangered species or historic and cultural resources are present in the location 
where the permitted activity will occur, then consultation under the ESA or the National 
Historic Preservation Act must occur. See id. at 10,283–84 (general conditions 18 and 20). 
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require an individual permit when, in its discretion, one appears to be 
necessary.217 
Many of the exemptions from the registration requirements 
under the securities laws (both statutory and regulatory) can be, or 
are, justified on the grounds that very minimal harm could occur from 
the exempt securities transactions. For instance, many of the 
exemptions set caps on the total amount of securities that can be 
issued or require that the securities can be marketed only to 
“sophisticated” investors who presumably are less vulnerable to fraud 
and likely have more funds to cover any losses from fraud, or both.218 
Finally, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has a 
system to determine whether proposed construction projects would 
interfere with air traffic.219 Any proposed construction project that is 
more than two hundred feet high or would vertically cross into the 
potential approach airspace of a nearby airport must provide notice 
to the FAA.220 If the proposed construction project is more than two 
 
 217. See 33 C.F.R. § 330.5 (2011). The EPA has a similar provision allowing it to require an 
individual permit for any general permit application. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.28(b)(3) (2012). 
  Additional examples of the relevance of tailoring for a general permit program are 
both the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA’s) over-the-counter and generic drug-approval 
process. As noted above, the generic drug approval process has a streamlined permitting 
program that only requires generics to demonstrate that they are “bioequivalent” to already 
permitted drugs. Again, by showing similarity with an existing drug, this showing makes clear 
that tailoring would not be socially beneficial because the harms and benefits would be the same 
as those already concluded to be acceptable. 
  The over-the-counter drug approval process is similar. The FDA makes an initial 
determination that harms are minimal and benefits are relatively large for a specific drug or 
group of drugs. Here the conclusion that harms are minimal means that the utility of specific 
permitting of individual drugs would be relatively low. See Drug Applications for Over-the-
Counter (OTC) Drugs, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/
DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/ApprovalApplications/
Over-the-CounterDrugs/default.htm; 21 C.F.R. §§ 330.1, 330.10 (2011). The statutory basis for 
the over-the-counter exception is 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1), which defines a “new drug” that 
requires FDA approval as a drug that is “generally recognized, among experts qualified by 
scientific training and experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of drugs, as safe and 
effective for use.” 
 218. See, e.g., HAZEN, supra note 182, §§ 4.19–4.20 (describing how various exemptions 
under Regulation D limit offering amounts to below $1 million or $5 million, or allow marketing 
only to “accredited investors” who have a substantial net worth, or both). 
 219. See 14 C.F.R. § 77 (2012). 
 220. Id. § 77.9(a)–(d). Structures that fall within the two-hundred–feet-high category must 
provide additional information. Id. § 77.11. Structures that are “shielded by existing structures 
of a permanent and substantial nature or by natural terrain or topographic features of equal or 
greater height, and will be located in the congested area of a city, town, or settlement where the 
shielded structure will not adversely affect safety in air navigation” are exempt from the notice 
requirements. Id. § 77.9(e)(1). 
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hundred feet high, however, the FAA presumes that the project will 
interfere with aviation, and the permit seeker must provide evidence 
rebutting that presumption along with basic notice.221 Proposed 
construction projects that are five hundred or more feet high, or are 
over two hundred feet high and close to an airport, or that are within 
specified areas near to the airport, are presumed to be hazards to air 
navigation and must submit to an aeronautical study by the FAA to 
determine if a hazard exists.222 Other projects may be subject to a 
study if the FAA determines that a study is required.223 Again, the 
system increases the level of information required by the applicant—
and the concomitant scrutiny by the regulatory agency—based on the 
level of potential harm caused by the proposed project. 
The NPDES general permit program, which as previously 
mentioned is part of the CWA, provides an example of how the need 
for tailoring might undermine the effectiveness of a general permit 
program. The NPDES general permit program has at times been 
justified by the agency on the grounds that it can avoid regulatory 
burdens for small discharges with minimal impacts.224 But the NPDES 
general permit regulations do not restrict the use of general permits 
to “minor” point sources, and any one permit can cover a range of 
sources.225 In addition, there are more fundamental problems with the 
NPDES general permit program from a tailoring perspective. First, 
there are often site-specific reasons to be concerned about the 
impacts of emissions from a particular discharger into a particular 
waterway. Each waterway is different, and may be susceptible or 
 
 221. Id. § 77.7(d). 
 222. Id. § 77.17. Even if the FAA concludes that a proposed construction project is a hazard 
to navigation, the agency cannot directly prohibit the project, although its adverse conclusion 
will usually have significant impacts on local zoning approvals, insurance, and airport 
operations. BFI Waste Sys. of N. Am., Inc. v. FAA, 293 F.3d 527, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2002); J. Scott 
Hamilton, Allocation of Airspace as a Scarce National Resource, 22 TRANSP. L.J. 251, 267 
(1994). 
 223. 14 C.F.R. § 77.27. 
 224. See, e.g., General Permit Requirements and Reporting Requirements for Storm Water 
Discharges Associated with Industrial Activity, 57 Fed. Reg. 11,394, 11,405–06 (Apr. 2, 1992) 
(justifying exemption of some NPDES general permits from a notice-of-intent requirement on 
the grounds that those permits involve small discharges with minimal impacts). 
 225. See Gaba, supra note 79, at 422–23; 40 C.F.R. § 122.28(a)(2)(ii) (2012). The regulations 
generally do require a finding that the discharges “within each category” involve similar 
operations, similar discharges, and require similar effluent limitations or operating conditions. 
Gaba, supra note 79, at 422; 40 C.F.R. § 122.28(a)(2). 
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vulnerable in different ways to discharges.226 However, the EPA’s 
current NPDES general permit system does not appear to be very 
effective at taking these site-specific water quality issues into 
account.227 Second, the best management practices (BMPs) that are 
usually imposed on regulated parties through the NPDES general 
permit program often require some form of site-specific development; 
the EPA has attempted to address the potential incompatibility 
between general permits and site-specific crafting of BMPs by 
allowing regulated parties to draft their own BMPs with minimal or 
no review by the agency, which has raised serious enforcement 
problems.228 Although there may be other justifications for the current 
NPDES general permit program—either political, or on the grounds 
of reducing impacts on small parties—tailoring is not one of them. 
D. Permits as Political Tools 
The way in which a permitting system is structured might help to 
address political constraints or reduce resistance to a regulatory 
scheme.229 General permits might provoke less political resistance 
from regulated parties because they are less burdensome in terms of 
paperwork and transaction costs. Indeed, some permits that do not 
even require notice to the agency might impose essentially no costs 
on the regulated party—and from that party’s perspective, the 
permits might equal a full-blown exemption from regulation. 
Avoiding regulatory burdens might be important even if the use of 
the permits is not limited to situations in which reduced regulatory 
burdens are economically justified, such as for small parties or when 
tailoring is not appropriate. To the extent that particular interest 
groups have substantial political power or influence, reducing 
regulatory burdens on those groups might make the regulatory 
system politically possible. This is likely one reason that the EPA has 
used general permits for the regulation of agricultural discharges230—
farmers have substantial political sway.231 
 
 226. This may be the case, for instance, because the waterway is already heavily affected by 
other discharges, or contains threatened or endangered species. 
 227. See Gaba, supra note 79, at 434–56.  
 228. Id. at 456–64.  
 229. See Schuck, supra note 3, at 284–85 (noting the importance of exemptions from rules 
that can mollify powerful political interests). 
 230. See Gaba, supra note 79, at 430–31 (providing an overview of concentrated animal-
feeding operations (CAFOs) general permits); Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding 
Operations, 68 Fed. Reg. 7176 (Feb. 12, 2003) (the EPA’s announcement of general permits for 
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Another important source of political resistance due to 
regulatory burdens is the regulation of widespread, common activities 
pursued by many individual members of the public.232 The fixed costs 
of permitting might simply be politically impossible to impose on 
frequently pursued activities,233 especially if there is a general 
expectation that the activity should be permitted.234 General permits 
can allow for regulation with an especially light touch, even allowing 
ex post approval of projects under the permitting system and avoiding 
potential backlash against the regulatory system. This is how section 
404 permits have been used on occasion, allowing developers who 
might not have even been aware that their activities were covered by 
the regulatory program to receive after-the-fact permits.235 In so 
doing, the regulators may avoid a major political fight over applying a 
regulatory program to “everyday activities”—albeit at a potentially 
high cost to the deterrent effect of the regulatory program. 
But if the goal is simply to reduce regulatory burdens to address 
the political resistance to a regulatory program, why not just grant 
outright statutory exemptions from the regulatory program for 
favored interest groups? There are several good reasons. First, 
general permits might allow at least some regulation even when there 
is substantial political resistance—providing for some reduction in 
harm compared to a baseline of no change under an exemption. For 
 
CAFOs); 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(h) (general permit provisions for CAFOs). EPA has justified its 
use of general permits for CAFOs on the grounds that the NPDES permit process requires end-
of-the-pipe emission controls, but that CAFO water emissions are best addressed through 
BMPs, which are very different. See Gaba, supra note 79, at 420–21; National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System, 42 Fed. Reg. 6846 (Jan. 28, 1977); Natural Res. Def. Council, 
Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1377–80 (D.C. Cir. 1977). There is nothing inherently inconsistent, 
however, between the use of BMPs and specific permits. 
 231. See Ruhl, supra at 84, at 331–33.  
 232. In Part III, we explore the possible reasons for this resistance, why this resistance will 
be of increasing importance in a globalizing world, and how this resistance might be reduced or 
ameliorated using general permits. See infra Part III. 
 233. Of course, the fixed costs of permitting might be economically unjustifiable when they 
are imposed on frequently pursued activities. If each instance of the activity requires permitting, 
the fixed costs would mount rapidly. Reducing those fixed costs through general permits will 
therefore be desirable, just like in the context of regulating the behavior of small actors. Those 
fixed costs might also be minimized by allowing an actor to receive an ongoing permit, rather 
than by requiring a permit for each particular activity. 
 234. See Eric Biber, Climate Change and Backlash, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1295, 1317–28 
(2009). 
 235. See Addison & Burns, supra note 79, at 621, 647–49.  
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instance, it is possible that without general permits there might have 
been no regulation at all of large animal feedlots under the CWA.236 
Second, general permits might also be more flexible compared to 
exemptions. For instance, compare two options: on the one hand, a 
complete exemption under the statute for certain activities or interest 
groups, versus on the other hand, the placement of those activities or 
interest groups within the regulatory jurisdiction of the agency, to be 
regulated using a general permit. The statutory exemption might be 
very difficult to change or eliminate over time—perhaps in response 
to changed political circumstances (for example, reduced political 
resistance to the regulatory program), or to an increased need for 
regulation of the exempted activities or interest groups (for example, 
because of economic, ecological, or social changes). Legislatures 
often face substantial inertia that restricts their ability to enact even 
small changes in statutes237—particularly at the federal level where 
legislation requires approval by two legislative bodies, the President, 
and (effectively) the relevant committees within each legislative body. 
Agencies, on the other hand, can change rules so long as they have 
the support from the President (or at least indifference if the change 
is sufficiently low profile), and the rule change survives judicial 
review.238 If the legislature intends to stop the agency’s regulatory 
change, it must overcome its legislative inertia and pass a substantive 
or appropriations bill that prevents the change.239 General permit 
systems, therefore, might more easily allow the phase-in of 
regulations in situations in which there is substantial political 
 
 236. There are significant exemptions from many environmental laws for agriculture. For 
instance, the CWA exempts “return flows from irrigated agriculture” from regulation. 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1342(k)(1) (2012). For a comprehensive list of the many exemptions, see Ruhl, supra note 84, 
at 293–315. Indeed, the EPA originally intended to completely exempt most agricultural sources 
from any regulation, but was prevented from doing so by litigation. See Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
 237. See Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the 
Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1179–80, 1198–99 (2009) (describing 
the difficulty of enacting legislative change at the federal level). 
 238. Given the deference that courts usually provide to agency action, judicial review is 
more likely to delay than absolutely prevent a regulatory change. See William S. Jordan, III, 
Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review Significantly Interfere with Agency 
Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393, 
418 tbl.3 (2000) (concluding that of sixty-one cases in which the D.C. Circuit remanded an 
agency rule between 1985 and 1995, there were only twelve cases in which the remand order 
prevented the agency from pursuing its objective). 
 239. The legislature’s position is even worse because if the President supports the regulatory 
change, he can veto any bill that prevents the change. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. Congress must 
garner two-thirds support to override a presidential veto. Id. 
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resistance because there is less inertia to overcome in making 
regulatory changes. In fact, although the EPA did not refer to 
political considerations, its development of the NPDES general 
permit system was intended as a phased process in which the agency 
would move over time from permitting a wide range of agricultural, 
stormwater, and silvicultural sources under blanket general permits, 
to permitting more tailored general permits and even individual 
specific permits.240 
As for the difference between a regulatory general permit and a 
regulatory exemption, the border between the two can be difficult to 
draw—as noted above, it is unclear how different the situation is from 
a regulated party’s perspective, between a rule that grants a general 
permit for an activity with no notice or conditions requirements, and 
a rule that flat-out exempts the activity from regulation. Of course, 
under some statutory schemes the agency might not have the 
authority to exempt an activity from regulation, even if the activity 
falls within the agency’s jurisdiction.241 But even if regulatory 
exemptions are available as options, there might be a reason for an 
agency to choose to use a very lax general permit system instead of a 
complete exemption. There might be a psychological or political 
difference between not regulating at all and regulating with a very 
slight touch, if the agency believes that in the future additional 
regulation might be required. Actors who believe that they are 
completely exempt from regulation might fiercely object to the 
imposition of substantial regulatory exemptions, whereas actors who 
understand that they are subject to minimal regulation might be less 
resistant to seeing that regulation gradually increased.242 Indeed, it 
was the concern that exemptions would be all too permanent that led 
the D.C. Circuit to reject the EPA’s efforts to carve out regulatory 
exemptions from the NPDES permitting program: 
 
 240. See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, 42 Fed. Reg. 6846 (Jan. 28, 
1977). The EPA continued to pursue this strategy for many years. See General Permit 
Requirements and Reporting Requirements for Storm Water Discharges Associated with 
Industrial Activity, 57 Fed. Reg. 11,394 (Apr. 2, 1992) (using a phased general permit approach 
for stormwater regulation). 
 241. See Natural Res. Def. Council, 568 F.2d 1369 (rejecting the EPA’s attempts to exempt a 
wide range of agricultural, silvicultural, and stormwater sources from NPDES regulation).  
 242. See Biber, supra note 234, at 1317–28 (describing how the imposition of new regulatory 
restrictions on previously unregulated, but widespread, activities can create a political backlash 
against regulation). 
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  There is also a very practical difference between a general permit 
and an exemption. An exemption tends to become indefinite: the 
problem drops out of sight, into a pool of inertia, unlikely to be 
recalled in the absence of a crisis or a strong political protagonist. In 
contrast, the general or area permit approach forces the Agency to 
focus on the problems of specific regions and requires that the 
problems of the region be reconsidered at least every five years, the 
maximum duration of a permit.243 
The political and legal flexibility that general permits create 
compared to exemptions might also be particularly useful in the 
context of regulating de minimis harms. Although de minimis harms 
might justify an exemption from regulation,244 one challenge is that 
the kinds of harms that are considered de minimis might change over 
time. For instance, as the number of actors imposing very small harms 
on an environmental resource increases, what was at first seen as a 
harm that could be ignored, might eventually become a cumulatively 
important harm that requires attention.245 It will be easier to adjust 
regulations to take into account the changing impact of certain harms 
through a more flexible general permit system than through an 
exemption system.246 
Another possible concern with the use of full exemptions is that 
exemptions might be vulnerable to political pressure. As noted above, 
in general we would expect that agencies should have less information 
about how widely exemptions are used, and the harms that they 
cause, compared to even general permit systems (which might have 
 
 243. Natural Res. Def. Council, 568 F.2d at 1382. CWA permits are valid only for periods up 
to five years, so general permits necessarily require revision and reissuance on a regular basis by 
the EPA. This, however, is particular to the CWA; general permits need not necessarily have 
limited terms.  
 244. See Edward W. Warren & Gary E. Marchant, “More Good than Harm”: A First 
Principle for Environmental Agencies and Reviewing Courts, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 379, 426–27 
(1993). 
 245. For examples and discussion of this problem, see infra Part III. See also Holly Doremus, 
Takings and Transitions, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 19–20 (2003).  
 246. If the use of general permits is seen as a step toward a more “adjudicatory” form of 
rulemaking compared to exemptions, then it makes sense that general permits would be more 
flexible and responsive to changes in conditions. Adjudication is frequently identified as more 
flexible and responsive than rulemaking, and therefore more appropriate for policy contexts 
that are dynamic or uncertain. Bernstein, supra note 157, at 588, 616 (recommending the use of 
adjudication when information is tentative and uncertain); Shapiro, supra note 158, at 927–28; 
Magill, supra note 161, at 1406–07 (noting that adjudication is preferable when there is 
“inexperience, complexity, and unforeseen circumstance”); Schuck, supra note 3, at 196, 265 
(arguing that adjudication “facilitates cautious and flexible policy development”). 
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reporting or other requirements), because exemptions by definition 
require no reporting through a permit process. Gathering information 
about how widely an exemption might be used or its impact would be 
very costly, whether for an agency, outside groups, or the general 
public.247 Because information is a public good, it will be difficult to 
organize members of the public to collect information about the use 
or impacts of the exemption.248 The informational advantages that 
regulated parties often have will therefore be exacerbated, and the 
lack of information about the exemption may make it difficult to 
mobilize members of the public to push for administrative or 
legislative changes to the exemption, or even to know whether 
changes are desirable. 
A final political advantage of general permits compared to 
exemptions is that they might provide more politically feasible ways 
to collect funds for mitigating harms or restoring damaged resources. 
Activities, whether covered by a general permit or by an exemption, 
may cause significant social harms—harms that we might want to 
offset through mitigation or eliminate through restoration activities. 
Mitigation and restoration cost money. But if the activity is covered 
by an exemption, it may be more difficult to connect the fees 
collected with the harms caused—after all, if a harm was caused, why 
not regulate in the first place?249 General permits, however, explicitly 
recognize the harm caused by the activity, perhaps providing greater 
political support for, and judicial approval of, fees that are collected 
for mitigation or restoration.250 And it seems plausible that these kinds 
of fees are much more politically feasible to collect and use than are 
general taxes to pay for restoration or mitigation.251 
 
 247. Eric Biber, The Problem of Environmental Monitoring, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 31 
(2011) (discussing how expensive environmental monitoring can become). 
 248. Information is a public good in economic terms because it is nonrivalrous and 
nonexcludable. Id. at 13–14. The organizational obstacles to producing information will be 
particularly challenging to overcome if the harms caused by an exemption are also to a public 
good—for example, pollution from an unregulated factory that contaminates the air. 
 249. See Schuck, supra note 3, at 184–85 (arguing that the difference between an exception 
and a permit is that an exception implies that the otherwise-regulated action is justified and 
without moral blame, whereas a permit implies that the action is morally blameworthy but is 
being permitted in any case). 
 250. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013) (requiring 
environmental permit mitigation exactions and fees to meet the “essential nexus” and “rough 
proportionality” tests); see also infra note 322 and accompanying text. 
 251. See David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market Salience 
and Political Salience, 65 TAX L. REV. 19, 51 (2011) (summarizing literature that finds voters are 
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We can think of one way in which specific permits might have a 
political advantage over general permits. To the extent that the public 
feels a need to closely watch over perceived bad actors such as 
polluters, the paperwork and transactional burdens of regulation 
might be seen as a good thing. They might even be seen as 
appropriate punishment for socially undesirable (but not illegal) 
activities. The tailored, more empirical approach of specific 
permitting could also build greater public legitimacy for the 
regulatory regime.252 Of course, this political rationale will only apply 
when someone else is paying the cost of a specific permit program, 
and as such, this rationale will likely not apply when a regulatory 
program covers activities that are widely pursued by many members 
of the public.253 
Thus, overall, general permits provide some substantial political 
advantages compared to specific permits and to outright exemptions. 
Those advantages might explain why a number of environmental laws 
give the relevant agencies wide jurisdictional authority over permit 
design, which those agencies in turn apply through a significant 
number of general permits or other regulatory tools.254 Statutory 
exemptions might pose a particular challenge in the context of 
environmental laws. The beneficiaries of environmental regulation 
tend to be broadly distributed (often the entire public if an 
environmental resource is a public good), whereas those subject to 
much environmental regulation are small groups of regulated 
industry. Beneficiaries therefore tend to face significant obstacles in 
organizing to enact legislation.255 The enactment of stringent 
environmental statutes may therefore be an infrequent event, 
prompted by high-profile crises or catastrophes that mobilize the 
 
more likely to support government revenues that are labeled as fees than those that are labeled 
as taxes). 
 252. See generally Tom Tyler & David Markell, The Public Regulation of Land Use 
Decisions: Criteria for Evaluating Alternative Procedures, 7 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 538 (2010). 
 253. We discuss the challenges that regulation of individual activities poses in Part III, infra. 
 254. See, for example, the CWA’s prohibition of all point-source discharges without a 
permit, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2012), the ESA’s prohibition of all “take” of members of listed 
endangered species without a permit, 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (2012), and the Migratory Bird Treaty 
Act’s prohibition of all “take” of members of migratory bird species without a permit, 16 U.S.C. 
§ 703. The 1933 Securities Act has a similar default rule of prohibiting all actions unless they are 
specifically permitted. See 16 U.S.C. § 77d. 
 255. See Biber, supra note 53, at 40–49 (2008). 
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public to overcome those organizational obstacles.256 If legislation is 
an infrequent event—and there has not been a significant 
environmental statute enacted at the federal level in over twenty 
years257—then statutory exemptions would be extremely hard to 
eliminate or reduce even if changed circumstances warranted such an 
adjustment. Legislators and activists who have the opportunity to 
enact stringent environmental legislation are likely quite aware of 
how difficult it is to revisit the legislation, and therefore might err on 
the side of over- rather than under-inclusiveness, counting on the 
administrative process to address the problems of over-inclusion 
through tools such as general permits. 
E. Permits as Enforcement Tools 
Permits are, of course, an important component of the 
enforcement of regulatory standards. Permits can allow a regulatory 
agency to know who might be violating the law, what standards 
regulated parties need to be complying with, and where regulated 
activities are supposed to be occurring. The value of increased 
enforcement would be determined, at least in part, by the level of 
harms or benefits that the regulatory program is trying to prevent or 
provide; higher harms or benefits mean more payoff from 
enforcement. Compared to a complete exemption, general permits on 
average should make agency enforcement easier—though general 
permits may not facilitate enforcement as much as an individualized 
specific permit. One of the criticisms of the broad use of general 
permits in the section 404 program has been that the use of general 
permits has made it too difficult for the agency to identify and 
prosecute violations of the law, and that more detailed specific-
permitting requirements would allow the agency to keep better tabs 
on who is engaging in regulated activities and whether those parties 
are complying with the law.258 
There is another enforcement alternative for an agency with a 
broad regulatory mandate besides general or specific permits—it can 
choose not to issue any permits (or it may not be empowered to issue 
permits) that authorize certain activities, and instead it may use its 
 
 256. See Anthony Downs, Up and Down with Ecology—the “Issue-Attention” Cycle, 28 PUB. 
INT. 38, 39–41 (1972); Farber, supra note 166, at 66–67 (1992). 
 257. Michael Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 129 
(2013). 
 258. See Addison & Burns, supra note 79, at 645–46. 
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discretion to not prosecute violations of an otherwise applicable 
regulatory mandate. In some circumstances, large numbers of people 
might be violating the law, but the agency prosecutes only a tiny 
fraction of violators. These kinds of overbroad statutes might allow 
for relatively simple prosecution of otherwise hard-to-detect 
regulatory violations, as regulatory agencies can use the frequent but 
small violations as proxies for more serious, but more difficult-to-
prove, violations. For instance, many states prohibit “waste” of 
animals killed by hunters, which usually is defined to include leaving 
any portion of a killed animal behind, rather than transporting the 
animal to be used for food, hides, and other purposes.259 Waste 
statutes are frequently violated by hunters, but they allow for the easy 
prosecution of poachers who are seeking to kill animals simply for a 
particular high-value organ (such as horns or gall bladders).260 
Similarly, many states criminalize the nighttime possession of 
firearms in automobiles in areas that are commonly used for hunting 
to prevent illegal “spotlighting” of animals.261 Spotlighting involves a 
driver using car headlights to freeze a deer so that it will not react, 
and can be shot and killed easily. Spotlighting would be very difficult 
to prevent directly because it requires catching someone in the act of 
putting their headlights on the animal and attempting to kill it, but it 
is much easier to identify someone with a weapon in his or her car at 
night. Prosecutorial discretion can therefore allow enforcement 
agencies to decide which of the many violations of waste or firearms 
rules should be enforced based on their judgment about whether the 
violator is in fact a poacher or spotlighting.262 
The problem is that this sweeping use of prosecutorial discretion 
creates tremendous uncertainty for regulated parties. Especially if the 
regulated activity requires significant investment, that uncertainty 
might be undesirable. A general permit might balance the need for 
having broad underlying statutory authority to allow for enforcement, 
with the need to provide some assurance to regulated parties.263 
Indeed, agencies might codify their use of prosecutorial discretion 
through guidance documents in ways that effectively act like general 
 
 259. See DALE D. GOBLE & ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, WILDLIFE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 
724–25 (2d ed. 2010). 
 260. Id.  
 261. Id. at 699–707. 
 262. Id. at 705–06, 723–25. 
 263. Again, rulemaking is generally identified as providing greater predictability for 
regulated parties. See supra note 163.  
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permits. For example, the FWS has effectively struck such a deal with 
regard to the enforcement of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act264 against 
commercial wind power facilities, under which, if a facility follows the 
guidance the agency has issued, the agency does not enforce the 
statutory take prohibition if a migratory bird is killed by a wind 
turbine.265 
F. Permits as Constraints on Administrative Discretion 
Specific permits are also more likely to have significant public 
participation requirements and to face more in-depth judicial review 
than are general permits. Public participation requirements tend to be 
greater for specific permits in part because many general permits do 
not have a structure that allows for notice to the public and an 
opportunity to be heard: if a general permit does not require notice to 
the agency, members of the public will not receive notice either. 
Agencies might apply the statutory mandates for public participation 
in permitting only during the stage at which they create the general 
permit, not when applying the permit to individual actors. This has 
occurred in both the section 404 and the NPDES general permit 
contexts.266 And, even if there is a theoretical system by which 
members of the public might be involved in the permit’s actual 
application, there is little reason to expect it will actually occur. For 
instance, NPDES general permits allow for any “interested person” 
to request that the agency issue an individualized permit for a 
particular project.267 However, unless members of the public are 
regularly sifting through the notices of intent that are submitted to 
the EPA or to state agencies, there is no way that they would be 
aware of whether a project is even occurring, let alone whether there 
 
 264. Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 701–719c (2012) 
 265. See Draft Voluntary, Land-Based Wind Energy Guidelines: Questions and Answers, 
U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., http://www.fws.gov/windenergy/docs/Wind_Energy
_Guidelines_Qs_and_As.FINAL.pdf (last visited July 6, 2014) (“The Service will regard such 
voluntary adherence and communication as evidence of due care with respect to avoiding, 
minimizing, and mitigating significant negative impacts to species protected under the Migratory 
Bird Treaty Act and Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, and will take that into account 
when exercising its discretion with respect to any potential referral for prosecution related to 
the death of or injury to any such species.”).  
 266. See supra text accompanying notes 108–15 (describing the section 404 program); see 
also Gaba, supra note 79, at 426 (detailing the framework regulations for EPA-issued NPDES 
general permits and cross-reference procedures for individual permits when laying out how an 
overall general permit is created); 40 C.F.R. § 122.28(b)(1) (2012). 
 267. 40 C.F.R. § 122.28(b)(3)(i). 
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are any permit applications pending.268 And, if the notice of intent has 
minimal information about the proposed activity and its potential 
impacts, it will be very difficult for members of the public to 
determine whether a request for an individualized permit makes 
sense.269 Of course, the relative lack of public participation does 
reduce the burdens on regulated parties, which might be desirable for 
economic or political reasons.270 
Some applications of general permits to particular projects are 
not exempted from judicial review requirements that apply to specific 
permits.271 Nevertheless, in practice it may be very difficult for outside 
 
 268. There are also questions of whether NPDES general permit notices of intent are even 
available to the public. See Gaba, supra note 79, at 465–67 (describing litigation on this question 
and inconsistent agency positions). If notices of intent are not even available to the public, then 
that makes public participation even more difficult. 
 269. For instance, early versions of preconstruction notices for section 404 general permits 
were extremely sparse in information, making it very difficult for outside parties to determine 
whether more careful scrutiny would be warranted. See Addison & Burns, supra note 79, at 642–
43 (noting the information in preconstruction notices is insufficient to allow for adequate 
review). Current versions of preconstruction notices have more substantial information 
requirements. See Reissuance of Nationwide Permits, 77 Fed. Reg. 10,184, 10,184 (Feb. 21, 
2012) (imposing a general condition (number 31) on preconstruction notices that requires 
additional information from permit users). 
 270. The fact that specific permits, on average, might allow for greater public participation 
than general permits is in tension with the general trend in the literature, which argues that 
adjudication makes broad public participation more difficult compared to rulemaking. See 
NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 US 759, 777 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The rule-
making procedure performs important functions. It gives notice to an entire segment of society 
of those controls or regimentation that is forthcoming. It gives an opportunity for persons 
affected to be heard.”); Berg, supra note 173, at 163 (describing the most frequently cited 
arguments for why “rulemaking offers advantages both in terms of fairness and efficiency”); 
Fuchs, supra note 195, at 94 (detailing the advantages of rulemaking); Magill, supra note 161, at 
1396 (describing the consequences of the choice of forum); Alan B. Morrison, The 
Administrative Procedure Act: A Living and Responsive Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 253, 255 (1986) 
(“Unlike adjudications, which are often focused on a single party, rulemaking allows an 
opportunity for all interested parties to comment.”); id. at 255–56 (the costs of participating in 
rulemaking are lower, so it is “much easier for large segments of the public to become 
involved”); Shapiro, supra note 158, at 930 (noting that a “substantial advantage[] . . . for 
rulemaking is that it requires the agency to allow general participation in the deliberative 
process by all those who may be affected by the rule”). This in part may be because of the 
specific statutory requirements for public notice and comment for permits issued under statutes 
like the CWA and Clean Air Act, which supplement the bare-bone procedural requirements for 
informal adjudication under the APA. 
 271. As noted above, the creation of a general permit in the first place is generally subject to 
judicial review. See supra text accompanying note 123; see, e.g., Reissuance of National 
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) General Permit for Offshore Oil and Gas 
Exploration, Development and Production Operations off Southern California, 79 Fed. Reg. 
1643, 1643 (Jan. 9, 2014) (“For purposes of judicial review the permit is considered issued on 
January 23, 2014. The final permit was signed on December 20, 2013 . . . and is effective on 
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parties (parties besides the regulated party) to seek judicial review of 
the application of a general permit to a particular project, for the 
same reasons that it is often difficult in practice for outside parties to 
participate in the general-permitting process. If outside parties are 
not aware that a general permit even applies, it will be difficult for 
them to seek judicial review of the permit’s application to a particular 
project. Of course, as has been done, they might challenge the permit 
as a whole.272 But plaintiffs might then run into the challenges of 
providing evidence of the flaws in the permit: if general permits 
provide on average less information about the actions that occur 
pursuant to the permit, then plaintiffs will have less information to 
challenge the legality of the permit. 
Thus, agencies might have more leeway in the application of 
general permits to individual cases than they would in the context of 
specific permits, at least with respect to parties other than the 
permitted party. The permitted party will often have significant 
information about whether the activity is occurring, what impacts it 
might have, and how the activity relates to the regulated system. But 
that will not be the case for outside parties. As a result, we might 
expect that agencies’ added discretion in the context of general 
permits will on average result in lower levels of regulation. If this is 
the case, then the added burdens imposed by specific permits on 
regulated parties and administrative agencies may be warranted if the 
harms prevented or benefits provided by the specific regulatory 
program are substantial enough. 
Although general permits might reduce the ability of 
nonregulated parties to control or constrain agency discretion, they 
also may have the effect of constraining or reducing agency discretion 
with respect to regulated parties. General permits are, in effect, an 
open invitation by the agency for regulated parties to undertake their 
activities without legal liability. As discussed above, they reverse the 
background rule holding that activities are prohibited unless the 
 
March 1, 2014.”). Regardless, whether the application of a general permit to a particular 
regulated party (what we identify as permit administration in Part I) is subject to judicial review 
varies from context to context. Here we focus on the implications and practical relevance of 
judicial review for permit administration.  
 272. There have been several challenges to section 404 general permits as being 
insufficiently restrictive. See, e.g., Ky. Riverkeeper v. Rowlette, 714 F.3d 402 (6th Cir. 2013); 
Alaska Ctr. for the Env’t v. West, 157 F.3d 680 (9th Cir. 1998); Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps 
of Eng’rs, 464 F. Supp. 2d 1171 (M.D. Fla. 2006). There have also been challenges claiming they 
are too restrictive. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 453 F. 
Supp. 2d 116 (D.D.C. 2006).  
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agency issues a permit—the background rule that so troubled 
Epstein.273 
Of course, agencies can revise or revoke general permits, either 
in general or in specific applications.274 Complete revocation of a 
general permit may require various administrative procedures, such 
as compliance with notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements.275 
Moreover, if the general permit is the response by the agency to 
political pressures or realities, that would significantly constrain the 
ability of the agency to eliminate or substantially change a general 
permit program in its entirety. If the agency singles out individual 
regulated parties for revision or revocation of their general permits, it 
can avoid or reduce the political problem. The risk of an agency 
singling out individual actors  appears to be one of Epstein’s concerns 
about how the permit power might be abused. But the same factors 
that make it difficult for outside parties to determine whether and to 
what extent general permits are being used will also often constrain 
the ability of an agency to single out individual actors. At the 
extreme, a general permit without any reporting or notice 
requirements leaves the agency with no information about who is 
engaging in the regulated activity, and therefore who can be singled 
out for enforcement.276 
 
 273. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 274. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e)(2) (stating that general permits under the section 404 
program must be revocable by the agency). For instance, there are general permits that require 
certification by the agency that the proposed activity would comply with the terms of the 
general permit. The agency can refuse to grant certification. And there are general permits that 
require notice to the agency of the regulated activity, in which the agency retains the right to 
step in and require a specific permit application.  
 275. See, e.g., id. (stating that a general permit revocation requires a public hearing). If the 
general permit has a sunset provision, such as the five-year limit for CWA permits, then no 
procedures need be followed by the agency to let the permit expire.  
 276. The literature generally concludes that adjudication is more susceptible to political 
pressure and favoritism than rulemaking. See Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of 
Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 93–94 (1983) (noting criticism of immigration 
adjudications as being vulnerable to political pressure) [hereinafter Diver, Optimal Precision]; 
Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393, 408–09 
(1981) (stating that critics have argued that adjudication has been “a paper veneer behind which 
rank favoritism or obsequiousness could flourish”) [hereinafter Diver, Policymaking]; Schiller, 
supra note 157, at 1150 (noting critics have argued that adjudication “encouraged agency 
capture [because a] ‘[l]ack of definite standards creates a void into which attempts to influence 
are bound to rush [in]’” and “nothing could limit administrative actors from simply following 
the self-serving dictates of the regulated”) (quoting HENRY J. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BETTER DEFINITION OF STANDARDS 22–23 
(1962)); see also Schuck, supra note 3, at 282 n.409 (arguing that it is more difficult for outsiders 
representing diffuse interests to participate in adjudicatory decisionmaking because of its 
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G. Permits as Easing Administrative Burdens for Agencies and 
Regulated Parties 
One of the reasons agencies most commonly cite when they 
develop general permit programs is that once a general permit is 
issued—which is not necessarily a small feat in the administrative 
state—it serves to reduce administrative burdens on the agencies 
themselves,277 for all regulated parties,278 or for both.279 Of course, it 
makes sense that if an agency is going to fully process a permit 
application, a shorter and more cursory application is easier to 
process. But there is no necessary reason why a specific permit 
 
technical complexity and the difficulty of determining whether a particular case will have a 
significant impact on diffuse interests); id. at 293 (noting that the general standards and low-
profile nature of adjudication may make adjudicatory exceptions vulnerable to favoritism). 
 277. For an examination of the reduction of burdens in the context of the section 404 
general permit program, see, for example, Reissuance of Nationwide Permits, 77 Fed. Reg. 
10,184, 10184 (Feb. 21, 2012) (the Corps’ explanation for renewal of the section 404 general 
permit program); Addison & Burns, supra note 79, at 630 (describing how conserving agency 
administrative resources was a major portion of the Corps’ original justification for the section 
404 general permit program); Davison, supra note 79, at 67 (noting how this explanation has 
been regularly used by the Corps throughout the history of the general permit program). In the 
context of the NPDES general permit program, see, for example, National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System; Revision of Regulations, 44 Fed. Reg. 32,854, 32,873 (June 7, 1979) (relying 
on administrative burden argument when developing general permit program); National 
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, 42 Fed. Reg. 6846, 6846 (Jan. 28, 1977) (same); Gaba, 
supra note 79, at 420–23 (describing the history of the general permit program). 
  An agency’s reference to “administrative burdens” might be a cover for the agency’s 
resistance to implementing a new regulatory program; a general permit program can allow the 
agency to avoid committing significant resources to a program that it does not wish to pursue, 
and allow enforcement to be minimal. This might have been the original reason behind both the 
section 404 and the NPDES general permit programs. See Michael C. Blumm & D. Bernard 
Zaleha, Federal Wetlands Protection Under the Clean Water Act: Regulatory Ambivalence, 
Intergovernmental Tension, and a Call for Reform, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 695, 704–06, 705 n.56 
(1989) (describing how, in response to a court decision that required the agency to expand its 
regulatory jurisdiction under section 404, the Corps issued a press release stating that the 
decision “would require permits from ‘the rancher who wants to enlarge his stock pond, or the 
farmer who wants to deepen an irrigation ditch or plow a field, or the mountaineer who wants to 
protect his land against stream erosion’”); Addison & Burns, supra note 79, at 629 (same). 
 278. See, e.g., 48 Fed. Reg. 21,466 (May 12, 1983) (proposing to change the nature of the 
section 404 general permit program to “reduc[e] unnecessary regulatory burdens”). Note that 
these kinds of efforts at regulatory relief are not just focused on small or new entities, unlike 
those discussed in Part II.A. See supra Part II.A. 
 279. Overall, rulemaking has been identified as imposing upfront costs on the agency to 
develop rules that would, ideally, reduce administrative costs in the implementation of the rule. 
See, e.g., Berg, supra note 173, at 255; Diver, Optimal Precision, supra note 276, at 73–74; Fuchs, 
supra note 195, at 94; Morrison, supra note 270, at 255. This tradeoff is very similar to the 
tradeoff we discussed earlier between spending resources in establishing the permit system 
(higher for a general permit) and spending resources in administering the permit program 
(lower for a general permit). See supra notes 108–13 and accompanying text. 
RUHL IN PRINTER FINAL - FOR KRISTI (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2014  5:18 PM 
2014] THE PERMIT POWER REVISITED 211 
program has to be more burdensome for the agency than a general 
permit program. An agency could require lots of detailed information 
on permit applications, but then simply rubberstamp the applications. 
Ensuring that the application information is accurate could be 
accomplished by randomly auditing the applications and imposing 
severe sanctions for false information.280 
Setting that point aside, reducing the administrative burdens on 
the agency—as with reducing burdens on regulated parties in 
general—will generally be socially beneficial only if the savings that 
result from the reduced burden outweigh any losses that result from 
less-effective regulation (less-useful information means less-effective 
enforcement). That tradeoff will depend a lot on the specifics of a 
particular regulatory program. 
H. Permits as Lessons for the Adjudication Versus Rulemaking 
Debate 
Our analysis of the pros and cons of general versus specific 
permits does not line up consistently with the general consensus of 
the pros and cons of adjudication versus rulemaking. We agree that 
general permits, like rulemaking, will (1) tend to reduce the costs for 
regulated parties and the public to gather information about what a 
regulatory standard is; (2) be more efficient than specific permits 
when issues in future decisions are more likely to have features in 
common; and (3) tend to be more predictable for regulated parties in 
terms of their implementation. We also agree that general permits—
which may be seen as more like adjudications than full-blown 
exemptions—are probably more flexible than exemptions in adjusting 
to changes in future circumstances, just as adjudications are generally 
seen as more flexible than rulemaking. 
But on the other hand, compared to specific permits, general 
permits may be less likely to produce useful information about how a 
regulatory program is functioning and may provide fewer 
opportunities for public participation. These conclusions are both in 
 
 280. This is a basic application of deterrence theory. For an example of this theory, see 
Steven Klepper & Daniel Nagin, The Deterrent Effect of Perceived Certainty and Severity of 
Punishment Revisited, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 721, 730–32 (1989). There might be limits on how 
severe the sanction can be. If so, the agency’s audit rate could only be reduced so far without 
reducing its deterrent potential. 
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tension with the general assessment of the administrative law 
literature about the relative merits of adjudication and rulemaking.281 
We think there are some important implications for the 
administrative law literature from our analysis. First, studies of hybrid 
forms can be essential in revealing whether generalizations about 
overall categories are accurate. Second, agencies that are seeking to 
resolve the tradeoffs between different archetypal forms may find 
hybrids attractive, as general permits may allow for some mixing and 
matching of the pros and cons of different categories, but unexpected 
results might occur if one is not careful to closely examine how and 
why different forms of agency decisionmaking produce different 
results.282 Thus, we think the third and most important lesson is the 
need to take a careful, context-dependent approach in thinking about 
rulemaking versus adjudication in agency practice.283 This includes 
careful consideration of the appropriate use of hybrid forms of 
permits in recommendations to legislators or agency leaders about 
how agencies and agency decisionmaking should be structured.284 
III.  PERMITTING THE FUTURE—THE CASE FOR GENERAL PERMITS 
As Part II covers and Table 3 summarizes below, general and 
specific permits each have their advantages and disadvantages. But 
looking forward, it seems plausible that general permits will be 
increasingly important as a regulatory tool in a world in which social 
costs and benefits are the result of the accumulation of millions, even 
billions, of individual actions across regions, nations and the world. 
As a case study, we focus on environmental problems, but we believe 
 
 281. See supra Part I.F. 
 282. For instance, the fact that general permits might produce less-useful policy information 
compared to specific permits may be a result of the fact that agencies generally do not conduct 
ongoing monitoring of permitted activities on their own initiative, instead depending on the 
permit to impose these obligations on permitted parties. See Biber, supra note 247, at 13–14. 
Specific permits are more likely to impose those requirements than general permits. Broad 
generalizations about rulemaking versus adjudication, however, would miss this important 
nuance in the context of permitting. 
 283. See Robinson, supra note 195, at 536 (stating that analysis of whether rulemaking or 
adjudication is preferable “has been hindered by too great an attachment to labels and abstract 
concepts”); id. (“[T]he arbitrary distinction between modes of proceeding does not provide 
useful criteria for determining what are the appropriate procedures in any particular kind of 
case. . . . These highly elastic concepts tend to obscure the varied needs of different agencies and 
varied demands of different regulatory functions.”). 
 284. See Schuck, supra note 3, at 297 (calling for a “richer array of procedural options, a set 
of alternative decision modes that mirror the diverse mixture of competing values presented by 
different kinds of exceptions decisions”). 
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that the issues and concepts we develop here have relevance for a 
wide range of other areas.285 
Table 3. Factors Relevant to Deciding Between General and Specific 
Permits 
Factor General Permits Specific Permits 
Barriers To 
Entry 
Reduce barriers to entry to 
perform regulated activities, 
encourage entry by new actors 
into economic activity, and 
reduce fixed costs that burden 
small business actors. 
Impose barriers to entry that 
might deter new entrants in 
economic activity or harm 
small business actors. Can 
provide screens that deter 
activities with low social 
benefits and high social costs. 
Information Relative to exemptions, provide 
more information about 
regulated activities and actors. 
Relative to general permits, 
provide more information 
about regulated activities and 
actors. 
Tailoring More appropriate when 
regulating low-harm or low-
benefit activities, or when harms 
and benefits are relatively 
uniform across regulated 
activities or actors. 
More appropriate when harms 
and benefits are highly variable 
across regulated activities or 
actors. 
Politics May allow for regulation that is 
socially desirable when specific 
permits are politically infeasible 
(such as for regulating politically 
powerful actors or everyday 
activities). Relative to 
exemptions, may allow more 
flexible and increased regulation 
over time. May also allow for 
the collection of mitigation fees. 
May satisfy public demand to 
punish bad actors through 
punitive regulatory burdens. 
 
 285. For discussion of other nonenvironmental areas in which this dynamic may be relevant, 
see infra notes 347–50 and accompanying text. 
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Factor General Permits Specific Permits 
Enforcement Relative to exemptions, provide  
more information that allows for 
effective enforcement. Relative 
to overbroad prohibitions that 
are sporadically enforced, may 
be fairer and more predictable. 
Relative to general permits, 
provide  more information that 
allows for effective 
enforcement. 
Constraint on 
Agency 
Discretion 
Relative to specific permits, 
harder for public to monitor 
permitting, and hold agency and 
regulated parties accountable. 
Relative to specific permits, may 
be harder for agency to control 
regulated parties’ activity. 
Relative to general permits, 
easier for public to monitor 
permitting, and hold agency 
and regulated parties 
accountable. 
Administrative 
Burdens 
Fewer administrative burdens 
compared to specific permits. 
Greater administrative burdens 
compared to general permits. 
A. Managing Cumulative Impacts of Small Harms 
The traditional depiction of environmental pollution—one that is 
still used in stock photos for press coverage of environmental issues—
is that of a massive industrial smokestack billowing emissions into the 
atmosphere, or of a large waste pipe from a factory discharging 
noxious wastes into a river or lake. Although industrial discharges are 
a significant contributor to environmental harms in the United States 
and around the world, it turns out that they are not the most 
significant contributor. In fact, much environmental harm is 
increasingly the result of the accumulation of actions by millions of 
individuals and businesses.286 
 
 286. Hope M. Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility for Improving the Environment: 
Moving Toward a New Environmental Norm, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 117, 119–24 (2009) 
(describing the contribution of individuals to environmental harm); Jason Czarnezki, Everyday 
Environmentalism: Concerning Consumption, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,374, 10,374 (2011); Michael 
P. Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV: The Individual as Regulated Entity in the New Era 
of Environmental Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 515, 541–84 (2004) [hereinafter Vandenbergh, 
Smokestack to SUV] (describing the contribution of individuals to environmental pollution and 
environmental harms); see also Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Social Meaning of Environmental 
Command and Control, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 191, 193–97 (2001) [hereinafter Vandenbergh, 
Social Meaning] (detailing second generation environmental problems). 
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Take climate change, for example. Although electricity, coal, and 
oil and gas companies directly produce fossil fuels and emit carbon 
dioxide into the atmosphere when producing energy, those emissions 
are a response to the individual demands of millions of consumers to 
turn on their lights, heat their homes, drive their cars, or fly in 
airplanes.287 Another example is the problem of air quality in major 
metropolitan areas of the United States. Air quality in cities such as 
Houston and Los Angeles remains unhealthy despite decades of 
significant federal, state, and local environmental regulation.288 That 
regulation has removed much of the emissions from large industrial 
sources of pollution. But, in most cities in the United States, most of 
the remaining air quality problems are the result of dispersed 
emissions, which are caused by the individual and mundane choices of 
millions of Americans to drive their cars instead of taking public 
transit, to clean their clothes at a dry cleaning facility, to paint their 
houses, to burn wood in a fireplace, or even to use lighter fluid on a 
backyard charcoal grill.289 
The accumulation of dispersed emissions is also probably the 
most important remaining cause of water pollution in the United 
States. Pollution in many rivers and streams in the United States is 
the result of diverse and frequent activities such as homeowners 
fertilizing their lawns and using herbicide to eliminate weeds; 
automobile owners changing their oil in their driveway; and farmers 
using fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides on their fields.290 Activities 
that appear to be far removed from water quality—such as paving 
over a field or forest to construct a parking lot, or adding a paved 
driveway to a single home—are major contributors to water quality 
problems.291 Even pet dogs may be a major contributor to water 
pollution in urban areas, given that many owners do not clean up 
after their animals, and animal waste has been shown to cause 
 
 287. See Vandenbergh & Stack, supra note 84, at 1402–11 (describing climate change and 
the 1 percent problem).  
 288. See David E. Adelman, Environmental Federalism When Numbers Matter More than 
Size (Univ. of Tex. Law Sch. Ctr. for Global Energy, Int’l Arbitration & Envtl. Law, Research 
Paper No. 2014-04), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2316294. 
 289. Id. 
 290. See EDWARD B. WITTE & NATALIA MINKEL-DUMIT, THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
HANDBOOK 194–95 (Mark A. Ryan ed., 3d ed. 2011); Ruhl, supra note 84, at 274–92 (describing 
the environmental harms that farms cause). 
 291. Dave Owen, Urbanization, Water Quality, and the Regulated Landscape, 82 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 431, 439–55 (2011) (describing how impervious surfaces produce significant water 
quality problems in urban waterways). 
RUHL IN PRINTER FINAL - FOR KRISTI (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2014  5:18 PM 
216 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:133 
significant water quality issues.292 These so-called “non-point sources” 
of water pollution—because the pollution cannot be traced to a 
particular point of emission, but instead result from the accumulation 
of pollution in runoff from the land into waterways—are generally 
unregulated under the CWA, yet are probably the primary reason 
why most rivers, streams, and lakes in the United States do not meet 
water quality standards.293 
Finally, consider the problem of human activities that degrade 
and destroy native species’ habitats and ecosystems. Of course, much 
of this is the result of activities by major corporations (for instance, 
timber harvesting by paper companies and strip mining by coal 
companies). But much of it is also the result of relatively small 
decisions by individual people to, for example, buy a lot and build a 
single-family home in a rapidly growing exurban development, or 
clear native vegetation in their front or back yard and plant a lawn.294 
Moreover, these are all activities that, if they are to be addressed 
by the legal system, will primarily be addressed through regulation by 
administrative agencies rather than by common law tort litigation 
under claims such as nuisance. Nuisance, after all, requires identifying 
how a particular actor’s actions proximately caused a particular 
plaintiff’s injuries.295 But the problems of identifying causation and 
responsibility are often insurmountable when the harm results from 
the accumulation of thousands or millions of individually trivial, but 
collectively problematic, actions. The accumulation of harm from so 
many sources makes identification, management, and enforcement 
 
 292. Nonpoint Source Pollution (Polluted Runoff), ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Oct. 5, 2010), 
http://www.epa.gov/region2/water/npspage.htm (“Pet wastes are a significant cause of nutrient 
contamination and contain bacteria and viruses which can cause harm to people and aquatic 
life.”). 
 293. See, e.g., Owen, supra note 291, at 432–60 (describing the challenges of improving water 
quality in urban watersheds, the importance of non-point source pollution in water quality 
degradation, and the difficulties of using current legal structures to address that problem); 
David A. Fahrenthold, Anacostia River Shows Decades-Long Failure to Improve Water Quality, 
Ecosystem, WASH. POST (Feb. 2, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2010/02/01/AR2010020103217.html (describing the failure to deal with nonpoint source 
pollution as an “environmental blind spot,” despite successes in reducing pollution from point 
sources such as sewage plants and industrial facilities).  
 294. See Paul Robbins, Annemarie Polderman & Trevor Birkenholtz, Lawns and Toxins: 
An Ecology of the City, 18 CITIES 369, 376 (2001).  
 295. See, e.g., City of Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mortg. Sec., 615 F.3d 496, 502–06 (6th Cir. 
2010) (applying proximate causation requirement to public nuisance claim); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1979) (nuisance liability only exists when allegedly tortious activity 
is the “legal cause” of harm). 
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much more difficult and costly. These harm-causing activities are 
often dispersed in space and time precisely because each individual 
action only produces a limited amount of harm; and the harm caused 
by each individual action is often subtle or difficult to detect, again 
because of the limited amount of harm.296 So, whom is the asthmatic 
resident of Los Angeles supposed to sue to reduce the smog that 
prevents her from leaving her house on dozens of days each year? 
Every driver in the greater Los Angeles area? Every dry cleaner? 
Every person who owns lighter fluid?297 
There is little need to carefully tailor a regulatory system for 
each one of these kinds of individual activities. For instance, there are 
likely minimal or no differences in the environmental impacts 
produced by two neighbors’ use of lighter fluid on backyard barbeque 
grills. Those minimal or nonexistent differences mean that we do not 
need a detailed specific permit to carefully tailor the regulatory 
system for each neighbor’s lighter fluid use.298 A standardized general 
permit will do. 
General permits are likely also superior to the two other options 
(specific permits and exemptions) in managing the environmental 
harms from the accumulation of thousands or millions of individual 
activities. Currently, many of these activities are exempt from 
government regulation. But as noted above, general permits—even if 
 
 296. Vandenbergh, Smokestack to SUV, supra note 286, at 590 (“Not only are the releases 
from any one individual smaller and less visible, but the harms arising from individual behavior 
in many cases are less visible as well. In fact, environmental harm may only arise from individual 
behavior when many sources are aggregated. In addition, the low concentrations and long time 
periods involved in many releases from individuals make it more likely that these releases will 
generate gradual, and in some cases almost imperceptible, changes in ecosystem health . . . .”); 
see also Babcock, supra note 286, at 130 (describing how “individual contributions are so small 
compared to the pollution from an industrial polluter”). 
 297. Indeed, Epstein himself concedes that these kinds of problems are not suitable for 
common law adjudication. See Richard A. Epstein, Beware of Prods and Pleas: A Defense of the 
Conventional Views on Tort and Administrative Law in the Context of Global Warming, 121 
YALE L.J. ONLINE 317, 320–26 (2011) (arguing against the application of public nuisance 
litigation to address climate change, and in favor of exclusive reliance on administrative 
remedies). There is, at the very least, some tension between Epstein’s claim that administrative 
permits should be limited to situations in which courts would find a common law nuisance, and 
his position that many diffuse harms that would not qualify as common law nuisances should be 
addressed only through regulation by administrative agencies. 
 298. Moreover, the complexity that a specific permit would impose on the broader public 
would likely be highly inefficient compared to a much simpler general permit. See Louis 
Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 150, 151 
(1995) (noting that complex rules can be efficient for regulation if only a small number of 
people have to bear the information costs of understanding and complying with the rules). 
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they impose minimal substantive and procedural burdens—can have 
significant advantages over an exemption. First, the general permit 
can allow the collection of information that can be used to design a 
more effective and politically sustainable regulatory program in the 
future. Second, it may be more feasible to, over time, increase 
regulatory standards if one begins with a general permit program 
rather than with an exemption. General permits also might make it 
more feasible for a regulatory agency to respond to emerging 
harms—for instance, an activity that previously was harmless because 
it was limited might become more widespread and begin causing 
significant damage.299 A general permit with minimal burdens might 
be relatively easily expanded into a general permit with some teeth 
that can more effectively combat the growing damage from the 
activity. In contrast, eliminating an exemption by imposing regulation 
where none existed at all may be much more difficult to accomplish, 
particularly when it requires legislative action. Finally, general 
permits might allow more public participation and accountability than 
a legislative exemption, given that there is at least a rulemaking 
process for the public to participate in and for courts to review. 
The other option would be the creation of overbroad laws that 
regulate a wide range of everyday behavior, with prosecutorial 
discretion being exercised to limit enforcement to all but the most 
extreme violations, or to prosecute a few high-profile violations to 
encourage compliance within the broader public. But as discussed 
earlier, overbroad laws raise a wide range of serious concerns.300 
Those concerns include uncertainty for regulated parties that might 
deter investment. Selective enforcement—particularly against 
individuals whose actions are no worse than those of other individuals 
who escape prosecution—also raises due process concerns,301 the 
potential for corruption and abuse by prosecutorial authorities, and 
may create a strong political backlash against a regulatory system that 
can arbitrarily single out individuals for government action. We may 
 
 299. See supra notes 232–36 and accompanying text. 
 300. See supra notes 263–65 and accompanying text. 
 301. See United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 691 (10th Cir. 2010) 
(concluding that conviction under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act violated due process where 
the defendant did not have notice that the relevant activity might harm birds, and where that 
activity was widely undertaken in the oil and gas industry). 
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be better off with a system that regulates almost everyone, but with a 
light touch, than with a system that regulates only a few.302 
B. Managing Transitions to New Regulation 
The challenge to addressing many of the most pressing 
environmental harms is that many of the individually small human 
actions that contribute to those harms are currently exempted from 
regulation under environmental laws, either through statutory or 
administrative exemptions.303 Most environmental regulations only 
indirectly touch individuals, by regulating the producers of goods and 
services rather than the consumers of goods and services.304 The 
regulation of wetlands and the protection of endangered species are 
the only two major examples of federal environmental law trying to 
directly regulate actions by individuals.305 Even in those areas in which 
there is no explicit exemption, in practice regulation has been either 
fitful or infrequent.306 
Those regulatory gaps likely exist because the regulation of 
individual activities is a difficult task. First, it may be hard to convince 
the public that regulation is even necessary. People may discount the 
importance of individual actions that cause small levels of harm, even 
though those actions might cumulatively be extremely important.307 In 
 
 302. This may be the case because, particularly if the goal is to deter or modify widespread 
behavior that is environmentally harmful, limiting enforcement to a few select cases may mean 
that punishment must be imposed at a high level. Fairness concerns and political backlash might 
be elevated when a few individuals are singled out for draconian punishment for activities that 
everyone is doing. 
 303. Ruhl, supra note 84, at 293–316 (describing agricultural exemptions); Vandenbergh & 
Stack, supra note 84, at 1394–96 (identifying numerous exemptions under many statutes). 
 304. See Katrina F. Kuh, When Government Intrudes: Regulating Individual Behaviors that 
Harm the Environment, 61 DUKE L.J. 1111, 1130 (2012) (“[T]he federal statutory scheme of 
environmental protection in large measure reaches individual behaviors and associated 
environmental harms only indirectly.”). 
 305. Vandenbergh, Smokestack to SUV, supra note 286, at 611–12. 
 306. Id. at 517. 
 307. As professors Vandenbergh and Stack observe: 
When individuals respond to a low probability as if it is essentially zero, one percent 
arguments may have powerful effects in policy debates, even when they relate to 
small contributions to a problem as opposed to small probabilities. 
  One way to see this is to consider how regulatory decisions, and in particular 
decisions about whether to exempt a source or set a regulatory threshold, can be 
framed. An exemption for a particular entity based on it being a small part of the 
problem can be stated as accepting a small increase in the probability of a particular 
undesired outcome. If, for example, my company’s water discharge amounts to only 
1% of the discharge of a pollutant into a river, then providing an exemption to my 
company is roughly equivalent to saying that a small increase in the probability of the 
contaminants in water reaching a certain level is acceptable. 
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general, the public does not know how important individual actions 
are for environmental harm.308 
Even if regulation is seen as potentially necessary, individuals 
may object to the direct application of government coercion to their 
day-to-day lives. “[D]irect regulation of individual behaviors may be 
expected to give rise to or to create perceptions of government 
overstepping, even when indirect regulation operates, without 
objection, to control the same behaviors for the same end.”309 
Regulation of frequent individual activities may raise significant 
privacy concerns due to the potentially intrusive nature of 
enforcement.310 Government mandates that reach inside the home 
might be particularly susceptible to such resistance.311 
Of course, citizens accept government coercion in a wide range 
of day-to-day activities. For instance, they adhere to speed limits on 
 
Vandenbergh & Stack, supra note 84, at 1401.  
 308. See Babcock, supra note 286, at 125; Vandenbergh, Social Meaning, supra note 286, at 
197–99. 
 309. Kuh, supra note 304, at 1166. Indirect regulation may be preferable because instead of 
requiring constant and potentially intrusive enforcement, it changes the structure of the social 
and economic environment to make certain undesirable activities less likely and less common, 
or desirable activities more likely and more common. Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and 
the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 655, 662–67 (2006) (arguing that 
structural laws are preferable). For instance, a ban on the construction of inefficient 
refrigerators by major corporations would not, in theory, prevent an individual from 
constructing his own inefficient refrigerator, but it makes it extremely unlikely. 
 310. See Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1231, 1244 (2001) (“Simply 
mandating a reduction in garbage disposal, for example, can turn government officials into 
garbage snoops . . . .”); Cheng, supra note 309, at 659 (detailing fiat regulation and its problems); 
Kuh, supra note 304, at 1148 (noting that it is “frequently articulated . . . that direct regulation of 
environmentally significant individual behaviors would require unacceptably intrusive 
enforcement—measures that would be too invasive of privacy and civil liberties”); 
Vandenbergh, Smokestack to SUV, supra note 286, at 598 (“[T]he intrusiveness of enforcing 
these regulations may undermine compliance or produce a political backlash.”). 
  In theory, one solution to enforcement problems is to increase the level of punishment 
for those violations that are detected. There are political limits, however, on how severely a 
punishment can be imposed, and for many minor offenses those limits are quite low. See Cheng, 
supra note 309, at 659–60 (“[I]mposing large, draconian fines or sentences for minor regulatory 
violations insults common intuitions of desert. Disproportionate penalties provoke community 
outrage and ultimately may cause even greater underenforcement as police and prosecutors feel 
increasingly conflicted about the law’s advisability.”). This will be a serious limitation in the 
environmental context, in which many of the individual actions that cause environmental harm 
are seen, at worst, as minor offenses. Under-enforced laws also raise the risk of “arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement.” Id. at 661.  
 311. Kuh, supra note 304, at 1175. Nonetheless, some forms of regulation—such as local 
recycling mandates that might require trash inspections or restrictions on the importation or 
exportation of endangered species—have not prompted the same level of backlash. Id. at 1148. 
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streets and highways—limits enforced by police officers. But 
regulations of individual behavior in the environmental context face 
several additional obstacles. Most saliently, they impose new 
constraints on the ability of people to do things that they had 
previously been free to pursue. There is evidence that mandates 
restricting individuals’ ability to engage in widespread activities that 
they feel entitled to pursue may provoke significant political 
resistance, at least initially.312 Many individual actions that cause 
environmental harm are the result of habits that may be difficult for 
individuals to change, such as commuting patterns.313 Relatedly, 
mandates that are seen as infringing on preexisting private property 
rights might be particularly unpopular.314 There are also 
administrative challenges—the regulation of frequent individual 
activities may be extremely costly in terms of enforcement.315 Finally, 
there may be a concern that regulation will be unfair or will 
 
 312. Babcock, supra note 286, at 152 (explaining how “when the freedom to conduct an 
activity is very important, individuals may react to increased threats to restrict that freedom by 
simply increasing their commitment to the illegal activity”); Jonathan Baron & James Jurney, 
Norms Against Voting for Coerced Reform, 64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 347 (1993) 
(describing the results of their experiment—that respondents are less likely to vote for imposing 
coercive regulations because of a fear of intruding on individual rights, even when the 
regulations are believed to be effective in accomplishing social goals); Biber, supra note 234, at 
1317–28 (describing the two ways in which backlash might occur); Kuh, supra note 304, at 1149 
(noting that “opposition has frequently been grounded in property-rights objections”). 
 313. Babcock, supra note 286, at 153–54; Vandenbergh, Smokestack to SUV, supra note 286, 
at 594–95; see also Giuseppe Carrus, Paola Passafaro & Mirilia Bonnes, Emotions, Habits and 
Rational Choices in Ecological Behaviours: The Case of Recycling and Use of Public 
Transportation, 28 J. ENVTL. PSYCH. 51, 58–60 (2008) (describing a survey that found past 
behavior to be a strong predictor of likely future environmental behavior); Christina Knussen, 
Fred Yule, Julie MacKenzie & Mark Wells, An Analysis of Intentions to Recycle Household 
Waste: The Roles of Past Behavior, Perceived Habit, and Perceived Lack of Facilities, 24 J. 
ENVTL. PSYCH. 237 (2004) (describing a survey of recycling behavior in Scotland, which found 
that individuals with a habit of not recycling were unlikely to recycle in the future); Linda Steg 
& Charles Vlek, Encouraging Pro-Environmental Behavior: An Integrative Review and Research 
Agenda, 29 J. ENVTL. PSYCH. 309, 312–13 (2009) (noting the importance of habits in 
determining environmental behavior). There is evidence that it may be harder for individuals to 
make one-time or infrequent changes (for example, by purchasing more efficient or less-
polluting equipment) than to make repeated or frequent changes to daily activities (for 
example, using equipment for shorter periods of time or less frequently). Linda Steg, Lieke 
Dreijerink & Wokje Abrahamse, Why Are Energy Policies Acceptable and Effective?, 38 ENV’T 
& BEHAV. 92, 97 (2006).  
 314. Kuh, supra note 304, at 1141 (“Section 404’s potential and actual interference with 
property rights has occasioned vociferous opposition to the program.”). 
 315. Babcock, supra note 286, at 150 (noting that such regulations are “often inefficient and 
expensive to enforce”); Vandenbergh, Smokestack to SUV, supra note 286, at 598 (“[T]he cost 
of enforcement against large numbers of individuals makes behavior change based solely on the 
threat of formal legal sanctions unlikely.”). 
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disproportionately affect a particular segment of society, at least in 
terms of transition costs.316 For instance, mandates or restrictions are 
most unpopular among individuals who have the least ability to take 
alternative steps to achieve their goals.317 
Many of the problems relating to the imposition of individual 
regulation therefore, are problems of transitions—of the psychic, 
informational, economic, and practical costs to individuals of 
adjusting their daily lives to a new regulatory rule.318 For instance, a 
ban on lighter fluid in Los Angeles requires individual residents to be 
aware of the new prohibition, identify alternatives to lighting their 
charcoal grills or using alternatives to charcoal grills, pay any costs for 
the transition to new solutions (such as buying a gas grill), and 
become comfortable with any ongoing added costs or inconveniences 
associated with the new solutions. Added costs or inconveniences 
might, for example, include longer wait times to ignite a charcoal grill 
without fluid, or more effort to light the grill. 
General permits might be very helpful in managing this 
transition. General permits can be structured to reduce some or all of 
the transition costs of a new regulatory system. For instance, general 
permits can reduce the administrative burdens on regulated 
individuals.319 At the extreme, general permits that do not require any 
notice to regulators, any mitigation fees, or any permit application are 
(in all but name) an exemption from regulation. This can give time 
for the regulatory agency to notify and educate the public on the 
 
 316. Baron & Jurney, supra note 312 (describing the results of their experiment—that 
respondents are less likely to vote for imposing coercive regulations because of a fear of adverse 
impacts on particular individuals, even when the regulations are believed to be effective in 
accomplishing social goals); see also Tommy Gärling & Geertje Schuitema, Travel Demand 
Management Targeting Reduced Private Car Use: Effectiveness, Public Acceptability and 
Political Feasibility, 63 J. SOC. ISSUES 139, 148 (2007) (summarizing traffic-management 
research reaching similar conclusions); C. Jakobsson, S. Fujii, & T. Gärling, Determinants of 
Private Car Users’ Acceptance of Road Pricing, 7 TRANSP. POL’Y 153, 153 (2000) (describing a 
survey that found lower-income drivers who could not as easily afford price increases were more 
likely to believe that charges to use roads were unfair and to oppose those charges).  
 317. See generally, e.g., Sytze A. Rienstra, Piet Rietveld & Erik T. Verhoef, The Social 
Support for Policy Measures in Passenger Transport. A Statistical Analysis for the Netherlands, 4 
TRANSP. RES. PART D 181 (1999) (describing that transport users least able to avoid road 
charges are the group most opposed to those charges).  
 318. Kuh, supra note 304, at 1166–67 (noting that “if government control over a particular 
type of individual behavior is not usual or customary,” it is potentially more intrusive). Large 
corporations may have fewer problems with these transition costs because they have expertise 
and experience in dealing with government regulations, and can afford to hire specialized 
personnel to manage the transition costs.  
 319. See supra Part II.G. 
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regulatory system before the permit requirements are stiffened—
giving the public time to identify alternatives and adjust to the new 
regulatory landscape. In this way, general permits also have political 
benefits in managing the transition, by reducing regulatory burdens 
on the general public that might otherwise prompt a political backlash 
against the regulatory system. 
Even if a general permit does impose some compliance burdens, 
these can be made relatively minimal. For instance, permit 
applications might simply require providing notice to the regulatory 
agency at the commencement of a regulated activity. If the burden to 
demand additional information then falls on the regulatory agency 
before the activity can proceed, the agency can let the vast majority of 
individuals proceed with no additional compliance requirements. 
Although a permit system that for most individuals requires only 
notice does not reduce the public’s costs to learn about the new 
regulatory system, other transition costs will be greatly reduced or 
minimized. A notice-only system means that most individuals can 
continue their activities without being required to make any changes 
or collect any more information—eliminating the costs to the public 
of identifying alternative actions, paying for alternatives, or dealing 
with the inconveniences of alternatives.320 More substantial permit 
requirements impose greater burdens on the public—both because of 
greater informational burdens to compile and produce information 
for permit applications, and because the substantive restrictions of the 
permit terms may be stricter. Again, however, these can be tailored to 
reduce the transition costs as the public adjusts to the new regulatory 
system. 
C. Managing Social Norms 
General permits overall make compliance with the law much 
easier by reducing the paperwork needed to obtain a permit.321 
 
 320. If the notice-only permit system imposes minimal penalties for failure to provide 
notice, then even the costs of learning about the new regulatory system are reduced for the 
public. For instance, warnings might be issued to first-time violators who do not provide notice, 
combined with education and outreach. 
 321. Mandates that are not complied with can lead to socially suboptimal attempts at 
evasion. For instance, restrictive garbage disposal laws may increase illegal dumping and 
therefore increase environmental harm. Carlson, supra note 310, at 1244–45; see also Babcock, 
supra note 286, at 130–31 (noting how effective regulatory design can be particularly difficult in 
the environmental context, in which the harms and benefits from activities can be diffuse over 
space and time). Significant amounts of evasion can lead law-abiding citizens to question 
whether they should comply with the mandate. Id. at 152. 
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Making a new behavior convenient is one of the most effective ways 
to encourage changes in behavior.322 A very lax general permit system 
(such as a notice-only system) does not necessarily cause a change in 
the relevant environmental behavior. For instance, a notice-only 
system that allows the filling of small wetlands for development will 
make it easy for people to continue to fill wetlands for development, 
an environmentally harmful behavior. But it does make compliance 
with the new regulatory system easy, which may make the public 
more accepting of the new regulatory system. Over time, that system 
can be made more rigorous, encouraging greater compliance with the 
new rule against filling small wetlands, and reducing the 
environmentally harmful behavior. Of course, we might still want to 
take other steps to make it easier for people to reduce the 
environmentally harmful behavior or increase environmentally 
beneficial behavior—for instance, a requirement for individuals to 
recycle cans and bottles would best be combined with a curbside-pick-
up system that makes it easy and convenient for individuals to 
recycle. 
Making compliance with a permitting system convenient will also 
decrease the willingness of people to violate the law. For instance, 
allowing solo drivers to purchase the right to travel in high-occupancy 
vehicle (HOV) lanes actually increased overall compliance with HOV 
rules, perhaps because this made the less-congested HOV lanes easily 
available for everyone who needed to travel quickly.323 Convenient 
 
 322. J. Stanley Black, Paul C. Stern & Julie T. Elworth, Personal and Contextual Influences 
on Household Energy Adaptations, 70 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 3, 17 (1985) (describing a study of 
energy usage in late-1970s Massachusetts households); Carlson, supra note 310, at 1275–80 
(providing evidence from studies of recycling that making recycling easier, such as through 
curbside recycling, is one of the most effective ways to increase recycling rates); id. at 1296 
(“Increasing convenience seems more effective than most persuasive techniques aimed at 
increasing participation.”); Holly Doremus, Shaping the Future: The Dialectic of Law and 
Environmental Values, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 233, 255 (2003) (“Making environmentally 
responsible actions as apparent, easy, and satisfying as possible should encourage people to 
undertake them.”); Gärling & Schuitema, supra note 316, at 150; Gregory A. Guagnano, Paul C. 
Stern & Thomas Dietz, Influences on Attitude-Behavior Relationships: A Natural Experiment 
with Curbside Recycling, 27 ENV’T & BEHAV. 699, 713–14 (1995) (describing a study of recycling 
showing that making recycling easier made recycling more common); Knussen et al., supra note 
313, at 245 (describing a survey of recycling behavior in Scotland that found that the perception 
as to whether recycling was easy was an important factor in increasing an entity’s stated 
willingness to recycle in the future). But see Carrus, et al., supra note 313, at 58–60 (describing a 
survey that found that one’s perception as to whether recycling was feasible was not a strong 
predictor of that individual’s likelihood of recycling in the future). 
 323. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, How Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social Norms: 
Commodifying California’s Carpool Lanes, 75 IND. L.J. 1231, 1267 (2000) (“[B]y allowing 
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permitting systems may even increase the social opprobrium that 
violators face.324 Conversely, making compliance with a legal mandate 
inconvenient can decrease its popularity.325 
The transition time that a general permit program establishes can 
allow time for public education efforts to let individuals know why 
regulations are necessary and socially beneficial. Regulatory 
mandates often inspire more compliance to the extent that the public 
perceives them as having clear benefits.326 Education efforts by the 
government about the impacts of regulated individual actions on the 
environment, or the benefits of alternative choices, may be effective 
in increasing public awareness about the need for and the benefits of 
regulation.327 Such educational efforts may also directly shape the 
 
motorists to buy into the HOV lanes, FasTrak gives people a more attractive alternative to 
breaking the law.”). 
 324. Carlson, supra note 310, at 1279–80 (“[I]t is one thing not to recycle when the costs of 
doing so are quite high. It is quite another to flout the convention when compliance would take 
little effort. Thus the commingled curbside recycling may both reduce the absolute cost of 
engaging in the behavior and increase the opprobrium one may experience for failing to 
comply.”); id. at 1257 (“During World War II the federal government undertook a massive 
effort to engage the citizenry in recycling, with a particular emphasis on creating social norms in 
favor of recycling for patriotic reasons.”); Strahilevitz, supra note 323, at 1264–67 (arguing that a 
program allowing solo drivers to pay for access to less-congested HOV lanes increased overall 
compliance with the law because solo-driver violators were now seen as avoiding an easy 
compliance option—the ability to pay to use the HOV lanes). 
 325. Kuh, supra note 304, at 1138–39, 1147 (stating that “[i]mplementation burdens – the 
cost and administrative burden of testing emissions from hundreds of thousands of vehicles – 
appear to explain, at least in part, the difficulties encountered with respect to the CAA I/M 
programs”). 
 326. Biber, supra note 234; Craig N. Oren, Getting Commuters Out of Their Cars: What 
Went Wrong?, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 141, 203–12 (1998) (arguing that one reason why mandates 
to employers to reduce the number of trips by employees are politically unpopular is that it is 
unclear whether trip reduction would produce significant air quality benefits); see also Gärling 
& Schuitema, supra note 316, at 148 (summarizing literature from Europe that congestion tolls 
are more accepted by the public when there is clear reduction in traffic congestion); Rienstra et 
al., supra note 317, at 197 (describing a survey from the Netherlands indicating that pricing 
measures were seen as ineffective in addressing environmental problems and were also less 
popular). Some scholars have speculated that individuals may, consciously or not, believe that 
policies that will have negative impacts on their lives will be ineffective, regardless of the 
policy’s actual efficacy. See Steg et al., supra note 313, at 96. 
 327. See Tommy Gärling, Anders Biel & Mathias Gustafsson, The New Environmental 
Psychology: The Human Interdependence Paradigm, in HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 85, 90 (Robert B. Bechtel & Arza Churchman eds., 2003); Linda Steg & Geertje 
Schuitema, Behavioral Responses to Transport Pricing: A Theoretical Analysis, in THREATS 
FROM CAR TRAFFIC TO THE QUALITY OF URBAN LIFE 347, 353–54, 356–57 (Tommy Gärling & 
Linda Steg, eds., 2007); Steg et al., supra note 313, at 93–94 (summarizing the literature in the 
energy and transport areas). 
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norms of individuals and change individual behavior in ways that 
reduce environmental impacts.328  
Educational efforts might eventually shift social norms in ways 
that significantly reduce environmentally harmful behavior or 
increase environmentally beneficial behavior. And the new regulation 
itself might be an important educational mechanism for shifting social 
norms.329 The new regulation can also communicate to society at large 
that there is a consensus around a particular norm, and that the norm 
should be followed.330 Communication may also provide an assurance 
 
 328. Andrew Green, Norms, Institutions, and the Environment, 57 UNIV. OF TORONTO L.J. 
105, 118 (2007) (describing the role of government and the law). There is a substantial 
environmental-psychology literature on the role that information plays in shaping individual 
behavior, generally finding mixed results. See, e.g., Wokje Abrahamse, Linda Steg, Charles Vlek 
& Talib Rothengatter, A Review of Intervention Studies Aimed at Household Energy 
Conservation, 25 J. ENVTL. PSYCH. 273, 276–78 (2005) (survey of relevant literature in the 
energy context finding mixed benefits from information in reducing energy consumption with 
benefits more likely when information was tailored to particular individuals (for example, home 
energy audits)); William O. Dwyer & Frank C. Leeming, Critical Review of Behavioral 
Interventions to Preserve the Environment: Research Since 1980, 25 ENV’T & BEHAV. 275, 291–
93 (1993) (earlier survey also finding mixed results, with personal tailoring of information more 
likely to be effective). Feedback to an individual about the impacts of her particular activities 
(for example, feedback about the actual amount of energy used in the past hour or over the past 
day) can have more substantial impacts on individual behavior. Abrahamse et al., supra, at 278–
80; Dwyer & Leeming, supra, at 297–302. For skepticism about the utility of information 
provision in shaping behavior, see E.S. Geller, The Challenge of Increasing Proenvironment 
Behavior, in HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 525, 530 (Robert B. Bechtel & 
Arza Churchman eds., 2003). 
  Individuals may need both information about how adverse environmental 
consequences flow from particular behaviors and also a belief that those who pursue those 
behaviors have responsibility for the consequences of those behaviors. Information about harm 
without responsibility may not lead to changes in behavior. A disconnect between information 
and responsibility might exist, for instance, when individuals believe they have no ability to 
change behavior despite adverse environmental impacts. See Gärling et al., supra note 327. 
 329. For general statements about how law can shape, sustain, or erode norms, see, for 
example, Abrahamse et al., supra note 328, at 274; Babcock, supra note 286, at 145–49; 
Czarnezki, supra note 286; Doremus, supra note 322, at 241; Green, supra note 328, at 118; 
Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 
338 (1997); Vandenbergh, Social Meaning, supra note 286. 
 330. Babcock, supra note 286, at 148 (“A law by itself can influence the social meaning of 
actions and can influence what people think others might do.”); Carlson, supra note 310, at 1263 
(“When jurisdictions impose mandatory recycling laws unaccompanied by real enforcement 
efforts, they may attempt to make noncompliers feel more psychic pain from failing to 
participate by signaling to their citizenry that recycling is important.”); Green, supra note 328, at 
118; McAdams, supra note 329, at 400–07 (describing how law can signal a consensus). 
  The new regulation can also communicate that a particular mandate to do or not do 
something is an appropriate application of an abstract norm that is widely accepted, and that the 
public should comply with the mandate. McAdams, supra note 329, at 407–08. For instance, a 
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to individuals that their socially beneficial actions are more likely to 
be reciprocated by other individuals, and therefore, provide greater 
impetus for the collective pursuit of higher benefits.331 A new 
regulation may also ingrain an anti-cheating norm over time, with 
respect to certain behaviors that “might ultimately engender still 
higher levels of compliance with the law.”332 
Again, general permits can create a transition period during 
which norms can be shaped by the new regulatory standard while 
reducing the transition costs to the public and lessening the possible 
political resistance to the new standard. Over time, as norms shift, the 
permit system can be made stricter—though increased compliance 
might be as much the result of changes in the norms as it is the result 
of the stricter regulatory standards.333 
Indeed, the relatively lean, lower-stakes nature of a general-
permitting system may also make it more likely that members of the 
public will independently adopt a new social norm. The relatively 
mild sanctions or rewards associated with general permits may be 
more effective in the long run in developing environmentally friendly 
behavior because individuals have to partly rely on creating their own 
personal justifications for compliance, rather than simply rely on the 
sanction or reward. In contrast, strong sanctions or rewards might be 
less effective in permanently changing behaviors (especially after the 
sanction or reward is withdrawn).334 
There are other ways in which general permits can make a new 
regulatory standard more effective and more politically sustainable 
over the long run. General permits can involve mitigation fees; unlike 
taxes, it may be more feasible (legally, administratively, and 
politically) to earmark the mitigation fees from a general permit to a 
particular environmental program, such as one that restores harm 
caused by past individual actions. There is research indicating that 
revenues from charges or fees on environmentally harmful behavior 
 
prohibition on littering can be articulated as a particular application of the abstract norm to 
“clean up after yourself.” A legal ban on littering can make this connection clearer for citizens. 
 331. Carlson, supra note 310, at 1263; see also Jakobsson et al., supra note 316 (survey 
finding that drivers would drive less in response to road charges if they believed that others 
would also drive less). 
 332. See Strahilevitz, supra note 323.  
 333. Regulations of individual behavior may be more useful “as a second order measure 
after information and other regulatory instruments have had an influence on beliefs and 
norms.” Vandenbergh, Smokestack to SUV, supra note 286, at 600. 
 334. Geller, supra note 328, at 536–37. 
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may be more acceptable if the revenues are dedicated to addressing 
or remediating the particular environmental harms created by the 
behavior, rather than used for general revenue purposes.335 
CONCLUSION 
Our perspective on the permit power has fit together three 
components. First, we have offered a framework for thinking about 
the scope and design of regulatory permits, showing permitting to 
constitute a far more flexible and contextual regulatory power than 
Professor Epstein’s critique assumed. In particular, the general permit 
model offers what might be considered a compromise between 
Epstein’s preference for judicial injunctions and his feared world 
represented by monolithic regimes of extreme specific permits. 
Second, we identified key policy questions that are likely to inform 
permit design decisions, and applied them to the spectrum of permit 
types from general to specific. Third, we anticipated the kind of 
challenges likely on the horizon of permitting, suggesting that general 
permits may be most useful in handling policy problems arising from 
the massive aggregation of thousands or millions of small harm 
sources. 
From these three analytical sources we now propose a set of 
default rules and exceptions based on a harm-variance continuum. 
The continuum captures the essence of the section 404 general permit 
provision, which conditions that general permits be used only when 
the risk of harm from a defined activity, both in individual instances 
and from the cumulative impact of many instances, is low, and the 
variance expected across instances of the defined activity is low. As 
 
 335. Steg et al., supra note 313, at 97–98; Steg & Schuitema, supra note 327, at 358–59. The 
choice between imposing a simple prohibition (with a permitting exemption) on an 
environmentally harmful activity versus allowing the environmentally harmful activity with a 
charge or tax probably does not make a major difference for political acceptability. Charges and 
taxes are often just as unpopular as sanctions and mandates. See, e.g., Jens Schade & Bernard 
Schlag, Acceptability of Urban Transport Pricing Strategies, 6 TRANSP. RES. PART F 45, 45–46 
(2003) (noting that surveys indicate that road pricing and congestion fees are less popular with 
drivers than regulation restricting parking or driving).  
  Unfortunately, overall there has been only limited research on the effectiveness of 
sanctions and other regulations to change individual behavior in the environmental context. 
Abrahamse et al., supra note 328, at 274; Dwyer & Leeming, supra note 328, at 295–96; Steg & 
Vlek, supra note 313. Much of the research on increasing incentives for environmentally 
friendly individual behavior focuses on providing incentives, rather than on imposing sanctions. 
Abrahamse et al., supra note 328, at 280–81 (finding that incentives often have impacts on 
individual behavior). A weakness of many of these studies is limited long-term follow-up on the 
impacts of incentives. Id. at 282; Dwyer & Leeming, supra note 328, at 295–96, 314.  
RUHL IN PRINTER FINAL - FOR KRISTI (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2014  5:18 PM 
2014] THE PERMIT POWER REVISITED 229 
Table 4 below shows, the strongest case for general permits exists 
when both factors are very low, and the strongest case for specific 
permits exists when both factors are very high. Intermediate models, 
such as the Corps’ PCN mechanism, can be used to respond to 
contexts between the extremes. 
Table 4. The Harm-Variance Continuum Default Rules 
 
 Low Variance
 
High Variance 
Low Risk Profile 
 
General Permits Intermediates 
High Risk Profile 
 
Intermediates Specific Permits 
 
Exceptions to these default rules may be justified, however, 
when any or a combination of conditions identified in Part II are 
present.336 Using specific permits as the default rule, moving toward 
intermediate or general permits would be justified in the following 
cases: 
  1. When using the specific permit model would place undesirably 
disproportionate entry barriers on small businesses and other 
interests deemed worthy of protection; 
  2. When there is no substantial need for new information about 
instances of the activity; 
  3. When tailoring to specific circumstances of different instances 
of the activity is not necessary or practicable; 
  4. When using the specific permit model for the class of activity 
presents political obstacles that could undermine implementation of 
any regulatory response; 
  5. When public participation and other mechanisms for 
constraining agency discretion are either unnecessary or 
impracticable; and 
  6. When using the specific permit model would impose undue 
administrative burdens on the agency or regulated entities. 
 
 336. See supra Part II. 
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Using this permit design framework, a wide range of 
environmental problems plausibly might be better resolved by 
general permits to address the challenges we identify in Part III. For 
instance, as previously described, when confronted by the prospect of 
regulating six million sources of carbon dioxide emissions under the 
Clean Air Act, the EPA’s “tailoring rule” gave millions of smaller 
sources what was in effect a temporary regulatory exemption to avoid 
what the agency described would be an absurd result of strict 
statutory interpretation.337 The Supreme Court agreed that regulating 
six million sources would be “patently unreasonable,” but found that 
the statute was ambiguous regarding the scope of authority and that 
the strict interpretation the EPA was hoping to avoid was instead an 
impermissible interpretation.338 What the Court failed to seriously 
consider, however, was the possibility that regulating the small 
sources through general permits could have fulfilled the intent of the 
statute without leading to an absurd application of the permit power. 
Using general permits might have provided an alternative that, for 
the reasons discussed above, would be superior to an administrative 
exemption from regulation—particularly in terms of collecting 
information and even mitigating fees—while still reducing the 
political and administrative costs of regulating so many individual 
sources.339 The EPA and a number of states did explore a range of 
streamlining alternatives to facilitate future permitting of greenhouse 
gas sources under the Clean Air Act, including general permits,340 but 
the government did not advance that prospect before the Court as 
reason to support the extension of regulatory power over small 
 
 337. See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring 
Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,516–22 (June 3, 2010) (explaining the factual and legal context for 
greenhouse gas emissions regulation under the Clean Air Act).  
 338. See Util. Air Reg. Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014). 
 339. The Clean Air Act explicitly authorizes general permits for its Title V permit program, 
under which all major stationary sources regulated under the Act are supposed to have a single 
permit that articulates all of their regulatory responsibilities under the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7661c(d) 
(2012); Operating Permit Program, 57 Fed. Reg. 32,250, 32,279 (July 21, 1992) (codified at 40 
C.F.R. part 70), and the EPA and state agencies already use general permits for a significant 
amount of compliance with that program, see Thomson Reuters, Operating Permits under the 
Clean Air Act Title V Permit Program, 0070 REGSURVEYS 12 (June 2013).  
 340. See PERMITS, NEW SOURCE REVIEWS AND TOXICS SUBCOMMITTEE, CLEAN AIR ACT 
ADVISORY COMM., AIR PERMITTING STREAMLINING TECHNIQUES AND APPROACHES FOR 
GREENHOUSE GASES (Sept. 14, 2012), available at www.epa.gov/air/caaac/pdfs/ghg-permit-
streamlining-final-report.pdf; Alex Ritchie, Scattered and Dissonant: The Clean Air Act, 
Greenhouse Gases, and Implications for the Oil and Gas Industry, 43 ENVTL. L. 461, 487–88 
(2013) (describing a number of streamlining options). 
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sources of carbon dioxide emissions.341 Apparently, however, that 
would not have helped, as the Court conjectured, without analysis, 
that “none of those techniques would address the more fundamental 
problem of the EPA’s claiming regulatory authority over millions of 
small entities.”342 Yet the fact of the matter is that the permit power in 
its many manifestations already exercises authority over “millions of 
small entities.”343 General permits are a way of balancing the reasons 
for regulating at that scale with the reasons Epstein gave for caution. 
Another example of a specific environmental challenge which 
general permits might help resolve is addressing climate change under 
the ESA. Climate change is already leading to the endangerment and 
extinction of species around the world, including species protected 
under the ESA.344 Climate change raises difficult questions about 
what, if any, should be the regulatory response under the ESA to 
these threats.345 For instance, the listing of the polar bear under the 
ESA could plausibly trigger the regulation of all greenhouse gas 
emissions in the United States by the ESA—raising the major policy 
concerns we have discussed in this Article.346 Although specific 
permits seem clearly infeasible—the FWS is not going to require all 
individual drivers or all gas station owners to apply for permits under 
the ESA to emit greenhouse gases that harm polar bears—general 
permits again might allow the agency to reconcile the strict dictates of 
the ESA with political and administrative realities, and perhaps also 
to reduce or mitigate some of the worst harms climate change has 
inflicted on endangered species. For both of these examples, much 
more specific research is needed to explore the legality and feasibility 
 
 341. See Util. Air Reg. Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 n.7 (2014) (“Nor have we been 
given any information about the ability of other possible ‘streamlining’ techniques alluded to by 
EPA—such as ‘general or ‘electronic’ permitting—to reduce the administrative problems.”). 
Briefs by the EPA and environmental groups did mention streamlining, but only in a general 
way. One amicus brief did discuss general permits in more detail as an option. See Eric Biber & 
J.B. Ruhl, General Permits and the Regulation of Greenhouse Gases, LEGAL PLANET (July 26, 
2014), http://legal-planet.org/2014/07/26/general-permits-and-the-regulation-of-greenhouse-
gases/. 
 342. Util. Air Reg. Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2444 n.7.  
 343. Id. 
 344. See J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act: Building Bridges to the 
No-Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1, 14–26 (2008) (examining the impacts of climate change on 
species protected under the ESA). 
 345. See id. at 26–31 (identifying these challenges). 
 346. Id. at 39–49 (explaining the legal basis for, and administrative difficulty of, applying the 
ESA to greenhouse gas emission sources). 
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of general permits under the statutory scheme and the nature and 
form of how general permits would best work. 
Our focus in Part III was on environmental harms and how they 
will increasingly involve the accumulation of small harms caused by 
numerous individual activities. This Part noted how general permits 
might be important tools in managing this problem. But, as alluded to 
earlier, we do not think this dynamic is unique to environmental law. 
Indeed, we can imagine a range of other areas in which there are 
significant social harms or risks that are the result of widespread 
individual activities. Some of these examples involve increased risks 
caused by otherwise trivial actions. For instance, computer systems in 
large organizations can be vulnerable to malware when individual 
employees do something as simple as open an e-mail attachment or 
visit an infected webpage. Other examples are products of increasing 
interconnectedness in a globalizing world. For example, the global 
financial crisis was triggered by the collapse of the mortgage market 
in the United States, a collapse that was the result of the decisions of 
millions of individuals about mortgages and household finances. 
Although considering how general permits might help address these 
and other kinds of problems is beyond the scope of this project, we 
think that general permits may well be an important part of any 
international or national effort to address them. 
There is another way that general permits might be important to 
the future of the regulatory state: managing the rise of the sharing 
economy. A number of high-profile startup companies such as Uber, 
Lyft, and Airbnb have used the Internet to connect individual sellers 
and buyers of services that historically were provided by large, 
centralized businesses like taxi companies and hotels.347 Ride-sharing 
services such as Uber and Lyft match individual drivers with 
individual passengers who need lifts; Airbnb allows homeowners and 
renters to offer a spare bedroom or an entire unit for rent to visitors 
looking for a place to stay. These start-ups have prompted a wave of 
legal disputes over whether and how they fit into existing regulations 
for taxi companies, hotels, and local land use rules.348 The paperwork 
 
 347. See Zachary Karabell, Requiem for the Middleman: Why are governments so afraid of 
Uber and Airbnb?, SLATE (Apr. 25, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/
the_edgy_optimist/2014/04/airbnb_uber_tesla_why_are_governments_so_rattled_by_their_
business_models.html.  
 348. See Elizabeth A. Harris, The Airbnb Economy in New York: Lucrative but Often 
Illegal, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/05/nyregion/the-airbnb-
economy-in-new-york-lucrative-but-often-unlawful.html; David Streitfeld, Companies Built on 
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and permitting that seem appropriate for a large-scale, centralized 
business focused on taxi services or hospitality are a tremendous 
mismatch with the compliance capabilities of individual drivers, 
homeowners, and renters. On the other hand, a complete exemption 
of ride-sharing or home-sharing activities from regulation seems 
inappropriate because they may have important impacts on the public 
(such as accidents caused by unlicensed ride-share providers), and 
exemptions could turn into loopholes that might be exploited by 
large-scale businesses.349 General permits might therefore be a useful 
model for tailoring the regulation of individuals participating in these 
activities—they would lower the compliance costs while minimizing 
the harm to the public, and would also retain flexibility to ensure that 
large-scale, centralized businesses do not escape regulation.350 
* * * 
We are well past the halcyon days, if they ever existed, when 
common law injunctions effectively managed all the large and small 
harms people occasioned on each other and the environment. To fill 
the breach, the modern administrative state has leaned heavily on the 
permit—the statutorily authorized, judicially reviewable, 
discretionary administrative granting of permission to do that which is 
otherwise prohibited by statute. Permits are everywhere, they are 
here to stay, and they are likely to grow in importance as a delivery 
mechanism for regulation in the modern administrative state. The 
permit power thus is an enormous power—of that there is no dispute. 
But as we have shown, it is an enormously flexible power as well. A 
robust theory of permits is needed to wisely and effectively calibrate 
the permit power to its particular policy challenges, to ensure the 
permit power gets the job done without falling into the traps 
Professor Epstein identified as cause for alarm two decades ago. Our 
hope is that we have begun to build that foundation in this Article, 
and that this foundation will assist us, other legal scholars, and 
 
Sharing Balk When It Comes to Regulators, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/22/business/companies-built-on-sharing-balk-when-it-comes-
to-regulators.html?_r=1. 
 349. The first fatal accident involving a ride-sharing driver occurred in San Francisco. See 
Kale Williams & Kurtis Alexander, Uber Sued Over Girl’s Death in S.F., S.F. CHRON. (Jan. 28, 
2014), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Uber-sued-over-girl-s-death-in-S-F-5178921.php. 
 350. Flexibility may also be important because technological innovation in this area will only 
accelerate, outpacing the ability of legislatures to devise new rules. General permits may allow 
more rapid evolution of the relevant legal standards without unduly discouraging innovation. 
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practitioners in further refinement of the theory and practice of 
regulatory permits in the administrative state. 
 
